

The Media, Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy

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The Media, Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy

By Ambrose Akor

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Abstract

Are foreign policy officials responsive to policy preferences of the mass media and the public in making their decisions? That question has dogged scholars for decades but there has been little agreement among them on what is the true nature of mass media- and public opinion-foreign policy link. In terms of mass media impact, there are two media theories which dominate the debate. First, the CNN Effect theory claims that, by their nature, the mass media have the power to compel policy officials to adopt their policy preferences. Second, the Manufacturing Consent theory counters with the claim that foreign policy is too serious a matter for officials to yield to mass media demands. Scholars are similarly divided on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. Lacking in almost all the known studies is an appreciation that foreign policy emerges out of a process involving policy stages.

These policy stages have different characteristics. In addition to the nature of those stages in themselves, relationships between policy actors - including the mass media, the public and officials - are different in those stages. Officials tend to react differently at each stage of policy when pressured by the mass media and public opinion. Therefore, in this study, I propose that we will have a better understanding of mass media and public opinion influence on foreign policy officials if we study official responsiveness or sensitivity at the stages of the foreign policy process – policy initiation, policy implementation and policy review. I further argue that official responsiveness to mass media and public opinion depends largely on the stage of policy.

For this research, I carried out a case study of Britain's war with Iraq in 2003 to test my theory. Principally, I tried to answer the question: Does foreign policy officials' responsiveness to mass media and public opinion depend on the stage of policy? I found that official response to the mass media and public opinion was not as precise as suggested by the dominant camps in the debate. More importantly, Official response to mass media and public opinion varied in the stages of policy. Specifically, I found that British officials were most responsive to mass media and public opinion at the policy initiation stage, very unresponsive at the implementation stage and even more unresponsive at the policy review stage. As a result of the variations in official responsiveness at the stages, I argue that there is a need to re-evaluate the way we study mass media- and public opinion-foreign policy link. To better understand the impact of the mass media and public opinion on foreign policy, I conclude that we need to examine how policy actors interact at different stages of the foreign policy process.

DECLARATION

I declare that no portion of this work entitled Mass Media, Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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1 Introduction and Literature Review

1.1 An Overview

For several decades, the relationships between the mass media, public opinion and decision making in foreign policy have been major subjects of academic enquiry. In fact, the true nature of the relationships has been intensely contested since the 1950s (Holsti, 1992; Cohen, 1963). A considerable number of scholars believe that the mass media and public opinion have extensive influence on diplomacy and foreign policy because of advances in communication technology and the end of the Cold War (Livingston, 1997; Taylor, 1997; Hoge, 1994). An equally increasing number of academics are of the opinion that foreign policy makers are unaffected, or at best marginally influenced, by mass media and public opinion (Gowing, 1994; Strobel, 1997).

The implications of those theories are enormous. If the mass media and public opinion are as influential as some claim, supposedly powerless government officials are constantly led by the mass media and public opinion in the making and implementation of foreign policy. On the other hand, if the mass

media and public opinion have no impact on policy officials, it would mean that officials are constantly unresponsive to public and mass media demands for changes in the direction of foreign policy.

Neither of the extremes is realistic or helpful in understanding the dynamics of policy making in an ever changing policy environment. As a result, there is a need to refine the debate. For instance, there is now a need to redress the little attention so far given to how the mass media and public opinion try to influence foreign policy making at the various stages of the policy process. We need to know how officials respond to mass media and public opinion at those stages of foreign policy making. The goal of this research is to look at the whole decision making process and to explore an alternative way of examining the interaction between the mass media, public opinion and foreign policy officials at policy stages.

However, in view of often repeated worries over the complex nature of the policy process (Hill, 1997), from the outset I have to create a framework with which to capture the processes involved in decision making. With that framework of policy stages I will find out if foreign policy officials show different degrees of responsiveness or sensitivity to pressure from mass media and public opinion at different stages of policy. My ultimate goal is to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of foreign policy formulation. Examining how policy actors interact at all stages of policy will help determine if and how public opinion and the mass media influence, not just the end product of policy, but the whole foreign policy process, including policy

formulation, implementation and review. My specific interests are to find out *if, how* (Robinson, 2002) and especially *when* the mass media and public opinion best play roles in the stages of the policy process. Are they more influential at a particular stage in the policy process than at another? If they are, the mass media and the public should ideally maximize pressure on officials when they are most responsive.

Additionally, to underscore the need for this study, I will look principally at how the literature examined mass media and public opinion influence on foreign policy. Overall, my initial assessment shows that there are extensive shortcomings in the dominant literature's notion of the nature of the environment for foreign policy making. They also tend to be over-specific by concentrating almost entirely on humanitarian intervention. Finally, they either overrate or overly underplay the capacity of the mass media or the public to influence policy. Therefore, my goal is to highlight how the nature and environment of policy making are reflected in the literature. In particular, I will demonstrate that policy stages have not been given due attention in the literature.

To address the noted deficiencies in the literature, in chapter two I will broaden my review of literature on policy making processes beyond International Relations and Media Studies. An overview of the body of literature in policy studies will underline the need for a more comprehensive approach to studying the process of making foreign policy. Drawing from my analysis of this broadly-based literature, I will map out the framework for

measuring how officials respond to mass media and public opinion at different stages of the foreign policy process. The framework will also set the tone for analyzing how the findings at each stage compare. In chapter three, I will explain the methods I have employed in carrying out my case study research. I will specify the key questions I intend to find answers and explain the rationale for the study. In chapters four, five and six respectively, I will describe the results of my three case studies which are based on official responsiveness to mass media and public opinion at the initiation of Britain's war with Iraq, the implementation and the review of the war policy.

Specifically, in chapter four, I will describe the nature of British public opinion, mass media policy demands, represented in British newspaper editorial comments or leaders and how British officials responded to those positions at the initiation stage of the Iraq policy. Similarly, public and mass media demands and subsequent official response to them at the policy implementation stage are provided in chapter five. In chapter six, I will present the result of my findings of how British officials responded to mass media and public opinion at the policy review stage. Finally in chapter seven, I will conclude by analyzing those results and point out the implications of those findings for the study of how the mass media and public opinion influence foreign policy makers.

After this overview of the study, I will continue in this chapter by critically reviewing how the impact of mass media on foreign policy is characterised in the literature. First, I will look at claims made in the CNN Effect literature and

then examine the Manufacturing Consent literature. I will also review the other body of literature which has more qualified estimates of mass media's impact on foreign policy. Finally, I will examine how the impact of public opinion on foreign policy is represented in the literature. As noted earlier, I found that a majority of known studies overlooked the influence policy stages could have on official responsiveness. Additionally, an overview of the literature will show why it is hard to sustain the claims that the mass media either have foreign policy makers in their grips or conversely that the mass media do not have any noteworthy influence on foreign policy (Matthew Harmon, 1999). The debate should, realistically, be centred on the level of impact (Seib, 1997; Goren, 1980; Reston, 1967), the timing of when impact is most felt, how the impact could be measured and if certain intervening factors are more influential on the foreign policy making process (Chang, 1989; Bennett, 1990; Zaller and Chiu, 1996). Now, I will focus on critically reviewing major studies in the relationships between mass media and foreign policy.

1.2 Key Literature on Mass Media Influence on Foreign Policy

As I already noted, the analysis of mass media impact on foreign policy has always been dichotomized. Since the 1950s, scholars have been divided on whether or not the mass media have direct impact on the process and execution of foreign policy (Bennett and Paletz, 1994). In the past few years, the debate has gathered even more momentum. Many think the international system is 'mass mediated' (Bennett and Paletz, 1994:13) because of the advent of the ever-pervasive new media technologies in the 1990s (Taylor,

1997, Hoge, 1994), coupled with a broad range of foreign policy situations arising in the same period.

Rather than having a broad approach to the subject, two opposing theories which dominate the literature seem to hold fixed positions. For example, the CNN Effect theory strongly claims that the mass media are overwhelmingly influential. On the other hand, advocates of the Manufacturing Consent theory are opposed to the idea of a significant mass media influence on policy officials. The whole debate is centred on who is influencing whom - the executive or the mass media (Hoff, 1999)? I will now exam the literature in those two opposing theories in more detail. I will start with CNN Effect literature.

1.2.1 CNN Effect Theory: Scope and limitations of the Literature

Despite the popularity of the CNN Effect theory, a common definition of the idea is yet to be achieved (Gilboa, 2005). In fact, the most comprehensive definitions of the theory clearly highlight the theory's shortcomings. One of the common claims of advocates of the CNN theory is that "the effects of instant communications and time pressure created by that speed may push policy makers to make decisions without sufficient time to carefully consider options" (Gilboa, Ibid, p28). In a sense, some conclusions of the advocates of the theory are based on the presumption that policy issues in all stages of the foreign policy process demand instantaneous action. But that is hardly the case. As I will illustrate in the next chapters, policies emerge after elaborate

processes. Even in the cases of emergencies, there are usually in place rudimentary aspects of policies guiding where, what degree and the budget for intervention in countries in distress.

Those fundamentals notwithstanding, several descriptions of the CNN theory create the impression of pressured and time limited policy environments.

Those impressions are what emerge in the works of Livingston and Eachus (1995), Neuman (1996), Schorr (1998), Freedman (2000) Feist (2001) and Seib (2002). Neuman (1996, pp15-16) aptly sums up that central theme of the theory of CNN Effect:

CNN Effect "suggests that when CNN (*the mass media*) floods the airwaves with news of a foreign crisis, policy makers have no choice but to redirect their attention to the crisis at hand. It also suggests that crisis coverage evokes an emotional outcry from the public to 'do something' about the latest incident, forcing political leaders to change course or risk unpopularity."

One aspect of this definition suggests that the mass media have the ability to direct official attention to an issue with so much pressure that officials cannot but pay attention. As I will later clarify, this is not the case in reality.

Although it is hardly contestable that the mass media play some agenda setting role, if the mass media's role, however, ends with only directing official attention to an issue, could that constitute considerable impact on foreign policy (Gowing, 1994)? Unfortunately, most claims of the CNN Theory are based on the concept that the mass media have the ability to carry out that initial role of directing official attention in a supposedly chaotic policy setting. As I will argue in more detail later, evaluating mass media influence on policy

at the policy initiation stage is not enough. It is also important to examine how actors behave at every stage leading to the emergence of concrete policies, their execution and review. The more contentious part of Neuman's suggestion is that television, or perhaps the whole mass media, have the power to force public officials to adopt issues as presented in the mass media.

In Daniel Schorr's (1998) article aptly entitled "CNN Effect: Edge-of-seat diplomacy", he alluded to the same claim of a mass media-driven foreign policy. According to Schorr (1998, p11), CNN Effect is "the way breaking news affects foreign policy decisions." The same sense is made in Livingston and Eachus's (1995, p413) definition of CNN Effect "as elite decision makers' loss of policy control to news media." In the same vein, Seib (2002, p27) claimed that the CNN Effect "is presumed to illustrate the dynamic tension that exists between real-time television news and policy making, with the news having the upper hand in terms of influence."

Also, Feist (2001, p713) noted:

"The CNN Effect is a theory that compelling television images, such as images of humanitarian crisis, cause U.S. policy makers to intervene in a situation when such an intervention might otherwise not be in the U.S. national interest."

Feist's definition of the CNN Effect underscored the prevalence of at least one of those limitations of the theory I have already identified. It is that most of the studies done so far were on humanitarian intervention (Robinson, 2002). This is a problem also found with the Manufacturing Consent theory. Perhaps the

choices in case studies were made because, by their nature, humanitarian interventions lend credence to what is manifestly a false idea that every foreign policy calls for some form of urgency. The measure of media impact on humanitarian intervention can hardly picture the wide spectrum of foreign policy issues that the executive deals with.

Although Livingston (2003) noted that officials managed to maintain a measure of control of the direction of foreign policy, he remarked that the environment in which policies were made was in the midst of fundamental change. Livingston (2003, p111) argued:

“Though still formidable, officials are more likely to find their assertions questioned, their premises challenged, and their objectives scrutinized by news media and other organizations now empowered by the Internet, wireless telephony and the information gathering capabilities of space-based satellite systems.”

The question Livingston left unanswered is: how do those questions, challenges and scrutiny by the mass media affect policy outcomes? Also, there is a need to find out if certain environments of policy making compel officials to be more responsive to those questions posed in the mass media. Do the timing of the questions, challenges and scrutiny determine the responses to them?

In another contribution to the debate Livingston (1997) pointed out that many journalists, policy makers and scholars had little doubt that media profoundly affected the foreign policy process. Livingston claimed that there was a general feeling among CNN theorists that once the media intensified their reporting of an issue on a foreign theme, the government was put under

irresistible pressure to act on the subject (Strobel, 1996). The mass media are said to permeate the highest level of the decision making process and, as a result, would elicit some response from the government once they start championing a course (McNulty, 1993).

Robert Kurtz (1991, p76) similarly argued that “media access to technology that was once the exclusive domain of governments has changed the nature of who knows what and when, (thereby) altering the forms of policy debate.” Accepted that the media are getting ever more pervasive, both Kurtz and Livingston fail to prove empirically how that pervasiveness may translate to influence. Both of them put too much emphasis on the importance of the medium of communication over the weight of the message itself. There is even less empirical research to show how that assumed power is brought to bear on policy.

Some have even implied that the new technology of communications has changed the policy environment so much that news media have usurped the traditional function of policymakers. This is a view espoused by George Kennan (1993, pA25): “There is no place for what have traditionally been regarded as the responsible deliberative organs of our government, in both the executive and legislative branches.” As I will soon demonstrate, the idea that officials have lost policy control to the media is clearly an overstatement in the real sense.

Expectedly, CNN Effect theory has a considerable list of critics. Most of those criticisms are made in support of the manufacturing consent theory which I will examine in the next sub-heading. Personally, I share the sentiments of Cohen (1994) who did not dismiss the role of the media but underscored the importance of a better understanding of the mass media impact on foreign policy. Cohen (1994, p9) was unconvinced by the CNN Effects theory's claim on the degree of mass media impact on foreign policy "as well as the persistence of an unjustified and widespread assumption that the news media (have) the power to 'move and shake' governments." I agree even more with Cohen's (1963, p15) earlier argument:

"The impact of the press on foreign policy choices we make is itself, an important dimension of the foreign policy-making process. In a large sense, the press as whole is a vital component in the process, and the more we know about that component, the better we can comprehend the whole web of relationship which comprises our system for making foreign policy."

Overall, the CNN Effect theory gives almost absolute attention to the technology of mass communication. It hardly considers the impact policy processes have on the attitude of policy actors. The theory, as evident in the literature, is mainly based on studies on how foreign policy actors relate when there is a need for humanitarian intervention. In reality, foreign policies cover a wide range of interests or issues. Therefore, there is a need to examine the elements of each foreign policy issue (Livingston, 1997) and the environment in which policies are made. In most cases, the elements of policies and the environment they are made in are markedly different (Livingston, Ibid). As a result, we cannot fully assume that a theory based on humanitarian intervention can help us to understand fully how and when external influences

play roles in foreign policy. It might be more productive to study media impact by using a framework which can apply to a variety of policy issues. My goal is to examine official responsiveness in the context of a framework which is common to all shades of foreign policy. The platform for this study (stages of the policy process) can be applied to all policy types and the results can be applied universally. Having examined the nature and limitations of the CNN Effect theory and literature, I will now turn attention to the Manufacturing Consent theory and the body of literature which draws from it.

1.2.2 Manufacturing Consent: Limitations of Theory and Literature

In terms of the influence of mass media on foreign policy, the goal of the Manufacturing Consent literature is to counter the CNN Effect theory. But advocates of the Manufacturing Consent theory face the same limitations as the CNN Effect theory in how they conceptualise the policy environment and their understanding of how officials respond to other actors in the policy process. Similar to what obtains in CNN theory, the Manufacturing Consent theory does not pay attention to the process of decision making but focuses on officials and how they are equipped to resist pressure. Gilboa (2005, p32) summarizes the manufacturing consent theory or the "propaganda model" as principally arguing that the media are willing tools:

"... The powerful control both the media and the government through economic power, and consequently are able to use the media to mobilize public support for governmental policies."

The theory inexplicably claims that the mass media "serve mainly as a supportive arm of the state and dominant elites, focusing heavily on themes

serviceable to them, and debating and exposing within accepted frames of reference" (Herman, 1993, p25). Although this theme of official dominance runs in all the Manufacturing Consent literature, claims of Manufacturing Consent theorists are wide and varied.

Helpfully, Robinson (2000a) was able to put the claims of the theory in two rough categories: executive and elite versions. According to him, the executive version (for example Chomsky and Herman, 1993; Entman, 1991; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Herman, 1993; Philo and McLaughlin, 1993) promotes the idea that the content of the mass media conforms with the agenda and frame of reference of government officials. On the other hand, Robinson identified the elite version of the manufacturing consent (for example Bennett, 1990; Hallin, 1986) as proposing that mass media coverage conform with the agenda of the politically powerful and the political elite in general.

Clearly, both versions suggest that officials in all political settings would be unresponsive to mass media demands in every stage of the policy making. They also suggest that the mass media are hardly virile enough to make far-reaching demands on officials at any point in the process of policy making. I think that none of those claims can stand a thorough scrutiny. In addition, scholars in both versions tend to use evidences on media coverage of United States foreign policy to validate the theory. Basing these studies almost entirely on United States is another major drawback for the universal

application of the Manufacturing Consent theory. Overall, both versions are united in their criticism of the CNN Effect Theory.

In one of those criticisms, Strobel (1997, p5) claimed that the CNN Effect, as implied by George Kennan, does not exist. He added:

“I found no evidence that the news media themselves, force U.S. government officials to change their policies. But under the right conditions, the news media nonetheless can have powerful effect on process.”

While Kennan (1993) might have been generous in attributing some power to mass media, Strobel tried to underestimate media influence in two ways: first, by claiming that those conditions in which policies are made are set only by policy makers themselves. Second, he implied that the media can only influence process rather than the substance of policy.

Further, Strobel (1997, p5) argued:

“If officials let others dominate the policy debate, if they do not closely monitor the progress and results of their own policies, if they fail to build and maintain popular and congressional support for a course of action, if they step beyond the bonds of their public mandate or fail to anticipate problems, they may suddenly seem driven by the news media and (their) agenda.”

The implication of his argument is that the only situation when there could be an external input into policy was when policy makers failed in their responsibility. Strobel did not recognize that the media sometimes could be proactive and set the agenda. Also, he fails to acknowledge that politicians, sometimes, seek out what the citizens require them to do. It is even more difficult to comprehend Strobel's assumption that officials, who are members

of the reading or viewing publics, would be uniquely immune to mass media messages and opinion polls and remain unresponsive to external pressure throughout the continuum that is the policy process.

On his part, Bennett (Bennett and Paletz, 1994, p14) claimed that the impression of a more intrusive and potentially damaging role of the news media often emanated from officials who have done battles with the media, with the former trying to present, defend, or even hide certain aspects of policy initiatives. Bennett was sceptical of the view that the speed and portability of communications equipment, combined with public fascination for the live events coverage, force officials to make calculations based on daily publicity surrounding their actions. Also, he was in doubt that the mass media could compel officials to produce policies that are “hasty, ill-conceived, damaging to future options or tempered by domestic public opinion rather than long-term state interests.” He proposes: “These kinds of claims need to be examined carefully to see if they have any theoretical standing,” or whether they are merely the emotional reactions of officials seeking an easier time with the press (Bennett and Paletz, Ibid). Despite Bennett's scepticisms, he raised vital questions for CNN theorists.

Bennett's (1990, 1995) indexing hypothesis (also in Bennett and Manheim, 1993) is probably his most outstanding contribution to the debate on the role of the mass media in foreign policy. In summarizing his understanding of the relationship between mass media and government officials Bennett (1990, p106) noted:

"Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to "index" the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic."

The indexing hypothesis goes a long way in claiming that the nature of relationship between journalists and the policy elite remains unchanged despite the political setting, the stage of the policy or the type of mass media and/or officials involved in that relationship.

However, it is remarkable that Bennett has refined his understanding of that relationship by at least acknowledging that, by their nature, some news stories are beyond elite control. Livingston and Bennett (2003, pp364 - 365) argued that in the case of "event-driven news", "coverage of activities ... at least at their initial occurrence, (was) spontaneous and not managed by officials within institutional settings." In terms of what they called "managed and unmanaged news" Livingston and Bennett (Ibid, pp365 - 366) "expect that the ratio of reporter to official cues varies across different news situations." They also claim that "beyond institutional staging, there are other types of stories that seem driven by the impact of spontaneous events."

According to them, "event-driven news is overtaking institutionally based news, at least in the technology-charged environment of cable television international affairs news" (Livingston and Bennett (Ibid, p376). However, they add that they have no reason to suggest that "evolving news management techniques are any less effective in one context or the other." They then suggest that "future research must isolate differences in the nature of official involvement in institutionally initiated stories and event driven news" (p377). In

summary, Livingston and Bennett clearly appreciated the fact that events which instigate policies, the environments in which policies are made and the levels of responsiveness of policy actors are never the same and they are, therefore, not static. Also, they seem to recognize that policy actors tend to be responsive to those evolving changes.

But Strobel (1996, p257) argued that the general opinion among policy leaders was that “these temporary emotional responses will conflict with the more considered judgement of foreign policy officials, forcing them to take action that would soon have to be reversed.” In another instance, though, Strobel (2000) agreed that global real-time television, the Internet and other recent technological advances clearly affected how top policy officials do their job. He addressed the question: Does the news actually change U.S. policy? He answered by claiming that the impact was not nearly as much as some argue.

However, Strobel (Ibid) further argued that the impact might be more pronounced in one narrowly defined area, that is, humanitarian relief policy. He accepted that to a certain extent television images of people suffering from famine, disease or natural disaster is capable of affecting world public opinion and could move the United States and other developed nations to intervene. But like most adherents of the Manufacturing Consent theory, Strobel places all attention on the relations between the mass media and policy makers. No consideration is given to the different environments in which policies emerge. As a result, his study is typically centred on humanitarian intervention and

based on the USA. As I noted earlier, a theory can only be formed if media impact on a wider range of policy issues is tested.

On their part, Lang and Lang (1994) studied how the media impacted on US policy on Iraq before the latter's invasion of Kuwait. They argued that much of the influence was indirect. Although they further noted that the mass media made a major, direct input to the decision-making process:

"Officials in Washington and in embassies throughout the world receive daily press summaries. They pay attention to editorials and to some news columns ... while the State Department has for some years collected information from public polls largely conducted for and by media organisations to keep abreast of public attitudes to foreign policy questions" (Lang and Lang, 1994, p43)

Many would view this opinion as what is expected, yet it is based on anecdotal evidence. There is a need to seek a correlation between the news summaries and columns that officials read, when they read them and the eventual policy.

Clearly, some of the writers have employed very problematic methods to carry out their studies and ended up creating serious doubts in their conclusions.

Take for instance one of the most cited analysts on this subject, Nik Gowing. Gowing (1994, piii) claimed: "Frequently the relationship is not as profound as conventional wisdom assumes. Ministers and officials resist the pressure with an iron will." Gowing (Ibid, p1) also noted that diplomats and officials were amused when he raised the question of media influence on policy. He quoted one as saying that diplomats "are used to working methodically, slowly,

systematically and reflectively.” One worrying footnote on all of Gowing's works is that he carried out a wholly interview-based study.

Aside the criticisms facing Gowing for employing the unreliable and problematic approach of asking officials whether or not they were influenced by media report (Robinson, 2002), he over-simplified what might get into the mix of “methodical”, “slow” and “reflective” policy making. Gowing should have been more prudent to recognize that the impact of the media could be incremental. As I noted on other claims made in the literature, Gowing's assumption that people, either as officials or private citizens, could be immune to mass media effect is difficult to sustain. Additionally, Gowing (1994, p2) could not ensure the reliability of his data merely by urging former political appointees “to be non-partisan in their responses.”

Louw (2005, pp259-260) gave other reasons why the media help the governing elite. First, he stated that the mass media personnel are part of the “interest block in society”, who “literally see the world through similar eyes.” Secondly, he painted a patronizing and, perhaps an unrealistic, picture of a Western mass media system in the grip of public relations and spin. Louw (Ibid) in conclusion, claimed that the mass media have become a conduit-pipe for disinformation and “intentional obfuscation.”

He put forward reasons why he thought the mass media were not well positioned to affect foreign policy. “Most journalists”, he wrote “are ill-equipped

to read foreign contexts and so can easily be led by overseas spin doctors and domestic foreign policy experts.” Thirdly, in restating that the domestic agenda take precedence over foreign affairs, Louw wholly agreed with Fallows (1998) that “overseas contexts generally tend to be reported in ways that (mis)read foreign events through domestic events.” He finally foreclosed any room for independent mass media initiative on foreign policy by noting that, especially in times of crises, journalists are inclined to embrace their government’s definition of events. “Journalists generally do not want to see their own country’s foreign policy fail,” he says.

Similarly, Jonathan Mermin (1997) emphasized the ability of officials to set the news agenda. Mermin clearly overplayed his hand by suggesting that American journalists turn to politicians and government officials for guidance in deciding what constitutes news. After studying United States television networks' coverage of the country’s intervention in Somalia, Mermin (1997, p3) argued:

“If television inspired American intervention in Somalia, it did so under the influence of government actors who made considerable efforts to publicize events in Somalia, interpret them as constituting a crisis, and encourage a US intervention.”

But what happens when a television network independently investigates a foreign crisis that has not sparked much interest in Washington and frames its reports in terms of a cry for help? Mermin argued that in such a case no impact on American policy was apparent. His findings are clearly at variance with what is usually the case in government-media relationship in domestic affairs. The common assumption is that if the mass media persisted in

reporting a subject, they would constitute enough pressure on the government to act, even if to a limited degree.

Furthermore, the presumed manipulative competence of the policy elite over the mass media is not constantly assigned to officials in their conduct of domestic affairs. Cohen (1963:28) rightly identified the situations that a more “neutral” press might be influenced:

“- that is, the more it tries to be faithful to transmit a record of what transpires (including therein the policy statements of officials) and more constrained it feels about judgement concerning the meaning and import of what transpires the more easily it lends itself to the uses of others, and particularly to public officials whom reporters have to regard as primary sources of news merely because of their position in government.”

In essence, the intensity of reporting an event or the slant of the report might not always tell the true policy stand of a mass media organization. Only editorials or leader articles can be that definitive, because those are the forums that the mass media expressly explain their policy preferences. To truly understand those policy stands, it is ideal to use editorial articles to rightly measure their impact.

Some scholars introduce a new dimension to the debate by suggesting that Manufacturing Consent subsists only in certain conditions. For example, Robinson (2001, pp 535 - 538) in his more succinct theory of media influence theorized that in accordance with manufacturing consent theory, when there is elite consensus over an issue, the mass media are unlikely to produce coverage that challenges the consensus. He added conversely that when elite

dissensus exists with respect to an issue, news media coverage reflects the debate. According to him, the extent to which the media can impact on policy depends on the extent to which political elites are united on the issue in question; the extent of controversies within the political elite and finally, the extent to which the executive has a firm policy.

Robinson (2002:31) further argued that if elites are united, the media simply helped them 'manufacture consent' for their policies. The media would have no impact on foreign policy formulation. Secondly, he found that if there were controversies within the elite, the media would reflect those controversies, but in those controversial circumstances if policy makers and the executive were still able to formulate policies, the media should not be credited with influence on policy formulation.

My view is that since journalists themselves are widely seen as part of the elite (Cohen, 1963), policy debate which involves active media participation should be seen as a natural course of the process leading to elite consensus. Policy debate in the mass media should not be seen as only resulting from a failure of elite consensus. Policy debate in the media does not ensue only after elite dissensus. If the policy process is at the formative stage there is likely to be "uncertainty" in the shape of a policy, and if the mass media intervened in that process at this stage, policy makers are evidently inclined to be media sensitive. From the key literatures reviewed so far, it is obviously clear that there is a disagreement on the impact of mass media on officials. In

the next section, I will summarize some of those claims and further examine their authors' understanding of the policy process.

1.2.3 Capturing Mass Media Influence

In view of the apparent disagreements on the role of mass media in the conduct of foreign policy, it is hardly surprising that there is no common understanding of how or if the mass media influence the process. There are varied opinions on the nature or magnitude of mass media influence on foreign policy. For example, Livingston (1997) constructed three conceptually distinct understandings of media effect on the policy process: (1) a policy agenda setting agent, (2), an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals, and (3) an accelerant to policy decision making. He situated those conceptualised effects to stages of a contrived linear policy process: (1) initial policy formulation corresponding with agenda setting, (2) policy implementation corresponding with impediment role and (3) policy implementation stage corresponding with media effect as an accelerant.

Chanan Naveh (2002, p11) also constructed a similar theoretical framework for looking at the role of the media in foreign policy decision-making but noted that the media affect policy by just being part of the environment in which policies are made. He described the complex process in the following simple framework:

“When an external international event occurs, leaders learn about it from the media (the input process, etc), information is processed via the various image components, and the policy or decision-formulating process is set in

motion, media advisers and PR professionals participate in the process, and officials consult with them and consider their advice. When a decision is made, or policy is being formulated (the output phase), leaders take into consideration the media environment (national and international) in the decision itself.”

Although Naveh’s introduction of a framework for looking at the role of the media in foreign policy decision-making is helpful, he failed to look critically and distinctly at media impact at all the stages, with the excuse that it might be difficult to identify each of the stages. Identifying or contriving those stages would be necessary to know at what point decision makers are more responsive to media influence.

Seaver (1998), on her part, took a broader view of how the media affect policy process. Hers was a more pragmatic view than is commonly found in Manufacturing Consent theory. Seaver (1998, p78) noted that in addition to serving as “diplomatic proxies”, the media do affect foreign policy decisions directly when they cover news in conflict zones. She further claimed:

“When reporters set up their satellite dishes in areas of armed conflict and produce vivid, instantaneous images beamed into the living rooms of the American public and policy officials, they compress transmission and policy response time.”

Seaver (Ibid) also re-affirmed the argument that “real time” images associated with armed conflict “often create a demand that something must be done quickly.” Once again, the problem with this analysis is that too much attention is paid to the “end-policy”, when conflict has already ensued. Much of the

work of diplomacy is done before crises ensued and it would be meaningful to evaluate the impact of the media at that point of decision making.

Also, it would be more ideal to focus attention on verifying the degree of impact rather than take an extreme stand on whether or not mass media have impact on policy. Hulme (1996) took this more pragmatic position. He argued that on the surface there seemed to be some possibility of media influence on either the population or the government. He also asserted that influence or pressure on the government could be achieved either directly by affecting policy makers to act as has been advocated in the press or by affecting public opinion which would pressure government to take action.

Analysts who have come to such pragmatic conclusions like Hulme are more likely to be found in the field of mass communications. Such views are rather marginalized in political science and international relations. For Hulme and others like him, the task should be to theorise this concept. Also, there is no doubt that there remains the need to provide evidence of sizable media effect not just on official policy but also on viewers'/readers' thought, feelings and actions (Bryant and Zillmann, 2002).

A majority of the arguments on the relationship between the media and foreign policy tend to ignore some known models of measuring media effects in Mass Communications. As can be seen above, the advocates of the CNN Effect theory do not seem to recognize proved handicaps of the 'bullet' or 'hypodermic' theory (DeFleur, 1970) by suggesting that the mass media could

create an unimpeded impact. Media effect itself has since been proven to be affected by external factors (DeFleur, Ibid). To study mass media impact on foreign policy, McQuail's (2000) model for measuring levels and kinds of media-induced change appears attractive.

He argued that "the media can:

- Cause intended change
- Cause unintended change
- Cause minor change (form or intensity)
- Facilitate change (intended or not)
- Reinforce what exists (no change) and
- Prevent change"

In contrast to the idea of varied degrees of mass media impact, most International Relations studies on the impact of the media on foreign policy seek to find whether or not there is a resultant *groundbreaking* effect at the end of the policy chain. It would be ideal to observe the whole chain of decision making process to note how officials responded or varied their responses. Changes could be minor or groundbreaking as I will soon demonstrate. Before doing that, I will consider how the mass media and public opinion relate with one another and how the impact of public opinion on foreign policy is represented in the literature.

1.3 Media and Public Opinion

To some scholars, advancement in information technology has equally enhanced the role of public opinion in foreign policy. According to Seaver (1998), neglecting the importance of the public dimension of foreign policy has become more difficult with the advent of the new technologies, increase in the

amount of information the public is exposed to and other developments in global politics. These changes have made it possible for the public to wield greater influence in foreign policy decisions, she noted. The claim is surely appealing but it might be ideal to look at the effect of the mass media in terms of the role they can play in focusing public attention on the most important issues.

Stuart Soroka (2003: 27-48) took such a step when he pointedly named mass media contents as the most likely sources of changes in the individual's foreign policy preferences. After examining the relationship between media content, public opinion and foreign policy in the United States and the United Kingdom, he declared:

"On one hand, the mass media are the primary conduit between the public and policy makers. Policy makers follow media reports on public opinion, and the media are the public's chief source of information on what policymakers are doing. In addition, the media are the principal means by which the vast majority of individuals receive information about foreign affairs, an issue of which personal experience is unlikely to provide much useful information."

In the same study Soroka (Ibid) found the mass media and issue salience as vital in the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. He argued that both the mass media and issue salience are keys to understanding how and why attitudes change over time. One handicap was that Soroka did not test if the timing of public opinion or media intervention plays any role in their capacity to influence policy.

On her part, Seaver (1998, pp79 -81) identified four ways the media could impact on foreign policy via public opinion: “First, by telling the public what to think about (agenda-setting effect), the media at least partially establish the foreign policy agenda for decision makers.” She noted that policy makers and real world events determine which foreign policy issues require attention. Second, Seaver argued that the media influence the foreign policy process through providing the criteria by which the public evaluates its leadership (priming). Priming is important because politicians do indeed care about the performance criteria that the media is conveying to the public.

Framing is another way the media could influence foreign policy, according to Seaver. “The angles the media use to convey stories have a significant impact on the US government’s policy responses”. And fourth, she claimed that the global extension of news media organizations enabled leaders of foreign countries and even terrorists to directly influence US public opinion. In that sense the media can create an impact just by setting the agenda for political discussion. For the sake of this study, these claims suggest that the public are capable of focusing attention on a few salient issues.

Also, McCombs and Shaw (1972, pp176-187) argued that the mass media “may well determine the important issues.” They explain:

“In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue but how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its positioning.”

Writing on how the news coverage of the Gulf Crisis affected US public opinion and subsequently legitimized of government action, Iyengar and Simon (1993, p365) similarly identified three types of media effects that prevailed:

"First, the level of network news coverage matched the proportion Gallup poll respondents (by) naming the Gulf crisis as the nation's most important problem (agenda setting). Second, use of data from the 1988, 1990 and 1991 National Electoral studies shows that the weight respondents accorded foreign policy performance of President George Bush significantly increased (priming) after the end of the Gulf war. Third, content data (showing that network news was preoccupied with military affairs and highly events oriented) and survey data are coupled to show that respondents reporting high rates of exposure to television news expressed greater support for a military as opposed to a diplomatic response to the crisis (framing)."

Entman (1993) laid much of the groundwork in framing research but his work has been widely criticised for attempting to construct a single general paradigm of the framing process (McQuail, 2000). Despite all the debate about the complex nature of framing, there are proven occurrences of effects that are more in line with news frames (McQuail, 2000). Clarke (1992) noted that the mass media were seen "more accurately" not much as channels of opinion and information to and from political leaders but increasingly as a policy arena in themselves.

Clarke further noted that the mass media "do not only have ubiquitous effect on the domestic societies on whose behalf external relations are conducted and thereby on the policy processes, but the presentation of policy in the world media is a major instrument of foreign policy in its own right." According to Clarke, most of the earliest literatures on the relationship between the

media and foreign policy (especially British foreign policy), address the way the media have acted as channels of opposition or support for policies, thereby setting the tone for public opinion. However, I am even more interested in finding out if those issues the public consider to be most important attract more acute official responsiveness. I will now examine more closely how scholars have looked at the possible impact of public opinion on foreign policy.

1.4 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Quite a number of scholars do not agree that public opinion could instigate a significant response from policymakers. In fact, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy has been described as unreasoned “passion,” involving “violent movements” “fluctuations,” and “temporary errors or delusion” (Shapiro and Page, 1988, pp211-212). Hamilton and others (1961) claimed that public opinion was an aggregate or collective phenomenon unworthy of response from unrestrained democracy.

Some of these scepticisms date back to Walter Lippmann (1922, 1956) who stridently questioned the judgement of policymakers who took public opinion seriously. What informed these criticisms? Most of the sceptics reasoned that foreign policy was too technical and the general public was not wise enough to make a meaningful contribution to foreign policy debate (Shapiro and Page, 1988). A similar belief is said to be widely held among policymakers. Bernard (1973) found that government officials at the State Department’s Department

of Public Affairs thought that the mass public had little capacity to contribute anything substantial to a dialogue on foreign policy.

Gabriel Almond's (1960) mood theory particularly laid a foundation for doubts on the potential of the mass public to make input to foreign policy during the early Cold War. First, the mood theory contends that attention to or interest in foreign policy is generally low and subject to major fluctuations in times of crises. Almond argued that the mass public's characteristic response to questions of foreign policy was one of indifference.

Further, he claimed that a foreign policy crisis, short of when there is immediate threat of war, could transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism to anger. All those reactions, according to Almond (1960 p 53), were just passing moods. On the basis of the supposedly low, unsteady and superficial public interest, he concluded that the public would not provide stable support to international commitments undertaken by the United States government.

In contrast, William Caspary (1970 p 64), while using the same Gallup poll's data used by Almond, strongly challenged the mood theory. Caspary claimed that on the basis of his findings, the American public was characterized by a *strong and stable* 'permissive mood' toward international involvement. He pointed to the lingering Vietnam War as an evidence of the existence of a permissive mood. In their own answer to any question concerning the volatility

of public preferences about foreign policy, Shapiro and Page (1988 p 213) declared “unequivocally” that “the notion of a capricious public is a myth.”

Theoretically, their argument is a model of how rational individuals form, hold and express their political opinions, “which, across the national population, aggregate into collective public opinion.” They maintained that examination of this collective public opinion, at the aggregate or macro levels was the key to understanding relationships between public opinion and policymaking in the context of democratic theory. Shapiro and Page in the same study argued that many of the familiar deficiencies of individuals’ opinions – weak information bases, lack of structure, instability over time and the like – were overcome in the aggregation process, so that collective opinion was highly stable, well structured and responsive to the best available information.

Another dominant argument in the literature is that the public opinion is a barrier to coherent efforts to promote national interests that transcend the moods and passions of the moment (Holsti, 1987). Shapiro and Page (1988, p 214) also had a strong response to that claim:

“Americans have generally responded rationally to changing circumstances. That is, they have responded in ways they perceive to be in their own interest or in the interest of the nation, based upon common sense, shared values, and common standards of judgements obtained from the media, policymakers and other elites.”

Ole R. Holsti (2004, p6) also explored the role of public opinion on foreign issues and the ability of Americans to make informed decisions on those issues thought to be "far removed from their experiences." Contrary to

widespread opinion, Holsti (Ibid, p21) found that public opinion on foreign policy was in most cases stable and reasonable. Above all he noted that public opinion "is likely to play a more rather than less potent role" in foreign policy. Holsti surveyed the changing perceptions of the effect of public opinion on foreign policy since World War so as to locate how bipartisan foreign policies gave way to political and ideological cleavages. Also, he sought to identify the determinants of public opinion on foreign policy, weighed the impact of generation, education, gender, race, and religion on foreign policy attitudes. Holsti paid a great deal of attention to establishing the nature of public opinion but left much to be done in terms of finding out how public opinion actually impacts on policy.

Also, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro (1992) studied an aggregate of six thousand polling questions used from 1935 to 1982 by five organizations, 1128 of which were similarly worded. They found that public opinion was "remarkably stable and rational when examined collectively." They claimed that the American public opinion did not experience the violet movement claimed by earlier researches (See Seaver, 1998).

Monroe (1998: pp 6-28), on his part, was more concerned with consistency. He tried to find out the extent to which the policy decisions of the U.S. governments were consistent with the preferences of the public. He used results of national surveys to compare public opinion with actual policy outcomes over 500 issues from 1980 through 1993. Policy outcomes, Monroe found out, were consistent with the preferences of public majorities in 55

percent of the cases, representing a decline of 12 percent from the 1960-1979 period. In terms of foreign policy decisions he found that governments were in agreement with the majority of the public in 67 percent of the cases. The degree of official responsiveness to public preferences tended to be among the most consistent in the previous two decades.

Also, writing on the role of public opinion in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies, Risse-Kappen (1991: 479-512) noted:

“Impact of public opinion is determined not so much by the specific issues involved or by the particular pattern of public attitudes as by the domestic structure and the coalition building process among the elite in the respective country.”

He analyzed the public impact on the foreign policy-making process in four liberal democracies with distinct domestic structures. The study done on France, Germany, Japan, and the United States found variations in foreign policy outcomes, although the countries were under the same international conditions and despite similar patterns of public attitudes. The four countries responded differently to Soviet policies during the 1980s despite having similar trends in mass public opinion. Risse-Kappen concluded that “these have to be explained by differences in political institutions, policy networks, and social structures.” This study lends further support to my argument that we cannot rely so much on studies carried out on the United States to explain public opinion impact on British foreign policy.

Furthermore, the need to locate the sources of public opinion has equally sparked the interest of scholars. Philip Powlick (1995) examined what sources of information foreign policy officials actually use to represent public opinion. He found a linkage model which links communication between the public and government following five paths: elites, interest groups, the news media, elected officials and the mass or general public.

Powlick compared the result of his study with earlier studies and found a “significantly diminished use of elite sources to represent public opinion, because of officials’ sense of the ‘lessons’ of Vietnam.” I would be wary of assessing public opinion through the path of interest groups because of their usually fixed interests. Mueller (1969) in explaining the consensus building hypothesis rightly stated: “Members of the opinion-making public are regarded as constituting a public in only the loosest sense of the term. Their orientation is segmented rather than continental.” In that sense, an aggregate of Powlick’s (Ibid) five paths could be the most viable way of identifying public opinion.

In his own work, Paul Burstein (2003) considered the impact of public opinion on public policy and raised a number of questions which included: how much impact does public opinion have? Does the impact increase as the salience of the issues increase? To what extent may the impact of public opinion be negated by interest groups, social movements, political parties and elites? Has responsiveness of governments to public opinion changed over time? And to what extent can it be generalized? He found that the impact of public

opinion was substantial and that salience enhanced the impact of public opinion.

Burstein also concluded that the “impact of public opinion remained “strong even when the activities of political organizations and elites are taken into account.” Responsiveness, Burstein noted, had not significantly changed over time and added that the extent to which the conclusions could be generalized is limited. These questions and the findings are very useful but the article is undermined by its looking at the whole spectrum of public policies as similar. As Livingston (1997) noted, “each operation” or type of issue tend to offer different sensitivities to external influences. On that basis, it would be wise to look at specific policy issues on the foreign policy agenda.

In their own work, Jeff Manza and Fay Lomax Cook (2001) categorized views on the impact of public opinion into three: theories of “large effects” or responsiveness, “small effect” or non-responsiveness, and “contingent” views on impact. The theory of responsiveness rests on the argument that political elites derive benefit from pursuing policies that are (or appear to be) in agreement with popular opinion (Downs, 1957; Geer, 1996; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000).

Conversely, the general theories of non-responsiveness rests on the assumption that politicians can deviate from popular opinion without damaging consequences and that politicians and policy makers may have their own, often strongly held, views which may conflict with public opinion and lead to

non-responsiveness (Wright, 1998; Aldrich, 1995; Cohen, 1997; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000 p.19).

Drawing from the range of arguments, I can conclude that based on the way the impact of public opinion is widely measured, predictions of possible impact of public opinion on foreign policy – in fact all policies – are far from accurate. As Burstein (2003) noted, increasing theoretical sophistication about opinion and policy has not narrowed the predictions. However, the understanding of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy has moved on from when researchers viewed public opinion as minimally influential (Soroka, 2003). More recent studies, especially on U.S. foreign policy, recognized public opinion as a major factor in foreign policy (Hartley and Russett, 1992; Powlick, 1995; Wlezien, 1996; Hill, 1998 and Sobel, 2001).

In a similar vein, the days of portrayal of public opinion as ephemeral and incoherent, characterized by “mood” than by well reasoned opinions (Almond, 1950; Converse, 1964 and Miller, 1967) seem to be over. This is because more recent works claim that public opinion on foreign policy tends to be rational, stable and structured (Caspary, 1970; Mueller, 1973; Graham, 1989; Wittkopf, 1990; and Page and Shapiro, 1992). However, it appears that most scholars of this subject concentrate on the role of public opinion in foreign policy-making process and on how to locate the sources of public opinion. Again, almost all of the studies are based on the United States' foreign policy.

As in the case of the mass media, the *timing* of public opinion in the process of policy making and implementation has only captured the interest of a few scholars. In reference to the media, O'Heffernan (1991: 47) argued that coverage "will rarely lead to a re-assessment of a policy position on an issue already on the agenda." Thomas Graham (1989, 1994), on the other hand, argued that public opinion was influential at all stages of the policy making process, ranging from agenda defining to policy implementation. He added, however, that impact will depend on the level of public support. In summary, there is a broad range of ideas on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy but they are varied in their understanding of that impact. In my examination of the last set of literatures, I will review the claim by some other scholars that the personality of the president or head of government bears very much on the direction of foreign policy.

1.5 President's Belief System as a Factor

Finally, I will briefly examine the argument that foreign policy cannot be debated without considering the orientation, ideology, or what Foyle (1999) called the belief system of the president. In pursuit of his interest in how people influence foreign policy, Foyle studied belief systems of a number of US presidents. From their belief systems he could predict if a particular president would follow, be constrained by, lead or ignore public opinion at five different options: in time beginning with agenda setting, and moving on to defining the situation, generating options, selecting a policy and implementing that policy. Foyle's study falls short in areas similar to other studies already

considered in terms of their location in the United States and lack of awareness of the environment and circumstances outside the person of the president. One idea is to look at the whole policy making framework to find out if there are unique sensibilities to external influences despite the “belief system.”

Parmar (2005) pursued a similar argument in his explanation of how a prime minister's responsiveness to public opinion depended on his personal orientation. On that basis, he tried to explain why British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, backed US President George Bush on major issues. Parmar argued that Mr. Blair's approach to world affairs very much depended on his personal orientation or belief system, a manifestation of his education, religious belief and whole ideology.

He argued that President Bush and Blair were soul brothers because of similarities in their upbringing. Parmar further reasoned that their sharing similar viewpoints definitely impacted on the direction of their decisions. According to him, because Mr Blair had much in common with Mr Bush, he should have been expected to be an unwavering ally of Mr Bush's despite British public opinion. However, to reiterate my argument, despite those personal orientations, policy makers are extremely likely to respond differently at certain points depending on what is happening at different stages of the policy making.

1.6 Summary

How the British mass media and public opinion have affected policies, whether in supporting appeasement in the 1930s, in the Arab-Israeli conflict or on Apartheid in South Africa, have been matters of speculation rather than of empirical research (Clarke, 1992). I have been able to demonstrate in this chapter the need to improve on that record and empirically test the nature of official responsiveness to British mass media and public opinion. This study will add to the well-researched relationship between American officials, the public and the mass media. Also, in this chapter, I have identified the inadequacies of the current ways of examining the relationship between mass media and foreign policy officials on one hand and public opinion and officials on the other hand.

I demonstrated that the CNN Effect theory pays too much attention to the suggested potency of the medium of mass communication and little attention to the content of the mass media message and the nature of changes they demand. The Manufacturing Consent theory, on the other hand, claims that the traditions of foreign policy make no room to mass media and public pressure. Most importantly, I have noted that both theories have paid little attention to the policy making process and how officials and other actors in the process might vary their attitudes at the different stages of the policy process.

In addition, I have considered how the environments under which policies are formulated and implemented are complex. Michael O'Leary (1973, pp121)

says of the environment in which foreign policies are formed and implemented:

“The very complexity of the modern societies, such as Britain, which diplomacy is charged with representing and protecting, coupled with growing complexity of the international system within which diplomacy takes place, all create seemingly irresistible temptations to avoid as much as possible establishing concrete goals for diplomacy.”

If the policy environment is that fluid, it demands that scholars should pay more detailed attention to how the mass media, the public and foreign policy officials behave in that environment.

As can be observed in the literature considered, most of the studies so far done in this area are concentrated on United States foreign policy. As Risse-Kappen (1999) found out, national peculiarities are major determinants of how external factors impact on policy. There is a need to test how the British mass media and public opinion affect foreign policy. My primary interest is to find out if mass media and public opinion are more influential on policy at any particular stage of policy (Dorman and Livingston, 1994; Jacobsen, 2000; Robinson, 2002).

I have also note that in the past, analysis of how the mass media have covered wars concentrated on the actual combat period (Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer, 2004). My goal here is to examine all the stages of policy. My analysis will go beyond how the media reported or how the public responded to the policy at the conclusion of policy, as found in previous studies. I intend to do this by verifying British officials' responsiveness in three stages of Britain's second war with Iraq. The study will cover how British officials

responded to external pressures (from the media and public opinion) before, during and after the main combat stage in Iraq. This will lead to an understanding of the role stages of policy actually play on how officials respond to mass media and public opinion.

In my own assessment, advances in communication technologies, norms of foreign policy making and personal characteristics of presidents might, to some degree, influence how officials respond to external pressures. But I argue that the nature of the policy environment, specifically, the stage of the policy, would be the most important determinant of how foreign policy officials respond to mass media and public demands. As I noted earlier in this chapter, overlooking the policy process when examining how policy actors relate in the course of foreign policy will create a serious handicap to the understanding of foreign policy making. In chapter two, I will examine the importance scholars in other fields place on the policy process to understand the relationship between policy actors. Based on that broader understanding of the role of the policy process in policy making, I will build a theoretical framework to test the impact of the stages of policy on official responsiveness in terms of foreign policy.

2 Theoretical Framework and Justification of Study

2.1 Overview

It has become a usual expectation in every democracy for citizens' opinions to play a part in the shaping of political outcomes (Baum and Potter, 2008). But as I noted in chapter one, scholars have seriously disputed whether or not citizens' opinions play similar roles in the formation of foreign policy. Also in chapter one, I pointed out that the most commonly used approaches of analyzing the public's impact on the foreign policy process have not helped in resolving the controversy. Notwithstanding the scale of the controversy, attention to one dominant question persists: Are foreign policy officials responsive to mass media and public policy preferences when making foreign policy decisions?

Although I noted in chapter one that many scholars have tried to find out whether or not policy officials are responsive and to whom they are responsive to, I pointed out that there was a lack of recognition of policy processes in the International Relations literature. For example, many International Relations scholars (especially advocates of the manufacturing consent theory) measure public impact only at the implementation stage of policy. Some, on the other hand, focus attention on the initiation stage and disregard the interaction of policy actors at other stages of policy. I also

highlighted the need to address more specific problems arising from the fact that foreign policy emerges out of a process made up of a number of stages. As a result of the noted lack of attention to policy processes in the International Relations literature, I will examine in this chapter how scholars outside of International Relations evaluate mass media and public impact on the policy process. My hope is that after examining policy processes in the broad sense, I will be able to reflect better on how actors engage each other during foreign policy making.

However, my main task in this chapter is to examine theories that underpin my research. Principally, they include democratic theory, theories of the effects of public opinion (large and small effects) and theories of responsiveness. In considering theories of responsiveness, I will focus attention on the application of the theory on a global scale or on specific issues. I will also examine the importance of issue salience in the context of official responsiveness to public opinion. Equally, theories of media-power relations will be examined. Most importantly, I will review theories of stages of responsiveness and stages of the policy process. I will draw from those theories to support my argument that policy stages should be the points of analysis of official responsiveness in foreign policy. Furthermore, I will introduce my own stages of policy process as a framework which I will use to analyze the stages or processes leading up to Britain's decision to invade Iraq, the implementation of the war itself and the policy review or evaluation stage.

Finally, I will seek to justify my study of the degree of responsiveness of British government to mass media and public opinion in foreign policy. A major part of this chapter is used to highlight the theoretical bases for examining the degree of responsiveness at different stages of a policy. However, before I look at the theoretical arguments for measuring responsiveness at policy stages, I will start by introducing those broad theoretical arguments that this study is based on. As already noted, I will start with the democratic theory which, in a broad sense, forms the main foundation of my study.

2.2 Democratic Theory: Foundation of Responsiveness

The whole idea of official responsiveness is dependent on democratic theory. In a nutshell, the theory presupposes that the public is influential in the making of policy. According to Jack L. Walker (1966), it is the understanding of democratic theorists that by extending general participation in decision-making, the citizen's awareness of his moral and social responsibilities reduces the danger of tyranny, and improves the quality of government. "Public officials, acting as agents of the public at large, Walker (Ibid, p285) reported, "would then carry out the broad policies decided upon by majority vote in popular assemblies."

Hughes (1978) further outlined how the influence was exerted. He noted that the public elected officials with the assistance of public-based interest groups

and parties, through the mechanisms of election and, more importantly, exert post-election influence on elected officials through interest groups and the parties. According to him, it is by interacting with institutions of the policy process and the public that it is ensured that the concerns of the classical democratic policy are addressed. With such a diversity of sources of influence, it is ensured that power does not remain in the hands of a few officials.

In proposing that officials are responsive to mass media and the public's foreign policy preferences, I have been guided by the same theory that an elected class would ideally be responsive to the electorate. It is clearly desirable to have some degree of official responsiveness in all policy spheres but the whole idea of a democratic theory has not gone unchallenged. For example, Walker (Ibid, p285) criticized the theory as unrealistic: "Public policy is not the expression of common good as conceived of by the citizenry after widespread discussion and compromise." He argued that this description of policy-making was held to be "dangerously naïve because it overlooks the role of demagogic leadership, mass psychology, group coercion and the influence of those who control concentrated economic power."

Hughes acknowledged that there was a general uneasiness with the theory's portrayal of the way in which policy is actually made. Such inadequacies have prompted attempts to revise the classical democratic theory. One major variation is the elitist theory of democracy. The elitist theory presumes that the average citizen is inadequately equipped, so the democratic systems would

rely on the wisdom and direction of their political leaders and not the population at large (Walker, 1966). Elitist theorists argue that “agreement on democratic values among the ‘intervening structure of elites’ is the bulwark against a breakdown in constitutionalism” (Walker, 1966, p287).

In the context of the study of mass media influence on foreign policy, the CNN Effect theory tends to be in support of the democratic theory, while the Manufacturing Consent theory is supportive of the elitist theory. Similar to my argument on both CNN Effect and Manufacturing Consent theories, most recent studies show that the democratic theory and the elitist theory are not representative of the true process of policy making. For example, John Zaller (1994) claimed that the dismissal of the role of public opinion in the policy process is unhelpful and unsupported. After studying the interplay between the US political leadership, public opinion and the media in the first Gulf War, Zaller concluded that many exaggerated reports of the demise of the elite-mass opinion interaction in the process of policy making.

Zaller (1994, pp.271-272) continued:

“...the democratic interplay between leaders and followers was alive and well in the Gulf Crisis. Politicians of both parties were, as past studies have shown, active agents in shaping public opinion, but they took care to lead toward goals the public would ultimately approve; or in the case of congressional Democrats, to avoid leading toward goals the public would not approve. In both cases, the threat of electoral retribution gave pause to the wielders of power.”

With the evidence of domestic influence on foreign policy still contested, it is necessary to find out if and to what extent these non-elite forces affect power. It is just as vital to find out when, in the policy process, they are most influential on policy. In subsequent subsections I will argue that there is a more profound role of domestic influence in the policy process. I will now focus attention on what really illustrates officials' sensitivity to public opinion - policy responsiveness.

2.3 Policy Responsiveness: Bedrock of Democracy

Unlike the trend in International Relations, there is little doubt among scholars of policy studies that citizens' ability to influence public policy is the bedrock of democratic governance (Gilens, 2005). The degree to which the public are influential is the main concern of policy studies. The principle is that public opinion matters in the conduct of the democratic process. To emphasize, democratic governance assumes that the views and preferences of the citizens should inform the choices of policy makers (Manza and Cook, 2002). According to Wlezien and Soroka (2007), public opinion can affect policy outcomes perhaps through changing preferences or through shifts in voting public.

Although I will draw enormously from these ranges of arguments in support of official responsiveness, I do not intend to propose that every public or mass media preferences must lead to official response or that it would always determine public policy. In fact, it has been difficult for the democratic process

to attain to the position of an ideal representative of the citizens (Curtin, 2006). Burstein (2003) argued that even dedicated proponents of democratic theory acknowledge that democratic governments sometimes ignore the public. On the other hand, Gilens (2005, pp. 778 – 779) aptly stated:

“While few would expect or even desire a perfect correspondence between majority preferences and government policy, the nature of the connection between what citizens want and what government does is a central consideration in evaluating the quality of democratic governance.”

After considering the different arguments, the more realistic question before scholars of all shades of opinion should actually be: what is the degree of responsiveness of officials to public or mass media preferences? Determining the degree of responsiveness or the relationship between public preferences and public policy should be a major concern of democratic theory. Related to that question, Soroka and Wlezien (2008, pp1-29) sought to emphasize the importance of the “responsive rule”, that is, the correspondence between citizens’ preferences and government’s actions. They found that policymakers were attentive to public preferences and that the public was aware of and reactive to policy change at least in certain domains. A study of mass media preferences and opinion-policy links are fundamental to our understanding of how and if British democracy works, especially in the process of foreign policy.

For structural convenience I have adopted a modified version of Manza and Cook’s (2002) approach of looking at the responsiveness theories under key subdivisions. The subdivisions are the theories of responsiveness suggesting large effects and small effects. These categorizations of effects are important

to me because I strongly believe that all degrees of impact in the policy process should be noted. I will start by examining the large effects theories.

2.3.1 Large Effects Theories

For emphasis, measuring the impact of the public, pressure groups, and institutions on policymakers has often been controversial. There have also been mixed evaluations of the extent of responsiveness of governments to preferences of the citizens. For example, Manza and Cook (2002, p. 633) explained the reason given for very high official sensitivity to preferences of the citizens:

“The view that politicians, state managers, or the political system as a whole are responsive to public opinion ultimately rests on some version of the argument that political elites derive benefit from pursuing policies that are in accord with the wishes of citizens.”

Politicians' electoral advantage is one of the key reasons considered to be the motivation for a high degree of responsiveness to public opinion. According to Manza and Cook (Ibid), this assumption in American political and journalistic circles, has highlighted the importance of poll and similar sources of information in influencing the behaviour of politicians.

Further, Manza and Cook (2002, p. 633) noted that officials perceive that it is in their own electoral interest to minimize the distance between their own positions and that of the public as they periodically have to face election or re-election. According to them, there are "both prospective and retrospective causal mechanisms" that "have been advanced to account for the dynamic of politicians' responsiveness to their constituents' views." The principle is that

those mechanisms will compel officials to be more sensitive to their constituents' opinions.

To some, confidence in official responsiveness to public opinion rests on early empirical work linking policy to public opinion. The first of a series of studies in this area was Miller and Stokes' (1963) "Constituency Influence in Congress." After bringing together surveys, roll call and voting behaviour of members of United States congress and comparing them with the public preferences of their constituencies, Miller and Stokes came to the conclusion that the members of congress were guided in part by the preferences of their constituents. The series of studies, referred to as dyadic representation, mainly claim that representation is to be found in the relationship between individual congressmen and their individual constituencies (Wlezien and Soroka, 2007).

Wlezien and Soroka (Ibid) point to another body of studies - collective representation - which examines the relationship between aggregated public opinion and system-level policy outcomes. Representation is viewed as a systemic property which should not be located in the behaviour of individuals but in the overall structure of the policy-making process. Wlezien and Soroka further reasoned that concordance between individual legislators' actions and constituency preferences is thus helpful but not sufficient condition for policy representation. That notwithstanding, those earlier studies found that those members of congress were responsive to the preferences of their

constituents. Those findings formed the foundations of the large effects theory.

In summary, the dyadic approach offers one way that public opinion influences policy, which is that constituents shape the policy activities of the elected officials. Even if that assumption is true, it is vital to measure the degree to which the elected officials or policy makers in general are responsive to the preferences of the public. At least one other question arises: how much of the public preferences were instigated by forces such as the media and the policy makers themselves? There are strong suggestions that the flow of influence is not one-way (Bandura, 2001; Quaille, 1998; Curran, 1991; Ball-Rokeach and De-Fleur, 1976). The dyadic approach fails to consider the possibility that elected officials can influence the attitudes of their constituents (Hill and Hurley, 1999; Hill and Hinton-Anderson, 1995; Manza and Cook, 2002). Another problem stems from the fact that the dyadic studies are based on constituency level or state level issues whereas it is the national government that makes policy decisions which citizens are most informed (Converse, 1990).

The empirical evidence provided on local issues cannot always serve as evidence of the degree of responsiveness of the national government. State governments are seen to be more responsive to public opinion than the federal government. Tyler Schario and David Konisky (2008), in a survey, found that a majority of those polled perceived the local government as the most responsive, followed by the state, while the federal government is seen

as hardly responsive. With the level of disagreement on the degree of influence at the federal level, it is, therefore, important to keep measuring the level of responsiveness of officials and in different policy scenarios. My next step is to examine claims that the public have a little effect on officials.

2.3.2 Examining Small Effects Theories

Despite the noted suggestions of a prevalence of responsive governments in known democracies, there are increasing objections to the idea that all politicians consider responding to public opinion as a virtue. In fact, a sizeable number of politicians and scholars see responsiveness to public opinion as a way of pandering when they need to be seen to be resolute (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). One example is Arianna Huffington's (2000 pp. 73, 77) criticism of a "poll-driven leadership" who run campaigns that are dominated by pollsters and consultants. She argued that "today's new poll-happy politician has replaced the old fashioned leader – one unafraid to make difficult, unpopular decisions."

Sceptics of large effects range from those who do not see how the views of the public can be organised in a coherent manner to those who believe that the public are easily manipulated by the power elite (Manza and Cook, 2002). Overall, they reason that it is close to impossible to find a link between policy and the preferences of the public. Manza and Cook (Ibid) also acknowledged a growing argument which claims that there is a broad autonomy of elected officials and bureaucrats from the mass public. They explain that models of

non-responsiveness are based on the assumption that politicians can deviate from the preferences of the mass public without any repercussion. According to Manza and Cook (Ibid), political parties, interest groups, activists and articulate actors exert more influence on politicians:

“Politicians may prefer to please activists – who provide sources of money and voluntary labour – over general voter who may be viewed as routinely voting for one party or the other and can largely be taken for granted.”
(2001 p18)

Responsiveness in this case, would have to be to policy preferences of the more dependable sources of electoral votes and/or elements deemed to be influential on public voting behaviour.

Additionally, non-responsiveness could result from politicians and policy makers having their own entrenched policy preferences which may have conflicted with the popular policy choices. It is suggested that this factor is a major cause of non-responsiveness (Cohen, 1997; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Manza and Cook, 2001). Studies show that politicians seek to avoid a direct clash with public opinion, so they only adopt their preferred choices when they do not fear a backlash from the electorate (Manza and Cook, 2001).

While decrying “strategic shirking” to pursue policy goals favoured by themselves and their partisan and interest group supporters, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000, p xviii) argued that changes in political and institutional conditions since the 1970s have elevated the importance attached to policy goals above that of majority opinion; “only the threat of imminent elections produces a temporary rise in responsiveness to public opinion.”

They further pointed to the trend of non-responsiveness:

“What we see today in contemporary American politics, however, far exceeds responsible leadership in representative democracy. What concerns us are indications of declining responsiveness to public opinion and the growing list of policies on which politicians of both major political parties ignore public opinion and supply no explicit justification for it. The American government is drifting from the norms of democratic responsiveness.” (2000, p xviii)

The second key assumption of those who claim that there is limited official responsiveness to public preferences is that public opinion on key issues is not well formed or consistent and could not possibly have influence on policy (Saris and Sniderman, 2004). As a consequence, it is presumed that members of the public are prone to be manipulated by the power elite. Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) acknowledge that the sheer complexity and scope of government decisions require elite initiative at times to serve as a source of public guidance.

I think that no responsible government will take delight in its citizens' ignorance of the direction of its policy. Governments are known to have embarked on elaborate 'kite flying' so as to get the public informed and to get debates going before a policy decision is made. The idea of flying policy kites would be meaningless if the public is thought to be entirely ignorant. However, some scholars persist that on a number of occasions the power elite may need to defy “ill-informed and unreasoned public opinion in defence of larger considerations” (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, p xvii).

From both the large and small effects theories, we can deduce that there could be varying degrees of responsiveness. Each level of effect results from the prevailing circumstances surrounding the policy. In terms of this study, it is very important to recognize that public and mass media impact on policy and politicians can vary owing to those prevailing circumstances. Therefore, it is necessary to find out if the British government was responsive to public and mass media policy preferences in the course of its war with Iraq. Drawing from these theories of responsiveness, it is equally vital to find out to what degree the British government was responsive or insensitive to the public opinion and the mass media in the process of its policy on Iraq. It is not enough to apply the results of studies in the United States on Britain. As I noted previously there are doubts on how findings of the US government's responsiveness can be applied universally. I will now focus attention on theoretical discussions on global and issue specific application of responsiveness.

2.3.3 Global Application and Issue Specific Policy Domain Theories

There is a need to test the degrees of responsiveness across nations and issues because official sensitivity might be found to be at varying degrees in different territories and even in different issue settings. For example, Soroka and Wlezien's (2008) comparative research on the dynamics of spending preferences and budgetary policy in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, provided a clear indication that opinion-policy connections vary across both policy functions and countries. They suggested that a wider

application of the line of research could provide valuable insights into how representation varies across political systems and issue areas.

One underlining implication of their finding is that changing the personnel in the democratic or bureaucratic structure may not necessarily alter the degree of responsiveness of a nation's government. This is because inbuilt mechanisms that shape policies are more important than a mere change in personnel. Soroka and Wlezien (2008, p 2) came to a similar conclusion:

“Differences in representation (and public responsiveness) across countries may be linked to a variety of institutional factors, such as the level of federalism, the relative power of the executive and the legislature and party competition itself.”

When Britain is compared with the United States, politics differs in many ways and these differences have a major impact on the nature and degrees of responsiveness. According to Soroka and Wlezien (Ibid), the separation of powers in a particular level of government matters quite a lot.

Indeed, several studies similarly suggested that parliamentary democracies may be less responsive to public opinion (Jennings, 1959; Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Tsebelis, 2002). Those studies suggested that cabinet governments exercise substantial discretion. Tsebelis (2002) contrasted the cabinet system with the presidential system and noted that the executive in the cabinet system was the proposer of laws and policies. Secondly, he noted that the legislature in the parliamentary system had only a limited check on the actions of the executive in a cabinet system.

How do those factors affect the responsiveness of the British government, a system in which the executive controls the legislative process? Soroka and Wlezien (2008) found in their comparative study that despite the British public's very pronounced sensitivity to spending in different domains, the British policy makers remained only selectively responsive to public preferences. They concluded that perhaps due to different institutions, policy processes or political culture, the public's reactions to policy and policymakers' responses to preferences vary across countries and indeed across policy domains in a country.

They, however, observed that spending, itself, followed changes in preferences in all the countries studied. Democracy works, Soroka and Wlezien declared, and added that there were, nevertheless, important differences in the details. They reported that across policy domains, responsiveness tended to be greater in certain domains, especially defence, welfare and health. The study further found that responsiveness was most pervasive and specific in the UK, less so in the United States and mostly very general in Canada.

Despite pervasive and deep public sensitivity, Soroka and Wlezien found that British policymakers' responsiveness to public preferences was apparent only in the defence domain. In Canada, policymakers' responsiveness was mixed: specific in the defence and welfare domain and not evident at all in other domains. The study found that in the United States, which practices a presidential system, there was a high level of policy responsiveness to public

preferences. In the UK and Canada, two countries with parliamentary systems, they observed lower overall levels of policy responsiveness. While policymakers in these countries were reported to be responsive to public preferences, officials, especially in Britain, exercised substantial discretion (Soroka and Wlezien, 2008).

It is instructive here that policy responsiveness differs across countries and we should not impose results of responsiveness on other countries and assume that democracy works there equally - to the same degree. It is also worthy to note that British policymakers show an appreciable degree of responsiveness in the defence spending domain, a policy area that many may consider to be removed from the immediate attention of the mass public.

Similarly, foreign policy is a policy domain that appears to be beyond the immediate attention of the general public. Therefore, in terms of foreign policy, we have to be wiser in view of Soroka and Wlezien's finding that governments are similarly responsive in related policy domains. As a result of this empirical evidence in defence spending, I hope to find evidence of official responsiveness to the British public's foreign policy preferences at some stages of the Iraq policy, contrary to what is claimed to be the case in other countries.

In summary, it is clear that initial studies in responsiveness concentrated on a multi-issue approach by examining in one empirical study how government

responded to multiple issues at the same time. As noted above, governments respond differently to public preferences, depending on the policy domain in question. There is, therefore, a justification to examine closely the nature of British government's responsiveness to foreign policy as a specific policy domain. I will now focus on whether or not the importance the public accorded an issue has an influence on responsiveness.

2.4 Issue Salience and Impact on Government Responsiveness

One theory that is widely accepted is that issue salience is the key to democratic responsiveness (Burstein, 2003). The assumption is that people care about issues that are important to them and on those bases evaluate candidates. People are likely to pay more attention to how politicians handle those issues that are very important to them (Ferejohn and Kuklinski, 1990). Politicians on the other hand are thought to pay more attention to those issues considered to be of most importance to the electorate for their own electoral interest. Hill and Hurley (1999) argued that it was clearly in the politicians' interest to pay attention to those issues the public considers salient.

Wlezien and Soroka (2007), on their part, claimed that there were many different and clear expressions of this conception of importance. They reasoned:

"In issue domains that are not important, people are not likely to pay attention to politicians' behaviour, and politicians are, by implication expected to pay less attention to public opinion in these areas" (p 807).

Overall, there is a growing consensus on the impact of salience on responsiveness in a number of other ways. For example, it is also commonly agreed that as salience increases, politicians are expected to be more responsive (Burstein, 2003; Jones, 1994; Soroka, 2003). Equally, it is thought that to the extent which salience varies over time, the relationship between policy and public opinion may vary. It is still not known, though, if salience varies significantly over time (Wlezien and Soroka, 2007).

In terms of this study, I am wondering if issue salience varies as policy stages change. Additionally, are officials more or less responsive as issue salience changes across policy stages? These are some of the questions I will raise later, in the course of verifying the influence of public opinion. Therefore, it is vital to find out the conditions under which the public is more or less attuned to foreign policy. One of the three approaches employed by Knecht and Weatherford (2006) was to trace public attentiveness over successive stages of policy decision making process.

So far, I have given more attention to the degree public opinion could impact on policy and what conditions officials would be more responsive to public opinion. In the next section, I will turn attention to theories of state-media relations. Also, my aim is to consider how they can be applied in policy stages.

2.5 State-Media Relations Theory and Policy Stages

At the level of domestic politics, it is often taken as a given that the mass media play a central role in politics (Choi and James, 2006). It is easily assumed that the media have a defined role as the fourth estate of the realm, charged, in the context of checks and balances, to have some measure of oversight over government and policymakers. As I noted in chapter one, that role is not as clear-cut in international politics. A wide range of assumptions and much of the literature on state-media relations conclude that the media are always very dependent on and even subservient to the state (Aday and Livingston, 2008). The mass media are seen, in the light of the latter argument, as mere tools in the hand of the power elite. Aday and Livingston (2008, p100) suggest that the news routines and journalistic beat system encourage reporters to be overly dependent on officials. They added:

“Media are, in this view, too often passive and weak because they rely too heavily on government sources to establish the contours of acceptable debate and controversy in the news”.

Powlick and Katz (1998, p 29) defined the subservient role of the media as a channel that policymakers use to stir up latent public opinion:

“To activate the public, foreign policy issues must receive major media coverage in terms that are compatible with public frames of reference. Such media coverage is usually generated by elite debate. Typically, the media present positions articulated by government.”

Turning their attention to conceptualizing the power and independence of the media, Aday and Livingston (2008, p103) suggested that while "policy

networks were robust and active," media were often "supine and passive."

They insisted:

"Networks generate new information, whereas media serve mostly as mouthpieces for governments' rehearsed platitudes. Transnational advocacy networks are powerful and transformative in their abilities to raise and shape political discourse, even when it is at odd with statist discourse, whereas media only mirror statist discourse".

The idea of a wholly passive mass media is hardly tenable. It suggests that at no time during the policy process can the mass media form a policy preference or prompt the government to respond to media- or public-generated policy preferences. This theoretical debate is a key motivation for this study.

Robert Entman (2004) added a new dimension to that debate. He not only argued that the mass media are more independent of government, he claimed that over time, the mass media have become more influential. The mass media, according to him are freer to "range out beyond the narrow array of official voices that, in indexing, dominate the news." After observing US media coverage of the Kosovo, Haiti and Balkan crises, Entman declared that the mass media emphasised cost and risks of US involvement and were no longer fearful of accusation of being unpatriotic and disloyal. He declared:

"The indexing model might have predicted at least a more equal contest between the administration and its critics. New here was the media, freed of Cold War constraints, themselves chose sources and composed and activated a counterframe, one that seemed to swamp the administration's line." (pp 98 – 99)

Clearly, the mass media, more than any other set of actors, assume a mostly self-imposed zealotry role as change agents. Operators in the mass media

and many scholars assume that the mass media can influence policy. As far as I know, the impact of the mass media on officials at all stages of foreign policy has not yet been tested. What is well documented is the media's role in the agenda setting stage of policy. The common refrain is that the media have a capacity to shape the general public's policy priorities, and this, it is assumed, results from the mass media's ability to view certain issues as more important. (Roberts and Bachen, 1981) Cook and others (1983) defined agenda setting as the process by which problems became salient as political issues meriting attention.

According to O'Heffernan (1991, p. 97), the mass media's role in the foreign policy process is more complex. According to him, policy makers – "Insiders" – see the media as dual actors. The media are seen as affecting the policy overtly and covertly both *inside* as players or a tool of insiders, and *outside* as part of the environment shaping policy. In the Insider Model, the mass media are said to affect official and institutional actors in five main ways or through five mechanisms: (1) Informing the policy process; (2) defining the acceptable performance; (3) effecting policy makers' attention to goals; (4) constraining the use of other outputs and (5) setting the pace of policy making (O'Heffernan, 1991, p. 98).

What is more pertinent is O'Heffernan's observation that these functions are not performed at all times and every stage of the policy process. According to him, foreign policy officials perceive the mass media as providing information at the earliest stage of policy development, "with most attention paid to the

Adoption of Policy stage and the least in the Solution Formation stage.”

Significantly, O’Heffernan observed that policy officials “also perceive that this information not only affects their cognitive perception, but is often translated into U.S. foreign policy outputs” (O’Heffernan, 1991, p.98). Although this might be a true account of the relationship between the media and policy officials, these are only but “functions”, some of them self-assigned by the media. In terms of my study, what is important is how officials respond to the media carrying out those functions. It is vital to know *when*, in the policy process, officials are more responsive to the policy preferences of the media and by extension how the media are successful in carrying out those noted roles. After evaluating theoretical arguments on the potentials public opinion and mass media have to influence officials, it will be important to exam theories of the stages responsiveness and of policy process to explain why they are viable ways of studying official responsiveness in foreign policy. How will the policy stages model help explain government's responsiveness? That is what I will exam next.

2.6 Stages of Responsiveness

The stages model has been employed many times in public policy analysis as an attempt to develop a scientific way of understanding a complex policy process (Sabatier, 1999). Principally, I have employed the policy stages model because I recognize the complexity of the foreign policy process. Even at the domestic level of policy, there has been increased recognition that

“policy processes are complex (and are) influenced by a variety of external factors which are hard to control” (Hill, 1997, p2).

My stages framework will be partly modelled after the work of Paul Schumaker (1975), who focused attention on how the same factors operating in the policy environment impact on policy across the stages of the policy process. Schumaker argued that, when put under protest-group demands, there were five stages of policy responsiveness to which policy makers had to face. He also formulated the types of actions which political actors must take in order to be considered responsive. Schumaker further explained the extent to which leaders would be ready to listen to the protest group.

He defined the first stage as *access responsiveness*. This stage of response results when authorities or legislators are willing to listen to the demands of the citizens. If citizens' policy demands are added into the political agenda, the response at this stage in the process is called *agenda responsiveness*. This is the stage during which citizens, social actors, and others could be invited to testify at parliamentary committee hearings. Usually, lawmakers are happy to demonstrate how the public's input is integrated into a proposed bill or legislative agenda. According to Schumaker (Ibid), if the proposal or issue on the agenda is passed into law, a third type of responsiveness, *policy responsiveness*, is attained.

At the policy responsive stage, Schumaker tried to measure the level of closeness between the proposal made by the protest group and the eventual

shape of official policy. If measures are taken to ensure that the legislation is fully enforced, a fourth type of responsiveness, *output responsive*, is said to have been attained. A fifth type of responsiveness, *impact responsiveness*, is attained when the implementation of the legislation actually assuages effectively the demands of the citizens.

Schumaker's model of responsiveness, with these verifiable landmarks in the policy process, can be adopted in studying policy change in diverse areas, which includes foreign policy. At the domestic level, a growing number of public policy scholars have echoed Schumaker in paying attention to the various stages in the policy process.

Chief among those who have drawn from his study are Burstein and others (1995) who built on the five stages and added a sixth stage, *structural responsiveness*. According to them, this stage evolves when the political system is changed such that more opportunities are opened for citizens to make further demands. Most vital of all, scholars of domestic policies, as demonstrated here, have seen the need to gauge how the very nature of each stage of the policy process "may condition" the effects of various factors in the policy environment (Soule and King, 2006).

2.7 Stages of Policy: Theoretical Approaches

Understandably, policymaking is a very complex process which brings into play hundreds to thousands of actors drawn from interest groups, journalists and governmental institutions. These different groups have diverse goals, varied understandings of the policy situation and policy preferences (Sabatier, 1999). Owing to the noted complexity, policy analysts, even more so foreign policy analysts, need to devise a way of understanding that process. Before that clarification is made, analysts need to make assumptions about which of the policy actors and relationships between those actors are critical. There is also a need to draw up models to understand at what points in that process that the actors/relationships are most or least relevant (Anderson, 1975).

One of the most influential frameworks for understanding and analyzing *public* policy is the Stages of Policy Process. Although Sabatier (1991, p147) argued that the “stages heuristic” was not a causal theory, he, like other policy scholars, agreed that the stages of policy process was useful in clarifying what happened within the complex process through which policies evolved.

Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, p2) acknowledged that “the stages of policy heuristics has provided a useful conceptual disaggregation of the complex and varied policy process into manageable segments.” Schlager and Blomquist (1996), while emphasising the usefulness of the stages of policy process, remarked that a worthwhile political theory of the policy process should explain activity at each stage. They reviewed other frameworks for policy analysis and noted that most of these other theories tried to move

explanations of the policy process beyond a policy stage, or a single actor but fall short of explaining the whole process.

Schlager and Blomquist (1996, p669) eventually came to the conclusion “that there is much to be gained by considering the policy process as a whole.” The model is based on the assumption that a policy is more than one decision (Jenkins, 1993). Anderson (1993), argued in the same direction, and noted that “policy making typically involves a pattern of action extending over time and involving many decisions.” Also, it is claimed that the policy stages model or knowledge of the policy process has improved the quality of governance by improving the quality and timing of information rendered to government (Lasswell, 1971).

Despite several criticisms, the idea that policy follows a sequential order has been, for several decades, a popular characterization of public decision making (John, 1998). Harold Lasswell (1951,1971), one of the first scholars to articulate the concept, focused particular attention on the policy process or what he considered to be the functional stages or phases that a given government policy would go through during its life. He tried to draw a “conceptual map that provides a guide to obtaining a generalistic image of the major phases of any collective act” (Lasswell, 1971, p28).

The model proposes that a policy begins as a phase of policy initiation (at what point the policy is modified by different forms of negotiations by different

actors), then it is carried into practice (implementation) (John, 1998) or terminated and then evaluated or reviewed (Brewer, 1974). John (1998, p23) also noted that the “linear account of decision making puts into concrete form the idea that the political system processes inputs and creates output.” He added that within this process, “policy is derived from the interactions of public opinion, interests, elites and ideas which are then filtered and structured by the institutions that guide the measure through the political system.” Because each of these stages does have a distinctive characteristic and process of their own (Deleon, 1999), the degree and manner of interaction of these actors within the different stages of the process becomes very important.

Despite the presumed impact of the model, scholars of foreign policy hardly employ the policy stages model. That trend has no doubt resulted from the well-reported conceptual division between foreign policy and other aspects of domestic policy (Ingram and Fiederlein, 1988). As part of that dichotomy, ideas and frameworks used by scholars of public and foreign policy have remained separate despite the increasing interdependence of international and domestic affairs (Hanreider, 1970; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Ingram and Fiederlein, 1988). A detailed examination of the policy stages model and also the limitation of the strategies employed by international relations scholars will no doubt prove that there is a need to employ public policy strategies in examining the behaviour of officials in the process of a foreign policy.

For example, studies failing to recognize this nature of the policy process are limited in the insight they can bring to an understanding of the linkage

between mass media, public opinion and the foreign policy makers. By implication, evaluating the responsiveness of foreign policy makers to mass media and public opinion only at the stage of policy implementation will obscure the fact that other factors, including mass media and public opinion, also matter at the stages of policy initiation and review.

According to Burstein and Linton (2002, p.400), it is partially useful to measure the impact of these actors by focusing on “the final and most visible, stage of the policy process.” As noted before, this trend “shows us little about the role of other factors in the process and what factors affect the stages that lead up to a final decision about a policy” (Soule and King, 2006, p. 1872). I will examine the policy stages model in two main ways: the legislative and bureaucratic policy processes. Although in each of the settings, officials respond differently at successive stages of policy, the processes have obvious differences. For instance, the stages of a legislative policy making process are more clearly defined than in the bureaucratic setting. The modes of consultation and the identity of actors in the legislative process are more clearly defined than in the bureaucratic setting.

2.7.1 Stages of Processing Legislative Policies

An examination of the legislative process is probably the best way to explain why studying policy responsiveness at policy stages is an absolute necessity (Burstein et al, 1995; Schumaker, 1975). In this section, I will illustrate by using the findings of a couple of studies to explain the impact of policy stages on how officials respond to public pressure. A good example is Soule and

King's (2006, p 1872 - 1873) comprehensive study of how social movements influenced three stages of policy development leading to the ratification of Equal Rights Amendment in the United States. One of the cornerstones of their study was an understanding that the final passage of a bill was not the entire story. Their method was to start the study of policy change from the pre-policy period to the initial introduction of the bill, through to the eventual passing or rejection of the bill.

Soule and King drew from a previous study by King, Cornwall and Dahlin (2005), which was instructively called a theory of legislative logic, and concluded that there were important theoretical factors which explain why policy change operated differently across the various stages of the policy process. That earlier study found that each succeeding stage in the legislative process had increasingly stringent rules and became more consequential.

According to King and others (2005, p. 1211), this logic or force of stringency and consequence unevenly distributes the influence of social movements across the legislative process. They concluded:

“Social movements should have less influence at later stages where stringent requirements are more likely to exhaust limited resources and where the consequentiality action will cause the legislators to revoke their support.”

On applying the study to the domestic environment, more specifically to a policy on woman suffrage, it was found that legislators responded to suffragists by bringing the issue of woman suffrage to the legislative forum,

but once the suffrage reached the voting stage, difference in social movement tactics did not have great impact. King and others (2005) most importantly noted that scholars of political change “characteristically see policy adoption as a single discrete outcome. In reality, policy change takes place over a sequence of stages.” I want to restate that this tendency on the part of scholars to look at policy as one outcome is even more prevalent in the study of foreign policy.

In summary, two main features of the policy process were identified in the both studies. First, rules of the debate over policies were considered to become more stringent as the stages of policy changed. Second, policy became more consequential as the policy stages changed. Soule and King (2006) particularly argued that it was necessary to consider how the increasing stringent rules and the increasing consequentiality of legislative actions structure the effects of social movements, public opinion and other components on policy change. Their main claim was that the effects of these factors would differ in critical ways over the stages of the policy process because of the increasing stringent rules and increased consequences of policy action.

King and others (2005), on their part, used the random effects sequential logic models to access the effects of independent variables on succeeding stages of legislation. In line with the theory of legislative logic, they contended that variations of rule stringency and consequentiality distributed the influence of social movements and other social organizations in the policy-making

process. They argued that social movements were more influential at earlier, less consequential stages of the policy process, than at the later, more consequential stages. For, example, they noted that social movements may be more successful at raising the salience of an issue and getting a bill introduced than getting the bill passed. In their words: “This differential level of influence is due to the fragmented nature of the legislative process and the corresponding logic at each stage” (King et al, 2005, p. 1213).

King and others (2005) also argued that political outsiders’ accessibility to the policy-making process was likely limited due to the fragmentation of the legislative process. The political process, according to them, contained many “veto points” and distinctive stages with differing levels of political access. In their view, the fragmentation of the legislative process hampered political access at certain points in the process because of the distribution of the impact of mobilization and the creating of multiple moments within which legislators made decision.

Finally, Soule and King (2006, p1877) gave prominence to the importance of understanding the unique character of each stage of the policy process, especially “with respect to legislator perception of the costs and potential consequences of action.” They continued by way of illustration:

“Introducing a bill is fairly easy and the consequences of such an action are fairly minimal in that the broader public may not even be aware that a bill has been introduced... However, as a bill gets closer and closer to becoming law, the rules become more and more strict, necessitating higher and higher levels of legislative support.”

Their assumption was that individual legislators might be less inclined to back controversial bills at later stages "because doing so can cost re-election" (Soule and King, Ibid). They equally reported that as a bill moves closer and closer to becoming law, members of the public become more aware of the proposal, the debate would become more intensified and that would affect the intentions of individual parliamentarians regarding the bill. Soule and King (2006) emphasised that the increasing stringency of rules and increasing consequentiality of legislative action across stages of the policy process "critically structures" not only the effect of pressure groups as King et al (2005) found earlier, but also affected the structure of political opportunity and public opinion on policy change.

If these factors can influence policy change, it is critical to begin to understand how the character of the policy process may condition these effects. So, just as it is important to know how these factors interact or relate with one another, it is equally vital that we know how their effects vary with the increasing stringency and consequentiality of the legislative process. In other words, there is a need to know how the effects vary depending on the stage of policy. Next, I will consider how stages of policy could be influential in more bureaucratic settings.

2.7.2 Stages of Bureaucratic Policies

So far, I have been able to identify a number of studies that used identifiable markers to highlight stages of policy in the policy-making process. For

example, we have seen Schumaker's five-stage model. There is also Soule and King's issue-based three-stage approach which simply identified stages as the introduction of a bill, the passage of the bill by the first house and the final ratification of the bill by the second house. Equally mentioned was Burstein and others' improvement on Schumaker's model with a sixth stage. Stages of policy in the bureaucratic policy process are not as well defined.

Because stages of bureaucratic policies are not as clearly marked, there is a debate on whether the policy process in such a setting is a continuum rather than a process with definable stages. As a result, there are stronger views on whether or not policy makers in bureaucratic settings are responsive to mass media and public opinion. The controversy notwithstanding, due attention should be given to the process of policy if how policy actors influence the policy content are to be well captured. Focusing on outputs alone, according to Jenkins (1993, p45), results in a "partial and incomplete view of the dynamics and totality of public policy."

To address this problem, the policy process was conceptualised by Harold Lasswell (1956) and others. For example, Jenkins (1993, p35), claimed that the model "assumes that policy emerges via a logical path." A policy issue, he noted, passes through the political system in a "processual way from point of entry, through decision and implementation, until a final choice is made to proceed with or terminate a course of action."

Much insight would be lost, if, as found in most studies on the process of foreign policy making, little or no attention is given to the stages of this process. Similar insight would be lost if the dynamics of the political environment in which policies are made are not considered. As a result of the limited insight, many foreign policy scholars have suggested that factors or actors outside policy circles do not have impact on foreign policy output (for example Gowing, 1994; Strobel, 1997). As I noted earlier, this theory is helpful if we are to fully understand the process of making foreign policies.

Thankfully, the systems model of the policy process illuminates the complexities of the policy process and maps a route for explaining those complexities. For example, advocates of the stages of policy process differentiate between the (1) point of policy demand, which includes the stage at which there is demand within and outside the policy circles; (2) point of policy decisions; (3) policy output and (4) policy impacts, including intended and unintended outcomes (Jenkins, 1993). It is not entirely easy to make such a differentiation in the stages of policy but mapping the process helps to understand the ingredients of policy-making. Commenting on the merits of the model, Hill (1997) noted that apart from providing a way of conceptualising complex political phenomena, the approach conveniently differentiates the policy process into a number of stages that are easier for analysis. Despite its limitations, the stage of policy model is still very popular among many scholars.

John (1998) pointed out that the aim of the stages models was to simplify the vast array of decisions and forms of behaviour that characterize public decision-making. He argued: "Because the policy process is complex and apparently chaotic, there is need to impose some conceptual order to comprehend it" (John, 1998, p. 22). In the same vein, he noted that policy emerges from interrelationships between intentions and actions of political participants: politicians elected to carry out policy reforms and bureaucrats who order (senior bureaucrats) and carry out policy decisions (lower-level officials).

John (Ibid) also argued that one of the main reasons why policy analysts look at policy stages was to distinguish policy goals and eventual outputs so as to determine when policies fail or succeed. He added that it was also an opportunity to determine how influential certain groups were through the policy process and how much of their policies found a place on the public agenda.

However, Paul Sabatier (1991, p 145) noted that while the model of stages of policy helped to divide the policy process "into manageable units of analysis," attention had centred on a single stage of policy (implementation stage) and not much attention given to what happened in other stages.

Aside the debate on stages of policy, scholars have also wondered whether policies follow a sequential order. Some are of the belief that the interaction between policy actors and the nature of policy actions are fluid and occur in no structured order. Nakamura and others (1987) were of the view that the

real world process of policy did not fit the sequence of stages as proposed. On the other hand, a growing number of analysts (Jones, 1970; Anderson, 1975; Kingdon, 1984; Peters, 1986) argue that the policy process is phased and, therefore, there is an opportunity of studying how each phase in the process reacts to input from the media and public opinion.

John (1998) claimed that policy begins as a phase of policy initiation and formulation, and went through modification as a result of negotiation and legislation and finally ended in the implementation phase. To illustrate, he provided an example of a policy that was made sequentially. John cited the Clean Air Act in the UK in 1956, which, for instance, originated from the growing public awareness of urban air-pollution in the 1950s. According to John, the acute event of a large fog in London caused strong public concern.

As a result of an effective lobbying campaign, regulations were introduced to control the smoke. John further argued that in this instance, there was a clear start, middle and end to the policy process which proceeded through the stages of democratic demands, the rational weighing up of objective, bargaining between interest groups and then the implementation of the measure. Although I am interested in the broad aspects of the debate, finding the role of individual factors at each stage of policy forms the core of my inquiry. Before I draw my theoretical conclusions on the cases made for stages of policy process, I will examine how other scholars tried to capture policy stages.

2.8 Attempts at Capturing Policy Stages

Although he was criticized for adopting a neat, logical order of the policy process, Easton's (1953) framework of policy stages informed many other mappings of the policy process. His model commenced with the initiation of demand, through conversion stage to the point of policy output. Easton's framework, for example, informed Jenkins's (1978, p17) more elaborate policy stages. The latter's stages model included: initiation, information, consideration, decision, implementation, evaluation, and termination.

Another scholar, John Kingdon (1995), examined what got into the first stage of policy, the agenda-setting stage, and noted that there was usually a policy agenda, or the list of problems and issues that get into the list. According to Kingdon, that vital stage attracted the attention of not only the policy makers but also that of the electorate. He added that all actors paid serious attention to what got into that list. Kingdon noted that at that stage of policy, three processes were involved in the drawing up of the policy agenda: problems (persuading officials to pay attention), proposals (form of generating, debating issues) and politics (factors that affect policy). What can be deduced from Kingdon's analysis is that although the policy process is more of a continuum, each stage of policy has its own complexities and elements. The foregoing reasons further underscore the need to examine each stage of policy in order to determine how policies evolve within them.

On their part, Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993) pointed to the limitations of applying a step-by-step approach to studying the policy process and claimed that it was risky. They acknowledged, though, that it was a popular method in recent years to separate (domestic) policy making into its component steps and analyze each in turn. They insisted that there was no “deliberate, orderly steps” that accurately portrayed how policy processes actually work. Further, they illustrated that the steps of implementation and agenda building, for instance, collapsed into each other. Without a doubt, some of these limitations can be acknowledged but they do not remove the practical benefits of examining the stages of a policy.

There is no doubt that war policies, for example, assume structured forms that are near as orderly and sequential as possible. In the case of a decision to go to war, there is usually an initiation of policy, implementation of the policy and a review. Those three policy stages are viable steps for me to study the impact of public opinion and the media on British policy on Iraq. Later, I will explain how I will use the three stages as the bases for evaluation.

2.9 My Theoretical Assumptions

So far, I have been able to clarify that the politics of each policy varies according to the stage of the policy process and that the policy process can be broken into stages which can be investigated. Drawing from the series of theories I have reviewed, I, therefore, theorize that even in the making of foreign policy, policy makers respond differently to pressures at different

stages of policy. Additionally, I expect the mass media and public opinion to have different magnitudes of influence at different stages of the policy process. I also draw on the theories to argue that policy stages are viable avenues to carry out an analysis of the foreign policy process.

I will further propose that British foreign policy makers will respond differently at stages leading up to, during the war and at the review of the Iraq policy. I expect that officials will be more responsive at the policy initiation stage than at the review stage and even less responsive at the policy implementation stage. Consequently, in the course of this study I will focus attention on how the nature of British policy on Iraq changed through the stages of the process. While I aim to note the content of policies at each stage, my main goal is to identify how officials responded to public and mass media pressure and how they changed the nature of the Iraq policy at each stage of the process. My main assumption is that at the points of agenda setting or policy initiation, information gathering or consideration, policy-makers will be more receptive to external pressure than, for instance, at the stages of policy implementation and evaluation.

Finally, I note that while the stages of policy model may not be perfect, a framework based on the model is a viable way of effectively studying the foreign policy process. The complex nature of foreign policy calls for such a framework for a better understanding of how policy actors interact during the

process. In the next section, I will conceptualize and explain my framework for analysis of my findings.

2.10 Stages of Policy Process: Conceptualization and a Framework for Analysis

From the foregoing discussion of theoretical models, it is clear that policy officials are sensitive to the reactions of the public whenever they are making policy decisions. Also, it is very apparent that a government that persists in making unpopular foreign policy decisions will be punished by the electorate. If an insensitive government faced the threat of being voted out of office, its foreign and domestic policies would be undermined (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). It is equally apparent from the theoretical models I have examined that the politics of every policy issue are different in each stage of the policy process (Ingram and Fiederlein, 1988).

I also found that each stage of the policy process is marked by different rules of practice and modes of interaction among policy actors (King and others, 2005). This is because different stages of policy are marked by distinctive characteristics. Official response to pressures mounted by groups outside policy cycles in those different stages are expected to result in different consequences (Soule and King, 2006). On those bases, applying the stages of policy model would lead to a better understanding of the role of policy actors in the making of foreign policy. However, I recognize that foreign policy can be a more difficult policy domain to study. The complexity of the foreign

policy process makes the stages of policy model even more desirable for studying how officials responded to public opinion and mass media in the making of foreign policy.

This model is similar to the theory of legislative logic adopted first by King, Cornwall and Dahlin (2005, pp1211-1234), and Soule and King's (2006) study of the process leading to the winning of women suffrage and equal rights in the United States. The similarities are more in the structure. They are less alike in content and expected result at each stage of policy. We have commonality in the desire to address the often overlooked stages of responsiveness as Burstein and others (1995) advocated. In the stages of policy process model, the implementation stage of a policy, which is usually the most recognisable of all the stages of policy, is not portrayed as the only step in the policy process. It is only one step in the process. That stage is preceded by a period of policy initiation and succeeded by a stage of policy review.

Further, I conceptualize that the foreign policy process is made up of three principal stages: policy initiation, policy implementation and policy review. At each policy stage I ask the questions: Are policy officials responsive to mass media and public policy preferences? To what degree are officials responsive at this stage? To make the picture clearer, I have to distinguish the three stages of policy. Although the three stages are interrelated as parts of a process, they are analytically distinct stages of the process (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006).

Stage 1: Policy Initiation: An ideal, rational, decision making process demands that at this stage, officials will embark on information gathering prior to embarking on the policy. At this stage in the process, officials will identify all options available to them and consider them in detail. That process would also involve their assessing the consequences of their chosen options (Hogwood and Gunn, 1986); they define the stakes involved in the policy (Foyle, 1999). It is equally at this stage of the process that the government would develop its choices and deploy responsible staff and build alliances. Policy development, in this case, involves the ordering of policies in terms of procedure (Hogwood and Gunn, 1986, Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). Ultimately, the decision to embark on this policy is arrived at this stage. As can be seen at this stage of policy, options are just being formed and official policy is uncertain (Robinson, 2002). So, officials, if rational, would be more responsive to policy preference advanced by the media and the public. Also at this point in the policy process, public attention on the policy issue would be highest. On the part of the media, the aggregate media attention would not be highest at this point but I predict that editorials seeking to shape the direction of policy will be highest at this stage of policy.

Stage 2: Implementation: This is the stage in the process when tactics and strategies that evolved in the policy initiation stage are put to work. Officials are more focused on the strategic goal rather than on tinkering with the policy. Other policy actors will tend to rally around the government at this stage, especially when the nation is at war (Baum, 2003). The aggregate quantity of

media coverage of the policy might be highest at this point but editorials demanding strategic policy changes would be less in number and the stridency of demands be whittled down at this stage.

Intensity of pressure on officials to make strategic changes will drop with public and mass media interest in strategic policy details becoming less an issue. The salience or importance of foreign policy issues to the public and the media is highest at this stage. But will issue salience be the key determinant of official responsiveness (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006)? How will officials respond to an increased public attention at this stage of policy? Officials are predicted to be cool to policy preferences of the public and the mass media at this stage. At this stage, there is increased public and mass media attention but because of psychological reasons, namely national interest, there will be decreased cases of the mass media and the public advocating policies outside official policy goals.

Stage 3: Review: If policy-making is to be conceived as an ongoing dialogue between policy actors, the next natural step is to assess the success and cost effectiveness of the policy options initiated and implemented in the process (Van Der Knaap, 1995). At the policy review stage, officials gauge whether to continue, modify, or abandon a policy (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). In an ideal policy setting, the ultimate goal of the review stage is to provide a feedback needed to improve the policy (Sanderson, 2000). In the words of Sanderson (Ibid, p.438), "within this rational model, then, evaluation (or review) fulfils an essentially 'instrumental' function in answering the question:

how effective are the chosen means in achieving the specified ends?” In the foreign policy setting that I am studying – and this may also be the case in most public policy settings - policy review is expected to be initiated and dominated by government officials (Sanderson, 2000). This top-down orientation of policy review is expected to be repeated in this study. Henkel (2000) argued that policy review was promoted by government as a contribution to the control of the periphery by the centre. I predict that this is the stage when the public and the mass media are least engaged in the foreign policy process. Owing to this lack of attentiveness, the government will pay little or no attention to public or mass media policy proposals. To fully understand how the government would respond, it is important that I map out how to measure official response to public and mass media demands at each stage of policy. I will use the next section to map out how to measure official responsiveness.

2.11 Mapping Degrees of Responsiveness

The next step is for me to map out clearly the degrees of responsiveness or the degrees of changes in foreign policy projected to occur at each stage of policy. These projected changes in British foreign policy are built on Charles F. Hermann's (1990, pp5-6) four graduated levels of change. The first and least consequential changes fall into what Hermann called *Adjustment Changes*. These are changes that occur in the level of effort (lesser or greater) put into a cause. It also includes changes to the scope of recipients or targets of a policy. Adjustment changes do not alter the goal that has been

set, or how it is carried out. The purposes for which the policy action was planned remain intact.

The second levels of changes are the *Programme Changes*. At this level of change, there are modifications in the methods or means of attaining the goal. According to Hermann, changes of this type involve the employing of new instruments of statecraft. An example of this level of change is a state's recourse to use diplomatic negotiation rather than outright use of military force to attain a goal. Programme Changes equally involve modification of what is done and how it is done. The ultimate goal of the policy, at this level of change, remains intact. Thirdly, there could be *Problem or Goal Changes* in policy. This category of changes sees a replacement of the policy goal. The purposes of the policy are changed at this level. The fourth level of changes, *International Orientation Changes*, is the most far-reaching form of change in foreign policy. As the name suggests, the state's entire orientation in international affairs is changed. At this level of policy change, a state's role and activities in world affairs are fundamentally changed. According to Hermann (1990), more than a single policy is changed when there are international orientation changes.

What are the implications of the framework of graduated changes in policy to the stages of policy process model? As already pointed out, the stages of policy process model proposes that the degree of responsiveness to public opinion or the mass media or degree of policy change would depend on the

stage of foreign policy. My next step is to describe the kinds of changes that I expect to occur at each policy stage. I will start with the policy initiation stage.

When the government is developing its policy options, at least the first three grades of policy changes are highly possible. There could be adjustment changes, programme changes and problem/goal changes. Information gathered at this stage of policy could also contribute to the most far-reaching change, international orientation changes. Because of increasing stringency of rules of policy change at the policy implementation stage, there is little likelihood that there would be programme or goal changes at this stage. As noted earlier, policy implementation stage has been the focus of most policy analysts. For most of the analysts, the types of changes they expect to see to acknowledge official responsiveness are problem and goal changes. It is difficult to find those levels of changes at the implementation stage. Therefore, the tendency would be for the policy analysts to report that foreign policy officials do not respond to public opinion or mass media policy preferences.

In terms of the expected conduct of officials, my expectation is that at the initial stage of policy, officials would be willing to listen to public demands. Opinion leaders might also be granted legislative hearing. It is also expected of officials to place the agenda in the public domain either directly or by deliberately leaking them to evaluate public response to the policy. Except in extreme cases, the policy initiation stage is more relaxed and takes longer. The considerably open environment characterizing policy introduction is an

ideal situation for policy makers to accede to their constituents' and the mass media's demands.

James E. Anderson (2005) shed more light on the environment of the policy formation stage and identified influencing factors that dominate the minds of public officials at this stage of policy. Such influences, according to him, include their personal values, political party affiliation, constituency interests, public opinion and deference to the opinion of other people. On political party affiliation, he noted that at the policy formation stage, party loyalty was a significant criterion for most parliamentarians. But even more influential was the interest of the constituency of policy makers or lawmakers. With those influential factors bearing on the minds of policy makers at the policy initiation stage, the content of policy at this stage is fluid (Anderson, 2005). Drawing from this analysis of the characteristics of the policy initiation stage, I can theorise that officials would be most responsive to public opinion and mass media demands at the policy formation stage.

I also theorise that policy makers would be least responsive at the policy implementation stage. The policy making circle would become more impregnable as the rules of the process become more stringent and the consequences of action and/or inaction become more significant (Soule and King, 2006). As Jacobs and Shapiro (2000, p xviii) noted, there is greater fear of accusation of pandering if there is any indication of responsiveness to external pressure at this stage of policy. Jacobs and Shapiro (Ibid) also argued that possible commitments to other nations at this stage of policy

would lead to a less responsive government to internal pressure for change of policy. I propose that the same would be the case with British officials at the policy implementation stage.

From the theoretical arguments so far considered, I have drawn up a policy stages model which will serve as a framework for testing official responsiveness to British public opinion and media preferences on Britain's Iraq policy. This model is largely drawn from the theoretical arguments which suggest that officials have a tendency to respond to public opinion and media preferences (Manza and Cook, 2002). It also relies on the argument that policies evolve in discernable stages (Sabatier, 1991; John, 1998) and that officials respond differently at each stage of policy (Soule and King, 2006; Knecht and Weatherford, 2006; Hermann, 1990). I have summarized my expectations of public, mass media attitudes and expected policy changes in Table 2:1 below.

| <i>Policy Stage</i> | <i>Expected Official Attitude</i> | <i>Expected Public Attitude</i> | <i>Expected Mass Media Attitude</i> | <i>Expected Grade of Policy Change</i> |
|---------------------|--|--|---|---|
| Initiation | Open | Engaged, Advocacy mood | Engaged, Advocacy mood | Adjustment, Programme, Problem/Goal changes, may lead to orientation changes |
| Implementation | Closed/ Focused on policy execution | Aware but guarded (mindful of national interest) | Very aware but guarded (mindful of national interest) | (Nuanced) Adjustment changes, Possibly programme changes |
| Review/Evaluation | Guarded | Non-attentive, Indifference | Nominally engaged | Officially instigated Adjustment changes, contributing to orientation changes |

Table 2: 1 Stages of Policy Process Model

2.12 My Research Questions and Hypotheses

I have been able to explain some of the features of the stages of the policy process and why mass media and public opinion might be more influential, or why officials would be more responsive, in certain stages of policy. My main task is to test this model on a foreign policy because, as far as I know, all the studies which used the model were conducted on domestic policies.

In addition to defining my main goal, I have also drawn up a number of research questions. The broad research question that I want to answer is: *Does the responsiveness of British foreign policy officials to mass media and public opinion depend on the stage of policy?* To further explore the stages of policy model, I have drawn up five supporting questions. The questions are meant to address three key areas of interest: first, the timing and sequence of policy changes and importance of policy stages in the process of foreign policy change; second, the influence of actors (individuals and groups) in the foreign policy process; and third, the degree of power relations within the policy environment.

The five questions developed from the main, broad question cited above are:

- (1) Does the degree of responsiveness to media and public policy preferences vary as the stage of policy change?
- (2) Were any tactics or strategies changed because of media and public policy preferences?

(3) How much did policymakers' responsiveness change when the importance of an issue increased?

(4) Was official responsiveness more procedural rather than strategic?

(5) Was policy responsiveness more strategic in some policy stages than the other?

2.13 Hypotheses

I approached the study with some key assumptions which I think would lead to meaningful answers to the questions raised above. In a broad sense, my key hypotheses are:

(1) Official responsiveness to media and public opinion would depend on the stage of policy, with responsiveness more pronounced at policy formulation stage, less at policy review stage and even less so at policy implementation stage.

(2) There is remarkable difference in the degree of official responsiveness as the policy stages change.

(3) When the importance of an issue is increased (issue salience is raised), officials would be more responsive.

(4) There will be verifiable link between official changes in strategy and tactics and media and policy preferences.

(5) Official responsiveness is more procedural rather than strategic.

To answer these questions and to test the hypotheses, I will use a case study method to test public and mass media opinion on British policy on Iraq.

Hopefully, I will be able to prove that examining the conduct of foreign policy at the stages of the policy process will produce a more accurate evaluation of the impact of policy actors on policy.

2.14 Summary

As I set out to do at the beginning of this chapter, I have been able to identify the key theories that form the bases of this study. Particularly, I identified the democratic theory as the main foundation of this research. In a nutshell, the theory presupposes that officials, who are mindful of the powers wielded by the electorate, would be willing to positively respond to the policy choices of the public. I also noted the need to test official responsiveness in Britain because, as Soroka and Wlezien (2008) found out, responsiveness tends to vary along the line of political systems and policy domains. As a result of these variations, I argued that it would be unwise to rely on studies based on the United States to assess official responsiveness in Britain.

Furthermore, I looked into the broad area of policy studies and noted the recognition given to the stages of policy, a trend that is lacking in International Relations. Aside identifying the key features of those stages, Soule and King (2006), for example, provided reasons why officials would respond differently to public pressures at different stages of policy. Based on the theoretical arguments I found in the literature, I concluded that examining official responsiveness at the stages of foreign policy would be the best way to fully explore how policy actors relate in the process of policy making.

As a way of verifying responsiveness, I drew up a framework based on three stages of policy (initiation, implementation and review). I also drew up a framework with which to analyze official response to public and mass media opinion. I expect changes to take one or a number of forms. I proposed that there could be adjustment changes, programme changes, problem/goal changes or international orientation changes.

In terms of the research question, I will focus on verifying whether British officials will respond to public and mass media demands on the country's Iraq policy and whether the degree of response will vary according to the stages of policy. My key hypothesis is that officials would be most responsive at policy initiation stage, non-responsive at policy implementation stage and only slightly responsive at policy review stage. As I noted earlier, I will use case study as my main method of research. In chapter three, I will explain in detail the research methods I will employ for this study.

3 Research Methods

3.1 Overview

In chapter one, I noted that International Relations scholars who study how officials respond to mass media and public opinion when making foreign policy have the tendency to overlook the dynamics at policy stages. However, in chapter two, I examined literature from the broader discipline of policy studies and found that scholars viewed the policy process differently. In a number of researches in policy studies, I found that scholars assessed official responsiveness across all the stages of the policy process. After drawing from those studies, I argued that examining the power dynamics at the stages of policy would lead to a better understanding of how officials respond to other actors in the making of foreign policy.

In this chapter I will continue by further conceptualizing the concepts and models applied in this study. The first concept that I will consider is *policy stages*. In that process I will further explain the stages of policy model. The other concepts I will explain are *responsiveness* and *policy change*.

Explaining both concepts will shed light on what I describe as the degrees of

responsiveness. The other key concepts I intend to define are *public opinion*, and *mass media preferences*. After defining the stages of policy model and each of the concepts, I should be able to explain possible implications of the model and how the concepts can be observed in the real world.

In section 3:3 of this chapter, I will review research methods other scholars have used in studying how the mass media and public opinion influence foreign policy. Furthermore, I will discuss the methods I will use for this study, the research design and its application. In addition to explaining the case study method I will state the justification for its use in this study. Finally, I will spell out how and why I have selected the cases used for the study. In addition, I will describe how I gathered and coded the data.

3.2 Model and the Concepts: Operationalisation and Implications

I will start by defining in more detail what *stages of policy model* means in the context of this study. The other key concepts used in the study which I will also define are: *openness, acknowledgement and responsiveness; public opinion; foreign policy and policy change; mass media and media preferences*.

3.2.1 Stages of Policy Model

As I have already noted, the aim of this study is to verify if stages of policy are determinants of how foreign policy officials respond to mass media and public policy preferences. To answer this question, I chose one possible way of measuring official responsiveness, which is to monitor how officials at each stage of the policy process respond to mass media and public opinion.

Drawing largely from the literature on public policy processes, I arrived at the conclusion that foreign policy decision making process can be captured in stages. I have, therefore, conceptualized that the foreign policy process evolves in three main stages: the policy initiation stage, policy implementation stage and policy review or evaluation stage.

On that basis, I should be able to monitor how officials responded to mass media and public pressures on foreign policy at each of the three stages of the foreign policy making process. I also assume that because of the nature of these stages, officials and other actors behave differently at each of these stages. I also conceptualize that the degrees of changes to policy will depend on the stage of policy. In chapter two, I defined those three stages of policy, the types of behaviours expected of the policy actors at each stage of policy and finally the grade or degrees of change expected of officials at each stage of policy and how those variables and concepts can be observed in real life. To summarise the definition of these variables and concepts, I will be drawing from similar definitions in the literature.

Because of the interconnectedness of the stages of policy, it is vital to define each stage of policy in order to be able to measure responsiveness at each of the discernable stages. One way of defining stages policy is to highlight policy activities that are expected to dominate each stage of policy. Starting from the policy *initiation stage*, this stage includes those points in the policy making process when there is a drawing of a “list of subjects to which government officials and those around them are paying serious attention” (Kingdon, 1984, p.3).

Equally, it is at this stage that officials weigh and define the stakes inherent in the policy (Foyle, 1999). Also at this stage of the policy process, officials draw up policy options and recruit or deploy staff for the execution of the policy (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). Finally, at this stage of policy making, governments usually make their policy decisions known. These series of actions constituting the policy initiation stage could be played out in different arenas: the legislature, press conferences or informal briefings, political rallies or in a bureaucratic setting.

The policy *implementation stage*, on the other hand, is that point in the policy process when the policy strategy, tactics and staff are deployed to work to meet the policy decision or objective. In the case of war, it is when war is declared and troops are called into action. This stage of policy has drawn most attention of state-media relations scholars, perhaps because this is when the policy decision is carried out.

In the context of this study, the *policy review or evaluation stage* is a specific part of the policy process. It is the stage in the policy process after the initiation and implementation stages, when officials make a deliberate “choice of whether to continue, modify, or abandon a particular policy” (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006, p.712). In the context of this study, at the policy review stage, the government should have announced or is seen to be taking actions which could suggest that it is evaluating if the nation would continue or re-adjust its pursuit of the policy.

My conceptualization of the stages of policy process is built on previous works identified in chapter two (Soule and King, 2006; Knecht and Weatherford, 2006; Douglas Foyle, 1999; and Thomas Graham, 1994). Although the results of those studies are contradictory in some aspects, the frameworks for analysis which they adapted are very helpful. Soule and King examined three stages of policy development with regard to state ratification of Equal Rights Amendment and found that movements mattered more to legislative decisions in the earlier stages of the policy process. However, they note that the effects of public opinion are much greater in the second and final stages of policy.

Their proposition was that public opinion became more critical or consequential as the piece of legislation moved across the policy stages. The difference between my stages of policy model and that adopted by Soule and King is that theirs covers the stages of legislative process. In my stages of policy model, all legislative actions preparatory to the implementation of policy are the kinds of activities that I consider to form the first stage, the policy initiation stage. Also, I have taken the model further from where Soule and King stopped so that I can observe how officials react to public and mass media preferences at the policy implementation and review stages.

Similar differences are found in Foyle's four-stage decision making process. The first three stages of his policy process - problem presentation, opinion generation and option selection - fall into my policy initiation stage. Foyle's fourth stage is the policy implementation stage. I will now explain the different concepts that relate to how officials respond to the public.

3.2.2 Openness, Acknowledgement and Responsiveness

In applying the stages of policy model to the foreign policy setting, I expect officials to be most open to public and media policy preferences at the policy initiation stage. *Openness*, in the sense that it is applied here, means that officials will more readily pay attention to or respond to those public and media preferences. *Acknowledgement* or clear responsiveness, in turn, means that officials are paying attention to other policy options outside those held in official circles. The natural expectation is that the stage when officials are most open to external policy options would provide the best chances for officials to accede to requests for policy change. Response in this situation could possibly include all four grades of foreign policy changes which I identified in chapter two.

From all the analysis I have done in chapter two, it is likely that officials would be most open at the policy initiation stage. At this stage, I expect that there would be a spike in the level of officials making media and public appearances to address public and media concerns. There would also be a spike in legislative activities to fine-tune policy to meet public expectation. As this model is being applied in the context of foreign policy, there would be a flurry of diplomatic moves and explanation of those policy moves. The ultimate aim of the wave of diplomatic activities would be to fine-tune policy so that it would appeal to domestic audiences. Openness, in the context I have used it, results from a number of reasons identified earlier in chapter two. The reasons include officials' desire to be seen to be responsive in line with democratic principles and the fact that officials might genuinely be conflicted on the best

policy options to achieve their objectives. They could also be striving to gain electorally.

However, I also expect officials in some cases to be "*opposed*" or "*neutral*" to public and mass media demands. "Opposed" in the context of this study refers to those occasions when government officials make pronouncements that counter the case made in public opinion polls or in mass media editorial opinions. Officials would be considered "neutral" when they fail to counter, endorse or act in line with public or mass media demands.

Finally, at the policy initiation stage, both the public and the media would appear to be most engaged and in the mood to advocate policy. The other way of categorizing *engaged public and mass media* is to describe them as attentive to the deliberations in official circles. They should be attentive in such a way that they are ready to suggest their preferred policy options vigorously. That vigour can be expressed in the number of poll responses and editorials published in the press. A majority of those editorials and respondents to polls would be expected to be asking for specific policy steps to be taken.

3.2.3 Public Opinion

The next concept is *public opinion*. It would be helpful to start by reviewing dominant conceptions of public opinion in political science and other social sciences. Many presume public opinion to be the views of the elite on public

affairs. According to Converse (1987), people whose attention to public affairs was casual could not, by this account, be viewed as contributing to public opinion. Others claim that public opinion was whatever community or national leaders like newspaper editors and elected officials “who could claim a finger on the pulse articulated it to be, in accord of their sense of community” or national interest (Converse, 1987, p.S13).

Susan Herbst (1993) sorted the various conceptualisations of public opinion into four categories, an attempt that is perhaps the most helpful approach to understanding the various ways of explaining public opinion. The categories are: aggregation, majoritarian, discursive/consensual, and ratification. In her own terms, these categories are not mutually exclusive, but will help the reader to make some sense out of the numerous definitions of public opinion across the disciplines.

It seems the aggregation principle is the dominant category. Included in that category are the usually popular means of assessing public opinion, like in polls, surveys, elections and referenda. Those who uphold this category believe that the public is “an atomized mass of individuals”, and that each individual has a set of opinions (Herbst, 1993, p.439). Public opinion, as far as many pollsters, journalists, researchers and theorists are concerned, is an aggregation of these opinions.

For others, however, public opinion is the majority opinion. This is partly based on the principle that in democratic practices, each voice or vote equals

another in weight (Converse, 1987). Drawing from that assumption, the opinion of the greatest number of people is what counts as public opinion. Just like the aggregation definitions, the majoritarian definitions are based on the adding up of the opinion of individuals. Although the latter suggest that some opinions are more important than others (Herbst, 1993).

The third in Herbst's categories are the discursive/consensual definitions. These are based on the notion that public opinion evolves through public discourse. Opinion, according to this categorization will fluctuate as often as individuals talk to each other. In this category is Habermas's (1989) argument that public opinion would emerge in the course of rational or critical discussion in the public sphere.

Herbst noted that ratification, the last category of theories, claims that public opinion does not exist at all but that it is a fictional entity. This argument dates back to early 20th century when Walter Lippmann (cited in Herbst, 1993) argued that public opinion was simply a projection of what journalists and the political elite believe to be true with the intention to achieve their own goals.

In the context of this study, public opinion falls into two of Herbst's categorization: aggregation and majoritarian. Public opinion, in the context I am using it, is an accurate or near accurate representation of the opinion of the general British population as represented in national polls. Individuals' opinion so represented is polled methodically in a way that all opinions are weighted equally. After an aggregation of the poll, the majority opinion is

considered as dominant and would as a result of its dominance receive the most official attention. I expect official response to be far-reaching in the direction demanded by more respondents. As already noted, the number of respondents agreeing with the popular view does go a long way to indicate the degree of public attention to the policy in question (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). When the leading view is not supported by an overriding majority, officials would seize on the state of public indecision to respond marginally or even disregard the dominant opinion.

3.2.4 Foreign Policy and Policy Change

My next step is to make clearer what I mean by *policy change* - one of the clearest signs of official responsiveness. I will start by summarizing the most popular explanations of the concept. First, I will look at what is meant by *foreign policy*. Cohen and Harris (cited in Gustavsson, 1999) understood foreign policy to be a set of goals, directives or intentions, formulated by officials of one nation but directed at some other actor or an environment outside their own sovereign state with the aim of affecting the target in the way the officials formulating the policy intended.

Hermann (1990, p.5), on his part, stipulated that foreign policy is “a goal-oriented or problem-oriented programme by authoritative policymakers or their representatives” directed towards entities outside the domain of the official.

Rosati (1994, P.225) has a broader definition of foreign policy: “the scope and collection of goals, strategies and instruments that are selected by

government policymakers to respond abroad to the present and future environments.”

Owing to a number of reasons, it is difficult in the real world to attain the policy objectives and the processes as originally set. Therefore, the re-ordering of foreign objectives and/or processes is what I consider to be a change in policy. This definition is not very distant from how some scholars have conceived foreign policy change. For example, Holsti (1982, pp.12 - 13) distinguished between “intended” and “actual” foreign policy. Goldmann (1988, pp7 - 10) separated between “verbalized policy,” meaning a policy that agents declared they are following and “non-verbalized policy,” which refers to what policy has in fact followed. The bases of my research, and many others before mine, rest on the argument that those changes are not carried out by officials willingly. The natural questions are: who prompts officials to act? When are officials prone to act on those promptings? To what degree are officials ready to adjust their policy objectives and the process leading to those objectives?

To further explain the concept of policy change and to answer some these questions, I am building on some of the best attempts to conceptualize change in foreign policy. I find Hermann's (1990) and Rosati's (1994) attempts to map foreign policy change most practical. Both of them developed practical typologies to help understand foreign policy change. As I noted in chapter two, Hermann identified four levels of foreign policy change. They include adjustment change, which include minor changes in the level of effort put into

policy. Second, there is programme change if there was a re-ordering of the means and methods of pursuit of a foreign policy objective but the goals remained intact.

The third level of change is the problem/goal change. In this case, there is a change in policy goals and objectives. The fourth level of change is the international orientation change, which refers to a more fundamental change in a nation's entire orientation towards world affairs. Rosati (1994, p.236) on his part, suggested that levels of changes could vary by "intensification," "refinement," "reform," and "restructuring." Gustavsson (1999) pointed to Rosati's levels of change as corresponding to little, minor, moderate and major changes in the scope, goals and strategy of foreign policy.

In this study, I expect to see different levels or degrees of changes in British policy on Iraq over the period 2002 through 2003, the period covered in this study. I further argue that the mass media and public opinion, in association with possibly other factors, may prompt officials to make those changes. As already noted, those changes will depend on the stage of policy. As mapped out in the stages of policy process model, I expect to see at the policy initiation stage adjustment, programme, problem/goal changes and possibly changes in positions that would add to long term orientation changes. In alternative terms, I expect to see at the policy initiation stage, levels of policy intensification, refinement, reform and, possibly, actions that would add to the restructuring of the policy.

At the policy implementation stage, I expect to see a reduced form of adjustment changes and possibly programme changes. That means that the means and methods of the policy process might be changed. There will be no changes in the problem/goal at this stage. That means that the goals and objectives of the policy will remain unaffected by mass media and public pressures at this stage. Lessons could be learned at this stage, but there will be no sign of orientation changes or policy restructuring at this stage of policy. It is unlikely that I will see any signs of dramatic and wholesale alteration of the nation's pattern of foreign policy or orientation (Holsti, 1982) at the policy implementation stage.

Finally, at policy review stage, I expect to see signs of adjustment changes but those changes would hardly be requested by the media, which I expect to be marginally engaged in the policy debate. Also at this stage, there will be an indifferent public, one that is hardly in the mood to demand for adjustment changes. In alternative terms, there will be signs of policy intensification and policy refinement mostly instigated by officials. However, I expect no changes in policy goals or reforms of policy objectives. Additionally, there may be policy steps that could contribute to orientation changes or policy restructuring in the future. In fact, it would appear that orientation changes could only take place outside the active stages of the policy process - during a long-term policy review process, usually outside the public purview.

I will initially examine the foreign policy process with each stage of policy as a basis of inquiry. Subsequently, I will compare the degree of responsiveness

and the nature of interaction between policy actors through the three stages of the foreign policy. The aim is not only to note the content of policies at each stage of policy but also to identify how external factors impacted on policy at each stage of the process (Hill, 1997).

3.2.5 Mass Media and Media Preferences

The last concept I will define is what I mean by *media preferences*. Perhaps the first place to start in this age of fast evolving media of mass communication is to define what I mean by the *mass media*. In the context of this study, mass media refers to those institutions or organizations whose primary objectives are to gather, write and process news, features and editorials for the consumption of a mass audience. Alternatively, I will identify what kinds of media outlets which do not fall within the types of media of mass communication included in the concept of mass media applied in this study.

Many in the fields of media studies and sociology have taken interest in the proliferation of social networking and how the medium of the Internet are used as instruments of activism. Whether or not this form of communication is an effective or a superficial form of activism is outside the scope of this study. Specifically, this type of media of communication and their form of media content do not meet the rational for my selection of mass media organs. I have chosen for my consideration mass media organizations that have structured means and ways of deliberating on public issues. They should also have a set pattern of regularly producing an opinion reflecting the views of the

organization for mass audience consumption. Ultimately, the aim of the mass media organs should be to affect the nature of public affairs.

Having defined the types of mass media outlets that will be examined in this study, the next step is to determine how mass media policy preferences are measured. In most studies of mass media activities, the content of the mass media are measured in frames. Although frames are mostly applied to news stories, they explain how journalists package news and commentary in the manner that they present a specific reality to the world (Entman, 1991; Wolfsfeld, 1997). In trying to interpret the media frames, people read meanings into the prominence given to particular subjects, image or word. Others try to read between the lines to understand the slant of the news (Block-Elkon, 2007).

In the context of this study, mass media policy preferences are not weighted by their positioning in the pages of the newspapers. This is because almost all newspaper editorials, which are the focus of my interest, are positioned in the inside pages. Furthermore, unlike news reports that could be given different interpretations, editorials are clearly expressed opinions of the news organizations. Therefore, the framing of the editorials will be read plainly. I will not be seeking to find an undertone in the editorials. Both the policy preferences and editorialists' objectives will be recorded as they are plainly expressed in the editorials. In addition, I will devise units of analysis to be able to quantify and compare the mass media preferences over the stages of policy.

3.3 Research Approaches in the Literature

Although I have tried so far to simplify how I will measure mass media and public influence on British policy on Iraq, I do not overlook possible difficulties in carrying out the study. The literature is replete with accounts detailing how problematic it is to measure how the mass media and public opinion influence policy. Robinson (2000) rightly observed that we cannot measure news media influence in a straightforward fashion and that we cannot see inside the mind of policy makers. The research problem is further compounded by the difficulty in delineating media influence from other influences in the policy environment. Direct observation is not a viable option. The space, time and process of policy making are so varied and spread out that it is difficult to monitor and weigh influences on policies as those policies evolved. However, the need to understand the role of media and public opinion in the making of foreign policy is undiminished by these obvious difficulties.

Four research approaches dominate the field. By the nature of the predominant questions that are usually asked - how, when and why - some researchers have used interviewing as a preferred option. The interview method usually involves asking policymakers to recall and quantify the impact mass media and public opinion played on their decision making (Bahador, 2007). Even among this group of scholars, there is no agreement as to the best interview strategy that would yield the more dependable result. One of the common interviewing strategies is to ask open-ended questions with the aim of directly prompting officials to recall what role the media played in

specific policies. Some researchers, including Gowing (1994), O'Heffernan (1991), Strobel (1997), Livingston (1997), Minear, Scott and Weiss (1997) based their study of media influence on this rather problematic strategy. They asked officials directly whether or not the choice of policy was influenced by the media.

As I noted earlier, this method is very problematic. Robinson (2000) noted the interview method could lead to distortions. According to him, using the method could result in over-estimating or under-estimating media impact. In most extreme cases, officials' deliberate distortion of their media experience and influence could undermine the direct interview technique as a true measure of media effect. In fact, of the interviewing strategies that may be used, the direct interview method is seen as most unreliable (Carruthers, 2000).

On the other hand, some have argued that a more useful approach to measuring media impact on policy could be to list what one might expect to observe if the mass media impacted on policy and then search for them through indirect questioning of officials (Robinson, 2000). This latter interviewing strategy is seen by its advocates as a more reliable way of establishing media impact. Wolfsfeld (1999, p72) argued that focusing on some key questions could help establish media influence on government policy. Among his key questions are:

"To what extent did the topic of media coverage come up in planning sessions? How important was the role of the spokesperson within the leadership? To what extent was the news media coverage of activities used as a barometer of success? How did political actors react to the presence

of the news media? Were any tactics or strategies changed because of coverage?"

But the problem with interviewing, as we shall soon see, is not about which strategy is better. No matter the strategy employed, the interview method could be a problematic way of studying attitudes of public officials. There is an inherent difficulty in replicating a result obtained by interviewing. Using the indirect questioning strategy could be very useful but it does not fully address the inherent shortcomings in using interviewing as a research method: the fact that results could depend on the environment of the interview, the mood of the respondent and those other factors that make it difficult to replicate the result (O'Heffernan, 1994).

There is also the human problem of an inability to recall the complete details of one's own media experience. Where deliberate documentation of events is not kept, recalling details of events and their sequence would be difficult. It would be even more difficult to recall impressions or impact made in the minds of officials at every turn of the policy making process. Robinson (2000) argued that policy makers' assessment of what really influenced given decisions was largely a matter of interpretation and perspective. According to him, experience has shown that a policy maker's assessment of the news media's importance vary over time and between different interviewers. It is reasonable to expect policy makers' perspectives on issues and their recall of details of those issues to change with time. It is also reasonable to expect officials' to be dependent on the personality and style of the interviewer.

My argument, which is in line with many others', is that solely relying on interviewing officials to ascertain the impact of media and public opinion on policy is a "potential source of bias, error, misunderstanding and misdirection" of fact (Holstein and Gubrium 1999, p. 105). Am I saying that the interview method is of no use? No. I believe that in evaluating media or public impact on policy, the interview method could be a valuable tool if used as a part of a mixed approach. It can be used to confirm or refute an idea or an emerging trend which had been found while using mixed research methods.

Another research method commonly in use is quantitative analyses of media reports. Scholars use this method to find a link or relationship between the quantity of media coverage (Livingston and Eachus, 1995) or public opinion and the behaviour of policy makers (Gilens, 2005). Some scholars argue that the media would have had a dominant impact (CNN Effect) if a considerable quantity of media coverage preceded an official policy advocated in the media (Bahador, 2007). If, on the other hand, the policy was announced before the avalanche of media reports, the media are said to have been led by policy officials.

Although this approach could be more rigorous than the interview method (Bahador, Ibid), the approach itself is undermined by the assumption that policies are static and could not be adjusted after they were initiated. I will continue to argue that in practical policy settings, evolving policies can be adjusted if they do not meet public and/or mass media expectations. Another

inherent problem with this method is its inability to establish a link between the media reports and the changed shape of policy.

Page and Shapiro (1983) used a variant of the quantitative approach in their effort to address some of those deficiencies. In their study, they examined changes over time in public preferences and tried to measure them with corresponding changes or lack of changes in public policy. Page and Shapiro found appreciable levels of congruency between the direction of change in public and the direction of change of government policy. Congruency in public preferences and official actions were found to be more pronounced for salient issues as well as for cases with large changes in public preferences.

Converse (1987) argued that finding congruency between public demands and the shape of policy did not take away the need to explore more avenues of understanding the degree or scope of that influence on policy. He noted: "Of course, this is mere congruence, and direct causal influence from public opinion to representative cannot be guaranteed" (Converse, 1987, p s22). These worries necessitate the employment of mixed techniques to understand influence.

Some other scholars have used qualitative methods to try to find the link between policy and mass media output. They looked closely at media content to find out if the way the media framed their reports had any relationship with government policy (Shaw, 1993, Bloch-Elkon, 2007)). The aim was to verify if

the frame presented in mass media reports had any bearing on actual government action. This method is linked to the quantitative approach in the sense that the more often a particular frame is presented in the media the more likely officials are supposed to respond. What is clear is that the method presents a fresh incentive for comparing what the media or the mass public are demanding and actual official policy actions.

Robinson (2000) applied a variant of the qualitative approach in his study of the policy-media interaction model. In that study, he weighed how mass media framing of crisis prompted government action. By applying a timeline to media reports and official action, Robinson introduced an interesting new approach to finding media-policy nexus. Finding proximity in time between media and public demands for a particular line of policy and actual official response could be a good ground for making informed deductions of a possible impact.

Furthermore, by evaluating the contents of official responses to mass media reports, it was possible for Robinson to make a considerable linkage of policy action and the mass media, although the linkages were mostly made through deductions. On my own part, I have noted some of the difficulties I might face in the course of my research. I will now examine some of those difficulties that I think will arise.

3.4 Research Limitations

Drawing from the limitations of some of the research methods found in the literature, I will now highlight some of the difficulties I might face in applying my preferred research methods. First, by selecting public opinion and mass media message as possible influences on foreign policy, I do not assume that those variables are the only factors which could influence foreign policy. In fact, there are numerous other factors, including institutions, personalities and policy environments that could prompt officials to alter the course of foreign policy. Within the space and time for this research only so much of those factors could really be tested. But by testing how officials respond to mass media and public opinion at different stages of policy, I will go a long way toward bringing insights into how those key factors and conditions could affect policy officials at different stages of policy.

Secondly, studying a sample period, instead of the entire stages of the process of British involvement in Iraq, could be a handicap for this study. Some policy actions prompted at one stage of policy could drag on into other stages before there are signs of official response. That situation would leave me to either ignore those responses or recognize them despite the data falling outside the stage of policy under consideration. I have resolved to note those policy changes even when they occur outside the immediate stage under consideration. I am not going to wish away the limitations that the categorization of the stages of policy process will bring. But I will strictly carry

out the study on categorisation of stages based on (1) the time-line of policy action and (2) the dominant activity at a particular stage of policy.

I am also anxious that by the time of finishing this study, the public inquiry into British participation in Iraq could possibly be concluded. More information could be in the public domain at around the time of finishing this study than I have access to at this moment. However, it is my belief that the amount of available data which this research is based on is enough to bring insight into how British foreign policy officials responded to mass media and public demands during the process of the Iraq policy. Based on the premises of my study, the data I have used and the explanation of the result based on the framework I have set out, my research will remain valid despite the amount of information that might be in the public domain soon. I will now continue by introducing the research approaches I consider to be most helpful for this study.

3.5 General Introduction of My Preferred Approaches

Owing to the handicaps I have already highlighted, I will not use the interview method. Specifically, I will not be asking officials whether or not they are influenced by the mass media while making a policy. Rather, I will use archival records in the forms of government documents, legislative accounts (to be specific Hansard of the House of Commons and House Committees' Reports) and media records of public officials' responses to the mass media and public opinion *during* and around the period of the policy stages. Published mass

media editorial opinions and public opinion polls will be compared with official responses found in those archival records or documented accounts. The comparisons will be done in the three stages of the policy process: periods of the policy initiation, policy implementation and policy review.

Specifically, I will use quantitative and qualitative analysis of mass media reports and other archival materials, already identified, in carrying out a case study. In summary, I will collate records of official reaction to mass media and public opinion as presented in policy positions on Iraq from government documents, parliamentary statements and in newspaper reports. I will compare my findings with public policy demands found in editorials of selected British newspapers and in public opinion polls conducted during the period I will study. The degree of responses at each stage will be compared.

3.6 Case Study Method: Explanation and Reason for Adoption

As already noted, the research will be a case study. I will proceed by briefly describing the case study research method. It is my belief that explaining the case study method will help make clear the justification for its use in this study. First, case study research has proved a popular choice for many social science scholars who seek to understand social phenomena in their natural setting (Myers, 1998; Burton, 2000). Despite the controversies that have surrounded the case study research and the degree of rigour involved in the research method, the case study method has become widely accepted as a

systematic research tool that is most suited to understand organizational contexts and their dynamics (Yin, 1981; Darke, Shanks and Broadbent, 1998).

The method has been used to meet research goals, including providing descriptions of phenomena, developing theory and testing theory (Darke et al, 1998). A central concept used in social science research is the idea of having cases as the building blocks for data collection. A case, according to Burton (2000 p215), could be an individual, an organization, a country and a continent. In addition, a case can also comprise an event such as some aspect of an organizational change or implementation of a new programme.

Yin (1994, p 1), on his part noted:

“In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when `how' and `why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events and when this focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context.”

Hakim (1992) provided another categorization of case study research as descriptive, selective and experimental. Descriptive case studies, according to him, can be used to illustrate cases thought typical or representative.

According to Burton (2000), in policy-oriented research, descriptive case studies can be used to illustrate good or bad practice.

Drawing from the foregoing accounts, I conclude that a case study research is suitable for verifying how officials respond to other policy actors in the course of making foreign policy in Britain. I am not necessarily trying to find out if there are good practices or not, but I want to know the degree of

responsiveness or degree of democracy (Soroka and Wlezien, 2008) that exists in the formation and conduct of foreign policy.

I have used a single case study: the process of British policy leading to its launching of the war on Iraq in 2003 to test official responsiveness to mass media and public opinion. While some have advocated the use of multiple cases especially in comparative studies (Bollens, 2009), the use of a single case study is noted to have the advantage of allowing in-depth analysis (Burton, 2000). I have been careful not to make overreaching generalizations based on this single case study (Lijphart, 1971).

Granted though that the case study method is considered most useful in studies intended to investigate emerging trends in a field, it can, no doubt, be used to develop a theory, test a theory or provide a better insight into a theory (Darke et al., 1998). My target is to meet some or three of these goals. In chapter two I provided the theoretical concepts explaining why officials will respond differently at each stage of policy. So, by using a case study method, I will be able to test the stages of policy process theory and possibly help develop the theory by proving that it is applicable in a foreign policy setting. The study could also help refine the CNN Effect and Manufacturing Consent theories.

The result of the case study when held up against the theories I have outlined will indicate whether the process of policy stages model in foreign policy is

workable, needs refining or is unfounded. There is, however, no doubt that by using a case study design, I will be able to provide an insight into the reality of the British foreign policy processes and how officials conduct their affairs in the stages of that process. A single case study method will certainly meet the focus of my research which is to have an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon (foreign policy process) and its context (Cavaye, 1996).

It is typical for case studies to combine different forms of data collection techniques. To be more exact, both quantitative data collection and analysis methods (mainly dealing with numbers and measurements) and qualitative methods (dealing with words and meanings) may be used in case studies (Yin, 1994). For this study, the types of evidence I intend to use are principally legislative and government documents and media texts relating to Britain's war with Iraq in 2003. The evidence would also include records of public and media demands on policy makers in regards to the Iraq policy. I will now explain my research technique in more detail.

3.7 My Research Technique

From the foregoing discussion of research methods applied in the study of mass media and public opinion impact on policy, it is clear that applying mixed research methods would be the best approach for this study. One of the justifications for pluralism is that a research study is not a "single discrete event but a process that would normally go through a number of phases"

(Mingers, 2001, pp243 -244). Mingers (Ibid) argued: "These phases pose different tasks and problems for the researcher." Certain research methods tend to be more useful in relation to some stages of the research than others. Therefore, the prospect of combining different methods appeals to me. Shortly, I will discuss the advantages of this technique.

Primarily, to be able to answer the research questions I have raised, I plan to use a variety of approaches including quantitative, qualitative and comparative analyses based largely on archival data. These methods are appropriate because of the nature of my questions which are mainly seeking to find out *how or to what degree, when, and why* British foreign policy makers are most responsive to public and media foreign policy preferences.

The methods I will adapt to measure official sensitivity and other concepts I operationalised in Section 3.2, are based on quantitative and qualitative processes. I will rely on simple counts of the frequency, the nature and the degree of official responses or sensitivity to public and mass media opinion to measure responsiveness. First I will weigh the degree of responsiveness at each stage of policy. At each stage of policy I will evaluate to what degree policies appear, possibly, to have responded or changed in relation to the context of demands made by the media and the public. The key method is to test official responses by using frequency of responses, weights assigned to the ranks of the officials and the nature of the responses to measure official responsiveness.

As I will recap in the case study chapters, these numbers and weights are derived from an aggregation of the number of occasions and the nature of sensitivity shown when officials directly or contextually referred to the demands of the public and the mass media at each stage of policy. In conclusion, I will compare the degree of responsiveness at the three stages of policy to get a sense of when officials appeared to be more or less responsive to public and mass media opinions.

Quantitative approaches will be employed to measure the frequency of mass media and public demands. That is one way of estimating the salience of issues. I intend to employ qualitative approaches to weigh the tone and nature of public demands and official responses. The result of the qualitative analysis will help define the nature of public and media demands and official responses. Similarly, the result of quantitative and qualitative analyses of data will be used to define the degree of policy response and the grade of policy change at each stage of policy. Finally, I will employ comparative analysis in establishing the similarities or dissimilarities of changes at each stage of policy.

From the foregoing, I am expecting that the mass media demands and public opinion will compel officials to act in a particular direction. As a result, the next task before me is to address the problem inherent in making causal inference or linkages between public opinion and policy and mass media preferences and policy. Monroe (cited in Page and Shapiro, 1983) made good progress in

finding considerable consistency between opinion and policy, especially in highly salient issues in foreign policy. That success has encouraged scholars like Page and Shapiro (1983) to examine relationships between changes in preferences and changes in official policy.

To measure the congruency between public and mass media preferences, I will adopt Page and Shapiro's change-oriented design. The design allows for a simple, ordinal measurement of policy. The cases of public opinion and mass media demands will be the units of analysis. One of the key steps is to find out if policy moves in the same direction as public opinion and mass media demands. If that is the case, then I will assume that there is congruency. If they move in opposite directions, then there is no congruency. I will measure the congruency at each stage of policy separately with the aim of comparing the degrees of congruency at the three stages of policy.

What is actually more important is to determine the degree of congruency at each stage. It is not good enough to state that congruency exists or not. I intend to measure the degree of congruency by allocating values to every sign of similarity of public and mass media opinion and the eventual policy. Values will also be allocated for official acknowledgement of public opinion and mass media preferences. In addition, I will carry out simple word counts of the number of references officials made to public and/or mass media policy preferences when making their own policy statements. I will consider such references as indications of links between mass media and public opinions to

officials' responses. When an official makes such a reference, I will note that the official's response has "links established" with mass media and/or public opinion. If there are no such references, I will note that there were "no links established" with mass media/or public opinion. Finally, when officials make conflicting comments that do not confirm or deny awareness of public and/or mass media opinions, I will note that links were "unclassified."

Ultimately, the goal of this research strategy is, first, to establish the degree of changes at each stage of policy. To achieve that, I have adopted mainly Hermann's typology of foreign policy change. Those expected changes, as I identified in chapter two are Adjustment Changes, Programme Changes, Problem or Goal Changes and finally International Orientation Changes. To a limited degree, I will make references to Rosati's typology of change which, in any case, is similar to Hermann's. The other goal is to verify the link between official policy changes, when they occur, and the trend of mass media and public preferences. In the next section, I will explain the research design.

3.8 Research Design

In the foregoing pages I have tried to summarize how scholars have tried to examine the extent to which public opinion and the mass media are factors in foreign policy making. Most of those studies covered a lot of ground in describing the content, trends and structure of public opinion and the mass

media. Studies that have established a relationship between public opinion and foreign policy are more difficult to find (Seaver, 1998).

The case study protocol I plan to use involves taking a step at each stage of the policy process, first, to establish the official British policy on Iraq. In fact, for true influence to be established, officials must already have a policy position of their own. Converse (1987, pS21) noted that if influence was restricted to instances when an official was a blank slate until when such an official learnt what public opinion was and then just ran like a robot to implement the public will, "then there is little influence which occurs."

Second, I will quantify both public and mass media policy preferences and carry out a qualitative evaluation of content of those public and media demands to establish what policy changes that they asked for. Within each stage of policy, I will evaluate official response to those public and media demands. By so doing, I will be able to establish the degree of responsiveness or grade of change to the Iraqi policy at each stage. Official responses at each of the three stages of policy are compared to ascertain at what stage responsiveness or grade of foreign policy change is most pronounced.

Another way I will try to find a linkage is to analyze mass media contents and trends in public opinion polls and surveys and compare them with implied or pronounced reasons for changes in the direction of foreign policy. The next

approach is to record official acknowledgement of mass media and public demands for change in policy and to note how officials weighed those demands. As stated in chapter two, my assessment of the degree of change will be based on Herman's (1990) four graduated levels of foreign policy change detailed in section 2:11. The levels of changes are adjustment, programme, problem/goal and international orientation changes. Earlier in Section 3:2 of this chapter I further explained the typology and showed how I will apply it.

3.9 Data Collection and Case Selection

As I noted earlier, most studies on media impact on foreign policy are based on framing analysis. In other words, scholars look at the slant, bias or frame of reference of the media and how different people would respond to them. (Entman, 1993; Robinson, 2000) Framing analysis, as it is applied can hardly indicate a causal effect. In this study, in terms of media content, I will rather concentrate on measuring newspaper editorials published in the period studied rather than carry out a framing analysis of the news pages. Editorial opinions are unequivocal and, therefore, I will not rely on inferences to make out what their policy preferences are. Quantitative analysis of contents of editorial pages would be employed to measure the intensity or significance accorded the policy direction in the media. Qualitative analysis will be principally employed to explicitly establish policy preferences of the mass media.

In terms of the actual time covered for this study, it is my intention to analyze media content and the direction of public opinion over three months. The first month is to represent the policy initiation stage, the second month will represent the policy execution/implementation stage and, finally, the third month is to represent the policy evaluation or review stage. Possibly, the groundwork of the Iraq war started before or about Saturday, March 6, 2002, after Prime Minister Tony Blair's meeting with President George Bush in Crawford, Texas. But I chose September 2002 to cover the first stage of the policy because that was when Prime Minister Tony Blair addressed the House of Commons on this issue. Subsequently the House made its first resolution on the Iraq war in that month. In fact, an open, official presentation of the case for war was first made in September 2002.

The second stage of policy will cover March 2003, when the war on Iraq was declared. The declaration of war marked the most pronounced sign of the implementation of the policy. The third stage will cover December 2003 when the Foreign and Commonwealth Office publicly announced that the government was carrying out a review of its Iraq policy along with other principal foreign policy issues. I do not want to imply that the three stages of policy lasted for equal lengths of time. For the sake of balance, I chose to study a month of each stage of the policy process. Each of these months serves as a sample to reflect how policy actors interacted at a stage in the policy process.

As for the data, I will analyze four British national newspapers for this study. I chose two liberal newspapers, *The Guardian* and *The Independent*, and two

conservative newspapers, *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times* to ensure that ideological slants in the interpretation of the Iraqi question are represented. Also to ensure that there is uniformity, I studied the editorial contents of the newspapers from Monday to Saturday. The reason is that some of the newspapers in my sample do not have Sunday editions.

I have not selected any case from the electronic media mainly because my data are drawn from editorial pages and British television and radio organizations hardly carry editorials. Also, there are other national newspapers which are not selected for this study. These are mostly tabloid newspapers. I left them out principally because they do not cover foreign affairs with the regularity found in the broadsheet newspapers. Similarly, editorials on foreign policies are not as regular as in the broadsheet newspapers.

After explaining how data from newspapers will be gathered, I will now explain how I will identify the public's policy preferences. To address some of the concerns over the use of opinion polls to represent national public opinion on a foreign policy (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey, 1987; Powlick and Katz, 1998), I will rely on a variety of national public opinion polls conducted within the period. Studying a wide range of opinion polls will broaden my understanding of trends in the public's assessment of British policy on Iraq. To a limited degree, I will use additional forms of expression of public preferences, like

national demonstrations and threats of students and labour strikes, as other indicators of public opinion.

On the official side, data are derived mainly from legislative documents obtained from the House of Commons Library on-line services. These data cover House deliberations, House Foreign Affairs committee reports, special panel reports, bills, the House research reports, and background and historical analysis of British involvement in Iraq done by the House of Commons research team. The data also include ministers' and other members' testimonies on the Iraq question. The other source of data is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on-line archive which holds archival documents detailing the backgrounds to the British Iraq policy. I will also rely on policy statements and press statements explaining or clarifying the government's actions.

The third set of official data will be derived from archival media documents. I will collect published data that show how officials conducted the Iraqi policy, how officials responded to public and mass media demands, and how aspects of the policy were executed. Archival media documents detailing official positions and actions are to be drawn from beyond the four newspapers studied in this research. The data are drawn from the news, features and opinion pages of different mass media types in Britain.

Almost all the archival media documents will be obtained directly from copies of newspapers for the dates studied (in case of the newspaper editorials and newspaper documentations of policy and official responses). I will personally study copies of these newspapers which exist in microfilm forms at University of Manchester John Rylands Library. Based on the already determined units of analysis, I will review the media documents line by line and code the relevant data accordingly.

More detailed units of analysis used for the coding of mass media and opinion polls are listed in the next three chapters. To make the data as clear as possible, I will tally the number of newspaper editorials under each policy topic. I will then use qualitative analysis to determine the policy position advocated in the editorial. The frequency with which each newspaper proposed a particular policy line is quantified. It is obvious that by this coding style, I will turn some qualitative data into quantitative data. My goal is to understand the degree of mass media demand for a particular policy line, and, as a result, I should be able to measure the salience of an issue and the media's potential to influence official policy. Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p778) reasoned that turning qualitative data into quantitative data “engenders deeper interpretations of the meanings in the original corpus of qualitative data.”

To code official responses, I will use a modified form of the degrees of foreign policy change to categorize official policy actions. I will code official responses to public and media preferences into units such like “opposed,” “neutral,” “acknowledged,” “adjustment change,” “programme change,” “problem/goal

change,” “international orientation change.” In Section 3:2 of this chapter I defined these concepts.

3.10 Case Analyses

So far, I have been able to outline some analytical tools to be used in this study. Those tools include: (1) categorization of cases, involving the reduction of data through coding; (2) comparison among cases and (3) dimensionalization, which involves the integrating of these categories after noting existing patterns in data (Spiggle, 1994). Those tools will be used to analyze the data and answer the questions earlier raised. When data are broken down into basic concepts and frames, it is possible to identify emerging patterns in the data. It is also possible to compare cases and these patterns to identify how, when and to what degree policy has changed (Crow, 2008).

A detailed case analysis for each stage of policy will be carried out. The first step would be to carry out a primarily descriptive analysis of the cases at each of these stages. These analyses and narratives will provide the needed insight for analyzing the complex policy process (Crow, 2008). The narratives for each stage of policy will be drawn from the data previously categorized. The next level of analyses would be to carry out a cross-case search to find out if there are patterns of similarities, differences and linkages in the stages of

policy to help the reader to have a better insight into the foreign policy process.

The successful conclusion of this research study will lead to a better understanding of how foreign policy changes at each stage of policy. It would possibly prompt scholars, especially in international relations, to view foreign policy as a process rather than an event. The public and the mass media will recognize the best time to exert influence on foreign officials. After analyzing the result of this research in comparison with the existing literature on CNN Effect, Manufacturing Consent, policy responsiveness, policy-media and policy-public link models, and politics of policy making, I would have drawn attention to the possibilities existing in using a multi-disciplinary approach to study the impact of mass media and public opinion on foreign policy.

3.11 Summary

In summary, I have been able to describe the key research methods employed by researchers when studying how mass media and public influence foreign policy. I have also explained that because of the complexities of studying the policy process I will employ a mixed research approach. Advantages of employing the case method are equally explained. Other parts of chapter three include explanations of models and concepts used in this study and other key steps I will take to execute this research.

Specifically, I noted that the principal method of research is the case study method. I will employ quantitative and qualitative approaches to identify public

and mass media policy demands. Then, I will use the same methods to measure government's response to those demands. Public and mass media demands will be compared with official response at each stage of policy. Ultimately, I will compare responsiveness in the three stages to establish at what stage of policy officials proved more sensitive to mass media and public opinion. I will have three case study chapters, each dealing with one stage of Britain's Iraq policy. In chapter four, the first of those case study chapters, I will be discussing public and mass media policy demands and how British officials responded at the policy initiation stage.

4 Mass Media, Public Opinion and Initiation of Britain's Iraq Policy: September 2002

4.1 Introduction

In chapter one, I identified how the CNN Effect and Manufacturing Consent theorists mostly ignore the stages of policy process in their analysis of the dynamics of foreign policy making. The gap in their understanding of the process of foreign policy making necessitates a reconsideration of how scholars verify the impact of mass media and public opinion on foreign policy. So far, I have highlighted the need for a change of strategy in the study of this subject. In chapter two, I introduced a broader range of literature in policy studies that supports my theoretical argument that officials are usually responsive to public demands in the process of policy making. I also noted the different features of each stage of policy and why officials are prone to respond differently at each stage.

Furthermore, in chapter three, I outlined the methods I have adopted for this study. Basically, it will be a case study and I will employ quantitative and qualitative processes to carry out the study. The processes involve carrying out simple counts of the values assigned to the frequency, nature and degree of official responsiveness or sensitivity to public and mass media opinion. As I

explained in chapter three, these numbers and weights will be derived from an aggregation of the number of occasions and the nature of sensitivity shown when officials directly or contextually referred to the demands of the public and the mass media at each stage of policy. After weighing the degree of responsiveness at each stage of policy, I will evaluate to what degree policies appear to have changed as a result.

This chapter, and two others that follow it, will be used to present answers to the research questions I raised in chapter two. While this chapter deals with the nature of official responsiveness and policy change at the policy initiation stage, chapter five will be used to present the nature of policy responsiveness and change at the policy implementation stage. Chapter six, which is the third case study chapter, will examine how policy responded or changed during the stage of policy review.

Afterwards, in chapter seven, a comparison of the three cases will be conducted to verify if there are any common features or differences in how officials responded or how policy changed at the three stages of policy. At the end of chapter seven, which is my concluding chapter, I should have answered the research questions previously raised in chapters one, two and three. Those questions could possibly be summarized in one principal question: does official response to mass media and public opinion depend on the stage of policy?

This chapter deals specifically with the events of September 2002, when the government made far-reaching efforts, publicly and in parliament, to make its case for war with Iraq. Before discussing the data outlining both public and mass media policy options, I will start with a brief background of the events leading up to September 2002. This will help bring into focus the reasons for mass media and public demands for certain lines of action. The events of September 2002 will be focused upon. Subsequently, I will apply the stages of policy model to understand how officials responded to mass media and public opinion at this stage of policy.

4.2 Background to British Iraq Policy in 2002

After Operation Desert Storm (the UN-led attack on Iraq) ended in February 1991, the dominant British policy was to support enthusiastically the containment of Iraq through sanctions and weapons inspection. But by the end of the 1990s and leading up to the summer of 2002, both Conservative and Labour governments in Britain concluded that, if needed, they would use force to see through several United Nations' resolutions on Iraq. Britain tried to put into action a long-term goal it shared with the United States to effectively remove Iraqi President Saddam Husain (Clinton, 2005). The key question faced by British officials and the public was whether or not Britain should join the United States in spearheading a war against Iraq over those same issues they had addressed through sanctions and weapons inspection.

There were, however, other policy issues, including whether or not containment should be continued, whether Britain should continue to support United States' policy on Iraq without exerting some influence on it, and if the United Nations should expressly pass a resolution authorizing war and effectively spearhead any combat effort before Britain's participation in one. There were also demands that Britain should endeavour to broaden the international alliance against Iraq.

However, prompted by his conviction "that getting Saddam was the right thing to do" (Campbell, 2008, p632), Prime Minister Tony Blair was hesitant to engage both Parliament and the Cabinet on those policies or his plan to escalate the Iraq policy. Blair's Press Secretary, Alastair Campbell (2008, p633) noted in his diary: "All of us were pressing Tony Blair to go with the flow on the demands for a recall of Parliament but he was resistant." As war appeared more imminent, there were increased demands for a change in Prime Minister Tony Blair's presidential style by, first, engaging the Cabinet in any decision on Iraq and, second, by convening parliament and by subsequently seeking its approval before British participation in combat in Iraq.

Further, Britain broadly disagreed with most of its European allies on the effectiveness of the UN sanctions and inspections regime. The official British evaluation was that the sanctions and the inspection regime were ineffectual and merely bought Saddam time to continue to defy the international community (Campbell, 2008). Britain's official stand on the alleged threat

posed by Saddam Hussein and Iraq was vigorously presented in Prime Minister Tony Blair's first case for action against Iraq made to the British House of Commons on September 24, 2002. He believed that the "assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt" that "Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons." Mr Blair also claimed that Saddam was striving to produce nuclear weapons and extended the reach of his ballistic missile programme. On the bases of those claims the Prime Minister and a handful of other officials, from the summer of 2002 and into the autumn, ratcheted their claim that further weapons inspections were ineffectual (Straw, 2002).¹

While making his case before parliament, Mr Blair stated that "in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)," he believed "this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest" (2002, p3). In a rather ominous tone, he dismissed those who considered Iraq to be far from British sphere of interest. Mr Blair (Ibid) declared:

"I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council Resolutions expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world."

While the Prime Minister made veiled acknowledgements that "gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy" (Blair, Ibid), he maintained that there was enough evidence to start preparing for military action against Saddam.

¹ Jack Straw in *The Sunday Telegraph*, 15 September 2002.

4.3 Issues in Contention and the State of Public Opinion

What was the public's attitude towards the government's position and how did the government respond to the public's attitude? To address both questions, I will start by looking at the state of public opinion on the key issues that dominated policy debates. The public attitude is here represented in a series of opinion polls. I will also present data showing the opinion of the mass media as represented in newspaper editorials. The results will be pointers to the degree to which mass media and the public pressed for change or strived to influence British Iraq policy at the initial stage of policy. Finally, I will present data indicating how the British government responded to an aggregation of the issues raised by the media and the public. These results will show the degrees of official responsiveness and/or the level the government was willing to change its foreign policy.

One of the key issues which dominated discussion at this stage of policy was the British public's attitude towards military attack on Iraq. In September 2002, a large majority of British people were clearly attentive to the government's plan, going by the results of opinion polls conducted around the period. The opinion polls also indicated that a majority of the British public held an opinion on whether or not Britain should engage in military action. According to one Guardian/ICM poll, 83 per cent of the public had a view on Britain's Iraq policy, another pointer to how the British public was acutely aware of the Iraq question. The trend clearly contradicted the suggestion in the literature that the public was ignorant or aloof to foreign policy (for example as found in

Page and Shapiro, 1983; Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987, Clarke, 1988; Jones, 1994).

The table below shows how the respondents in the poll responded when asked the question: Would you approve or disapprove of a military attack to remove Saddam Hussein?

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Approve | 37% |
| Disapprove | 46% |
| Don't know | 18% |

Table 4:1 Approval of military action

Source: The Guardian and ICM Research Limited, September 20 – 22, 2002

The poll also shows that many were wary of the consequence of war with Iraq, Some were doubtful that Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction after many years of strategic bombings and sanctions. A majority of British people polled (46%) supported a continuation of the weapons inspection. An analysis of some aspects of that poll conducted in September 2002 showed that a majority of British people thought that the time was not right to initiate action, although they also believed that Iraq posed some form of threat to the international community. The poll showed that the public had seen no compelling reason to back military action on Iraq, an indication that the allegations against Saddam and Iraq had not been proven.

A similar poll was conducted after the government's presentation of its dossier on Iraq on September 24, 2002. Again, the British public were still opposed to the war plan despite the government's celebrated dossier. The result of the poll further showed a very stable trend in public opinion, with many questioning the case presented as justification for war. When compared with the Guardian/ICM poll earlier in the month, support for the war dropped by 7 percent. Those opposed to the war dropped by 6 percent and those undecided on the Iraq question increased by 4 percent. As Table 4:2 below shows, opposition to the war remained strong.

Table 4:2 shows the result of the poll when respondents were asked the question: The information in the dossier has persuaded me that military action now needs to be taken against in Iraq.

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Agree | 30% |
| Disagree | 40% |
| Don't know | 22% |

Table 4:2 Dossier's impact on approval of military action

Source: IPSOS MORI/ITV News, September 24 – 25, 2002

It was instructive that the public took such a stand despite mostly agreeing on another occasion that Iraq posed a danger to the international community. They did not trust Saddam, yet the public did not want the government to proceed to war. In fact, one question in the Guardian/ ICM poll sought to know if the public believed Saddam's claim that he would allow the weapons inspectors to work without restrictions. Of those polled, 78 percent did not

believe him, only 13 percent believed him and 9 per cent didn't know whether to believe him. There is no doubt that the British public considerably mistrusted the Iraqi regime but the immense suspicion did not translate to support for the war. Table 4:3 below shows respondents' reaction when asked to comment on the next question: Information in the (government's Iraq) dossier convinces me that Iraq poses a threat to international peace.

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Agree | 54% |
| Disagree | 24% |
| Don't know | 22% |

Table 4:3 Dossier and perception of Iraq's threat

IPSOS MORI/ITV News September 24 – 25, 2002

From the above poll, it appears that the British people were not totally against a war on an intransigent Iraq but were clearly concerned about the process leading to the war. One of the key demands of the public was that the government should work along with other Security Council members to confront Iraq under the umbrella of the United Nations. A number of opinion polls, including an IPSOS MORI/ITV News poll, showed that a large majority wanted Britain to work with other key members in the United Nations.

One of the questions in the IPSOS MORI/ITV News poll was: Would you support or oppose Britain joining American-led military action against Iraq with UN approval?

| | |
|---------|-----|
| Support | 71% |
|---------|-----|

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Oppose | 23% |
| Don't know | 6% |

Table 4:4 Support/ opposition for joint UK/US military action

Source: IPSOS MORI/ITV News, September, 2002

Support for the war nearly doubled on the condition that United Nation approved a combat with the Arab nation. Equally, opposition to the war dropped by a half. The percentage of people who were undecided on the subject tumbled to 6 per cent if the United Nations were to approve of war.

There was a marked difference when asked the contrasting question: Would you support or oppose Britain joining American-led military action against Iraq without UN approval? As Table 4:5 clearly shows, there was a total reversal in the poll numbers. The percentage of people in support fell dramatically and those opposed to the war without United Nation's approval rose very swiftly. Without United Nation's approval 70 percent were opposed to the war while 22 per cent backed it.

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Support | 22% |
| Oppose | 70% |
| Don't know | 8% |

Table 4:5 Public's view on a UN backed military action

Source: IPSOS MORI/ITV News, September 24 – 25 2002

In a similar poll conducted by Guardian and ICM in September 2002, the numbers were even stronger in support of United Nation's and Parliament's approval of any war effort. When respondents were asked: Before committing

British forces to an attack on Iraq what approval do you think the British government should seek? (1) Approval of the United Nations:

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Yes | 86% |
| No | 9 |
| Don't know | 6 |

Table 4:6 Support for UN sanctioned invasion

Source: The Guardian/ ICM, September 20 – 22, 2002

(2) Approval of the British Parliament:

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Yes | 86% |
| No | 10% |
| Don't know | 4% |

Table 4:7 Demands for military action sanctioned by parliament

Source: The Guardian/ ICM, September 20 – 22, 2002

Both polls indicated that the British people had deep-seated doubts on the legality of a war without United Nation's approval. Also, according to the poll, the public thought that the war plan could be better managed with parliamentary oversight. Similarly, although there was widespread demand for the building of broader alliances, British citizens were very sceptical of the Bush Administration's approach, a feeling which apparently was shared by some in Cabinet circles. Some in the British government saw the Bush Administration's approach as "pretty raw, rough, emotional" and "simplistic" (Prescott, 2009, p286). The public's disapproval of American-British alliance in Iraq was well represented in several polls conducted or published in September 2002. Below are the results of some of the polls.

Question: Tony Blair is too supportive of George W. Bush's foreign policy.

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Agreed | 69% |
| Disagreed | 24% |
| Don't know | 7% |

Table 4:8 Public's view on Blair's support for Bush

Source IPSOS MORI/ITV News September 24 – 25, 2002

In a similar IPSOS MORI/ITV poll held in the middle of August 2002, the public condemned Mr Blair's "blind" support for Mr Bush. Asked if they would describe Mr Blair as Mr Bush's poodle, 54% said yes. Another 39% did not agree while 7% did not know. So, well over a half of the respondents thought Britain had signed up to US policies without getting any meaningful thing back from the US.

From the foregoing, the trend of public opinion tended to be in agreement with the outlook I set out in the theoretical framework for this study. Public awareness and attention to the issues were high at the initial stage of the policy. But did the government recognize the issues the public identified as important? To answer that question, I need to examine in detail how the government responded to those issues the public considered important.

So far, I can remark that as expected, the public was in an advocacy mood, and advanced policy options that it wanted addressed. According to the opinion polls, the most important issues include parliamentary and United Nations' approval of military action against Iraq. Although they wanted Britain to broaden the alliance against Iraq, the public demanded that Britain should come out from the shadows of the United States. Further, the public also

wanted the government to make a credible case or rationale for going to war with Iraq.

Clearly, at this stage of policy British people appeared to be doubtful of the rationale for participation. More importantly, the public persistently demanded for a legal and orderly procedure to the war. This trend was in line with the terms of the theoretical framework set out in chapter three. Principally, the public demanded action on the procedures and steps government needed to take before embarking on war.

For example, there were demands on the role of Parliament, the Cabinet and the United Nations and co-operation with other European allies. Although there was opposition to the fundamental question of embarking on war, at the policy initiation stage, the public appeared nearly evenly matched on both sides of the argument. As a result, mostly procedural changes were expected to occur. Before looking at official response to these procedural issues, I will examine the demands of the mass media at the initiation stage of policy.

4.4 Newspapers: Policy Demands, Frequency and Issue Framing

My next step is to identify the policy preferences of the four newspapers studied for this research. Those policy preferences were published in their editorial comments or leader pages in September 2002. There were 25 editorials that discussed British plan of action in the first stage of the Iraqi policy (September 2002). On the surface, the frequency and total number of

the editorials might not appear significant, considering that Britain was getting ready to embark on a war.

It is also important to note that the editorials were infrequent and especially infrequent in the several days before Mr Blair's presentation of his argument before parliament. For seven weekdays before Mr Blair's parliamentary appearance on September 24, 2002, there were no editorial comments discussing Britain's policy on Iraq in the four newspapers. However, the newspapers wrote the highest number of editorial comments (5) on September 25, 2002, the day after the government's presentation of its Iraq dossier. The editorial comments discussed the dossier and whether a case had been made for Britain to embark on war.

Although, I will not engage on a day to day commentary on how officials responded to editorial comments, the number of newspaper editorials on the Iraq question in September 2002 indicated that the mass media were reasonably engaged on policy advocacy. However, they were not as fully engaged as we will find during the policy implementation stage. Could the limited attention be because the policy initiation stage was not as dramatic as when the nation was in a state of war? It is possible that the mass media which thrive on dramatic events found the slow-moving policy initiation stage less compelling to comment on.

In addition to looking at the combined frequency of editorials in all the newspapers, I also sought to know if the ideological leaning of the newspapers played a role in their policy stance at the initial stage of the Iraq policy. From Table 4:9 below, it is clear that the conservative newspapers (*Times* and *Telegraph*) with a combined total of 14 editorials appeared slightly more enthusiastic to comment on the policy than the liberal newspapers (*Guardian* and *Independent*). The latter wrote a combined total of eleven editorial comments. I also found that the more conservative newspapers endorsed government action and offered less policy options.

| Sept 2002 | <i>Times</i> | <i>Telegraph</i> | <i>Guardian</i> | <i>Independent</i> | Total |
|-----------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------|
| Total | 7 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 25 |

Table 4:9 Frequency of newspaper editorials in September 2002

To better reflect on how newspaper editorials tried to contribute to the policy process, I will now present data to show newspaper editorial demands and how they framed the government's case to embark on war with Iraq. Just like the British public opinion, the newspapers were not totally against Britain's embarking on war with Iraq. Similarly, they were sceptical of the processes leading up to the war. An analysis of the data will point to the major areas of concern in the press.

In their editorial opinions as shown in Table 4:10, the newspapers showed similar degrees of resolve in demanding for further weapons inspection. Of the four newspapers under consideration, one (*The Guardian*) noted that it was

necessary that the government produced evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. One newspaper (*The Daily Telegraph*) reasoned that producing evidence of WMD was helpful to the case being made for British participation in war. One newspaper (*The Times*) argued that enough evidence had been presented and endorsed British participation in combat. But *The Times* also wrote in one editorial that it was helpful to send the weapons inspectors back to Iraq. Two of the newspapers (*The Guardian* and *The Independent*) said that it was absolutely necessary that the weapons inspectors were sent back to Iraq. On one occasion, one newspaper (*The Guardian*) called for further use of sanctions against Iraq instead of embarking on military combat.

Additionally, the newspapers were vocal in their demands for diplomatic solutions. Two editorials (both in *The Guardian*) demanded that diplomatic tools be employed to avoid war. Four other editorials (two in *The Guardian* and two in *The Times*) specifically demanded that diplomatic solution should be found using the United Nations as a channel to attain that goal. And to ensure there were checks and balances in the process, three editorials (two in *The Guardian* and one in *The Independent*) demanded that the Parliament must approve of war. One editorial (in *The Times*) demanded that the Cabinet must be involved in making decisions for the war. Notably, similar oversight prominently featured in the public opinion polls. In contrast with public opinion, the newspapers did not strongly demand for a United Nations' mandate for war or role in humanitarian affairs at the policy initiation stage.

| Dominant issues in editorials | Frequency at Policy Initiation Stage |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| 1 In support of military Intervention | 4 |
| (a) caution needed | 3 |
| 2 Necessary to produce evidence of WMD | 1 |
| (b) helpful | 1 |
| (c) enough already produced | 1 |
| 3. Necessary to send back weapon inspectors | 3 |
| (b) helpful | 1 |
| 4. Necessary to have a second UN resolution to approve war | 1 |
| (b) helpful | 1 |
| 5 Conflict avoidable through diplomacy | 2 |
| (b) It depends on Saddam | 2 |
| 6 Checks and balances needed | 4 |
| (a) parliament should approve war | 3 |
| (b) cabinet | 1 |
| (c) public opinion | 2 |
| (d) no need | 1 |

Table 4:10 Frequency of policy demands in newspaper editorials in September 2002

The other way of looking at mass media opinion is to observe the way they represented government policy in those key issues dominating public and media attention. Table 4:11 below shows how the newspapers under consideration represented the official position at the policy initiation stage.

| Representation of official policy | Frequency |
|---|-----------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rationale for war: | |
| Regime change | 9 |
| Saddam intransigence | 7 |
| Bush/US vested interest | 1 |
| National interest | 6 |
| Prevent attack on Israel | 2 |
| Saddam's terrorist links | 1 |
| Eliminate Iraqi weapons threat | 5 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of government actions: | |
| Critical | 4 |
| Commendation | 7 |
| Purposeful | 5 |
| Subservient to the US | 1 |
| Dismissive | 1 |
| Empathy | 3 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mode/tone of editorial: | |
| Derisive | 4 |
| Supportive | 7 |
| Tough | 4 |
| Insightful | 2 |
| Demanding action | 8 |
| persuasive | 1 |

Table 4:11 Editorial Representation of Official Policies, September 2002

With 25 editorials on the Iraq question on record (see Table 4:9), I can safely claim that the newspapers were engaged with the policy to some reasonable degree. But in terms of the number of editorials on those key issues of interest to the public, like UN mandate for war (four editorials), production of evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (two editorials), the newspapers were not intensely engaged. It could be recalled that while forming the framework for this study I estimated that the media would be 'engaged' and in 'advocacy mood' at this stage of policy. To a limited degree, the newspapers I examined advocated for policy changes but the public appeared to have asked more questions of the government than the press on some of the key issues. For example, on the question of subservience to the United States, which was high on the public agenda, only one editorial noted that Britain was in an unequal relationship with the United States on the Iraq question. That evidence raises the question of who really had more impact on the government: the public or the mass media? That is an issue that needs further inquiry.

A further look at the nature and purpose of the editorials showed that nine of the editorials really advocated policies while 13 others discussed the issues without advocating a particular policy line. Three merely analyzed the issues, four took sides on established elite debate, three were merely descriptive of events and finally three editorials endorsed the official policy on the Iraq.

The newspapers' assessments of government actions at the policy initiation stage were mostly positive. Seven editorials clearly commended government's

actions, five noted that the government was purposeful and in three editorials the newspapers empathized with the government and the position it found itself in. On the other hand, four editorials were critical of government action and one was dismissive of government action. Considering the tone and mode of the editorials, eight demanded certain policy actions on the part of government but nearly as many (seven) were supportive of the government. Four editorials were derisive of government while four others were tough. Two were insightful and one was very persuasive in making its case.

To a large extent, the newspapers appeared to be unconvinced by the official argument that the purpose of the war was to check Iraqi production and use of WMD. In fact, nine editorials, making up 36 percent of the 25 editorials on the Iraq policy at the first stage of policy argued that the purpose of the war was to effect regime change. Seven thought that the purpose was to teach Saddam a lesson for his intransigence. Six editorials reasoned that it was in Britain's national interest to fight Saddam. Only five editorials argued that WMD was a reason to embark on the war. Just one editorial thought it was valid to use Saddam's link with terrorist groups as a reason to fight. The latter was the government's second most important argument to engage Iraq in combat.

Overall, the issues identified as important in the editorials of the newspapers studied included: (a) the need for a parliamentary oversight in the decision to go war, (b) that weapon inspectors be sent back to Iraq and (c) that government must clarify its case for going to war. It was also important to the mass media that a diplomatic route should be found to resolve the problem.

From the nature of the comments in the press, it appears, as in the case of public opinion, that the mass media wanted the government to refine procedural issues before engaging in war. There was no demand for strategic changes. For example, the newspapers hardly engaged the principal question of whether or not the country should embark on war. So, the newspapers only demanded for procedural changes. But how did the government respond to the issues raised at the policy initiation stage? After examining the frequency and nature of newspaper editorials, I will now examine how officials responded to public opinion and the mass media demands.

4.5 Frequency, Nature and Weight of Official Responses

As I noted in chapters two and three, official responsiveness could be manifest in one or all of a number of official actions. To verify evidence of official responsiveness, therefore, I will look out for those key indicators I set out in the theoretical framework in chapter two. There is official responsiveness when there is evidence that officials have turned attention to the issues raised by the public and mass media. Second, the government's eagerness to explain its actions could also serve as an indicator of responsiveness. Third, government's readiness to make public and mass media demands part of its legislative agenda is another evidence of responsiveness (Soule and King, 2006, Schumaker, 1975). Finally, if the government took action in the direction demanded by the public and mass media (and there is official acknowledgement of those demands), I will assume there was official responsiveness.

As I pointed out in chapter three, my second approach will be to put those responses in categories in order to demonstrate how far-reaching government responsiveness has been. Drawing from Paul Schumaker's (1975) framework, I will consider the first level of official response as *access responsiveness*. That level is attained if authorities show they are listening to the public. I will record *agenda responsiveness* when public and mass media demands are included in the political and legislative agenda.

But if the policy is put into action or passed into law, there is *policy responsiveness*. When there is evidence that public and mass media demands are fully incorporated in the policy, I will record *output responsiveness*. If the implementation of the policy meets the demands of the public, there is *impact responsiveness*. In the context used by Burstein and others (1995), if the changes lead to a restructuring of the political or diplomatic process, I will record a *structural responsiveness*.

Another approach is to actually measure the degree of change in policy. For this purpose I have employed Hermann's (1990) model introduced in the theory chapter. In summary, the British government's response to public and mass media opinion on Iraq, as I will soon show, mainly resulted in adjustment changes with minimal elements of programme changes. Evidence of those changes among others can be seen in values or numbers (see Table 4:12 below) I have used to illustrate how the government responded to the series of pressures emanating from public opinion and from the mass media.

Before reporting fully on the available data, it is vital to note that it would really be difficult to tie government response solely to the result of public call for caution. But there are enough similarities between public and mass media demands and official actions to warrant inferences of public and mass media impact on officials. It is striking that, at times, different officials acknowledged public or mass media demands but argued against those demands. The data also showed that the British government, at this stage of policy, was not much swayed from what seemed to be its strategic goal: to end the threat the Saddam regime allegedly posed. Overall, there were ample indications of official responses to public and mass media demands.

As noted earlier, I am interested in both the quantity and quality of responses made by British government officials. (See the key explaining the numbers representing nature of responses in the footnotes.) In terms of quantity, Table 4:12 shows officials responded 34 times to public and mass media demands. The data clearly indicated that officials were “open” to public and mass media opinion as I projected would be the case at this stage of policy. It is also noteworthy that on 17 occasions, in the same period, officials actually made positive comments or took positive actions in agreement with public and mass media demands.

On the other hand, there were 19 negative responses (comments and actions in disagreement with popular opinion), showing that there was a marginal difference (two occasions) between government’s negative response and

positive response. This is a far cry from the picture usually painted in the Manufacturing Consent literature which portrays governments as mostly unconcerned about mass media and public opinion on foreign policy (see Gowing, 1994, Strobel, 1997, Herman, 1993).

| September 2002 | Nature ² of response (and total for each) | Number of responses | Type of response/sensitivity (and total for each) | Number of positive responses | Number of negative responses | Weight of official (and total for each grade) | Degree of change (and total for each degree) |
|----------------|--|---------------------|---|------------------------------|------------------------------|---|--|
| | 1(3), 2(6), 3(12), 4(7), 5(2),6(1) | 34 | 2(9),3(9) 4(11),5(1) 6(4) | 17 | 19 | 8(10), 6(9), 4(3), 2(8) 1(3) | 2(2) 1(13), -1(23) |

Table 4:12 frequency, nature and weight of official responsiveness/sensitivity.

Note: Numbers in brackets represent the occurrences or frequency of responses.

²Key to table: (I) Nature of response – 1: press statement; 2: press conference; 3: press interview; 4: public statement; 5: parliamentary statement; 6: policy announcement
(III) Type of response: 1: acknowledgement; 2: dismissive; 3: defensive; 4: conciliatory; 5: persuasive; 6: extensive case
(VI) Weight of official: 1: undisclosed source; 2: senior official; 3: Downing Street; 6: Cabinet member; 8: Prime minister; 10: Cabinet
(VII) Degree of change: -1: dismissive; 1: adjustment; 2: programme; 3: problem/goal; 4: orientation

When I consider the nature of responses recorded, the picture that emerges is of a positively responsive government. On majority of occasions (11 times), officials were actually conciliatory to public and mass media demands.

However, the government was found to be dismissive of the public position in 9 instances, while also defensive of its own position on 9 occasions. Although in the 18 instances of negative and defensive responses, it was willing to explain its action to the public, just as I expected of a responsive government. The data shows that the officials made extensive cases for their position on four occasions and made one extensive effort to persuade the populace.

In chapter two I noted that the rank of officials responding to public demand could be another indicator of how serious a government was taking public and mass media demands. At the policy initiation stage, I recorded 165 for the weight of officials who responded to public and mass media demands. The weight or seniority of officials who responded is a clear indication that the British government considered those demands very seriously. The Prime Minister responded more than any other official. He responded 10 times, followed by cabinet ministers who responded 9 times and senior officials (8 times). Downing Street, the Prime Minister's office, responded 3 times and unnamed officials responded 3 times. Government's responsiveness is underscored by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, clearly the force behind Britain's Iraqi policy (Prescott, 2009), leading the government's move to address public anxieties.

It is also important to look at the nature of the official responses. Most times, officials responded to public and mass media demands by means of press interviews (12 times). That is important because in granting press interviews, officials would usually choose the media outlet that reaches their target audience. That choice is usually made deliberately to attain maximum effect. Press interviews are different from news conferences because the latter are not as well targeted as the former. For the same reasons, interviews are more important than news releases. In the period studied, there were 3 press statements, 6 press conferences and 7 public statements. The latter is an effort to reach the public directly with an undiluted response to its anxieties. Most importantly, the issues that were of concern to the public were addressed in two parliamentary statements. They led to one policy announcement.

Based on my earlier projections derived from the framework mapped by Paul Schumaker (1975) and Burstein and others (1995), I can note that varied degrees of responsiveness at this stage of policy included access responsiveness. That was because authorities showed willingness to listen to the demands of citizens. Furthermore, because those issues the public and the mass media raised also formed the government's parliamentary agenda, agenda responsiveness was attained. But neither impact responsiveness nor structural responsiveness was attained. That was because there were no fundamental changes in the political or diplomatic objectives of government, despite, for instance, that the public and mass media questioned the legality of the war.

The other level of analysis is to look at the degree of changes suggested or carried out by officials in response to public demands. As evident in Table 4:12, officials showed degrees of responsiveness but they predominantly focused on the official policy objective. In 23 instances, representing 60.5 per cent of the cases, officials restated or acted in a way that entrenched its policy goal, although that varied with the public and the mass media demands. In 13 cases, officials indicated government willingness to make adjustment changes. In addition, there were two offers to make programme changes. All together, in 39.5 per cent of the cases, officials actually made offers to change or actually changed official policies in agreement with public and mass media policy preferences.

Overall, a review of official conduct at the policy initiation stage showed that the government was resolute in defending its main policy objectives. It made 19 negative responses to public demands. However, it conceded some procedural and a few strategic changes to a very demanding public and the mass media that were engaged on the issues to some degree. After reporting on the nature of government responses, I will now highlight some concrete instances of official responsiveness and try to explain what influenced government action.

4.6 Influences on Official Response and Instances of Changes

A vital question is: why did British officials act in the manner they did in response to public and mass media demands at the policy initiation stage? Could officials be responsive or more willing to change in different case scenarios? Explaining non-responsiveness Cohen (1997), Jacobs and Shapiro (2000), Manza and Cook (2001) reasoned that politicians and policy makers probably have their own entrenched policy preferences which may have conflicted with popular preferences. As regards Britain's Iraq policy, could there have been such entrenched policy preferences? My next goal is to identify some policy issues with which I will use to illustrate how the government responded to public demands. Also, I will use this section to make clearer the degree of change in government policy. I start by looking at the debate on whether or not weapon inspection should continue.

4.6.1 Response to Weapons Inspections Debate

Multiple reasons might have accounted for British government's unwillingness to adjust its strategic goal. Foremost of its claim was that "Saddam was dedicated to possessing WMD" (Campbell, 2008, p639). Dale (2009) claimed that those who championed a more aggressive approach to check Iraq could cite the problematic history of the WMD weapons inspection as their motivation. She further noted that advocates of a more aggressive approach argued that Iraq showed willingness to use WMD against its neighbours and its citizens. According to that school of thought, Iraq's willingness and actual use of WMD, demanded that Iraq should be closely inspected and, if need be, harshly sanctioned. Further to that, the so called hawks reasoned that since

those measures earmarked to contain Iraq were punctuated by a string of Iraqi provocations, Iraqi troop build-ups, and citizens' abuse, the only way to bring the country's threat under control was to effectively change the Saddam regime (Dale, 2009).

On weapons inspection, Britain repeatedly cited cases made by some think-tanks as justification to remain resolute on its strategy. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002), for instance, stated that Iraq used about four years of lull in (or total absence of) weapons inspection to revive and/or conceal its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. For example, in its September 9, 2002 Strategic Dossier (p11), the Institute noted:

"Iraqi scientists still have the necessary knowledge and experience to reconstruct Iraq's WMD and missile programmes, and Iraq possesses dual use equipment and materials that could be converted to support these programmes, especially for chemical and biological weapons. Most important, there is no indication that President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership have changed their commitment to retain and develop WMD and missiles as a high priority for Iraq's foreign and defence objectives."

But supposedly independent observers like the IISS could not account for the impact of the long-term UN embargoes on Iraq's access to technologies and materials needed for armament development. However, their comments on Iraqi military capabilities were freely cited by British officials as vindication of their own judgement that Saddam's Iraq posed serious danger to the world.

Although British officials had become weary of continued support for the UN weapons inspectors because "Saddam was making Blix and UN look like

fools" (Campbell, 2008, p647), the government in the middle of September 2002 made a conditional reversal of policy. Officials toned down their rhetoric on this subject as public position on the matter became clearer. For instance, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw, after a meeting with permanent UN representatives from US, Russia, China and France announced: "There is ... complete unanimity about the imperative of getting the weapons inspectors back into Iraq."³ He added that the inspectors would be in for a very short time. Whether it was a move to set up Saddam who was prevaricating on allowing back the inspectors unconditionally or to woo other Security Council members to side with US and Britain in their ultimate objective of containing Saddam, the decision was in line with British public opinion.

Mr Blair also positively addressed the public's request that Britain should go through the UN route to war. He said in a speech to the Conference of Trade Unions on September 10, 2002:

"I totally understand the concerns of people about precipitate military action. Military action should only be a last resort....

I believe it is right to deal with Saddam through the United Nations. After all, it is the will of the UN he (Saddam) is flouting. He, not me or George Bush, is in breach of UN resolutions. If the challenge to us is to work with the UN, we will respond to it..."⁴

In the final analysis, the British government offered concessions but there was never any evidence that the government ever considered changing its long-term goal on Iraq. In terms of the processes leading to the strategic policy, the government's responsiveness was only at the first of the four levels of changes I expected to occur at the policy initiation stage. In this case, my

³ *The Daily Telegraph*, September 14, 2002

⁴ House of Commons Research Paper 02/53 p74

expectation that any responsive government should at least make adjustments changes is met. As I explained previously, when there are adjustment changes, “changes occur in the level of effort and in the scope of recipients but the purpose for which it is done remain unchanged,” (Hermann, 1990, p5).

4.6.2 Security Council and Task of Coalition Building

The British government strived even harder to meet public demands for a broader coalition ahead of the war. But some of the Security Council members questioned American and British objective in the series of policies on Iraq. There were open disagreements between Russia and France pitted against the United States and the United Kingdom on future inspections and how to manage the sanctions.

Although steps were taken to address some of Russia's and France's concerns, their support of sanctions on Iraq and inspection of weapons in the country were at best mercurial. Only the United States and the United Kingdom remained completely united in the demand for full implementation of UN resolutions. The extent of the disagreements among the permanent members of the Security Council became more evident during the months leading up to the war in 2003. But by 1994 it was already clear in official circles that a broad mission to confront Iraq as a united force was no longer feasible. Secretary of State Albright (2003, p275) noted that despite what had been achieved in dismantling Iraqi weapons, “future progress, however, was

in jeopardy. Iraq owed Russia and France from past transactions and those countries wanted to collect.”

Albright recalled the then Russian foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, as reasoning: “Without sanctions the Iraqis would sell oil and pay us; with sanctions, they sell oil and use the sanctions as an excuse not to pay us.” In view of the entrenched interests, it was bound to be extremely difficult for the British government to forge a common front with Russia and France in 2002. It was apparent that those nations’ interests were mostly at variance with Britain’s.

Official claims that the French, for instance, “did not really matter” (Prescott, 2009, p284) must have prompted the high numbers of those who demanded a broader alliance. Academic explanation of the impasse in the Security Council did not really address people’s anxieties. For instance, while noting that the disagreement within the Security Council was mainly of a technical nature, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002, p8) claimed:

“The underlying dispute was political. Washington sought the removal of Saddam Hussein, while Moscow and Paris were prepared to accept his regime. As a result the US had every incentive to demand high standards for resolving disarmament issues, in order to maintain economic sanctions against Baghdad, while Moscow and Paris were inclined to offer incentives and compromise on disarmament issues in order to lift and resume normal relations with Baghdad.”

No matter the motivation for the vacillation of France and Russian, British domestic opinion constantly demanded that Britain worked in concert with a broader alliance of nations (Lewis, 2004). That popular demand was one

policy Britain publicly strived to pursue. Through most of the dialogue leading up to the war in 2003 it did appear, at least covertly, that a broad consensus was an option attractive to Britain. The poll numbers presented in Tables 4:1 to 4:8 must have added an impetus to the diplomatic drive.

Notwithstanding the effort made to build a broad platform to confront Iraq, the chasm between French and Russian policy on one hand and British and American stance never really closed. The former persisted in their argument “that the Iraqis would cooperate if only they were given a clear understanding of what was required to lift sanctions” (Albright, 2003, p284). As earlier noted, to the British and the Americans, experience showed Saddam “never moved except when forced to do so” (Clinton, 2005, p778). As the conflict appeared to escalate, French and Russian statements on how to proceed appeared even more at variance with United States’. The government could not be fully blamed for not making an effort. At least on one occasion it reversed itself to seek a second UN resolution for war as demanded by France. Britain's failure at alliance building was due mainly to a failure of diplomacy. The other factor that perhaps contributed to its failure to build the desired alliance could be its long-term and inflexible goal of ousting Saddam.

Former deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott (2009, p284) recalled the tactics employed by the government:

“During the run-up to the invasion, we all had our own reservations, and we were genuinely trying to delay an actual invasion, and go the UN route, if not stop it altogether, for as long as possible.”

Once again in this policy area, there were adjustment changes in Britain's plan to build alliances or go through the UN route. There were obvious cases of problem changes but the downside was that the moves were marked with failure owing to mutual suspicion between Britain and France especially.

4.6.3 American Influence on British Iraqi Policy

While there was public desire for a closer cooperation between Britain and other members of the Security Council, there was palpable public anxiety that British officials were uncritically supportive of United States' resolve to engage Iraq in a combat. In fact, it is possible that the call for closer cooperation with France and Russia stemmed from the fact that both countries were openly critical of US Iraqi policy. For instance, both countries demanded that weapons inspectors be given more time to scour Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. British public opinion tended to side with the French and the Russians, at least in principle.

On the other hand, the British public were averse to all of United States' key stands on Iraq. For example, US stand that there was no need for a UN resolution to approve a combat with Iraq was at variance with dominant British public opinion. United States' argument that there was no need for further work by weapons inspectors was also at odds with British public opinion. While US officials considered the use of force as the only viable way of verifying and eliminating Iraq's weapon of mass destruction, the British public thought diplomacy could still avert conflict. United States also judged Iraq

guilty of contravening numerous UN resolutions and thought it should be punished, an intransigence seen among some in Britain as already punished by the long regime of sanctions.

It also appeared that the British public were not convinced that Saddam Hussein had a hand in the September 11, 2001 terrorists attack on the United States, a common stand of United States officials. Above all, there was a sense that Britain should not subserviently sign up to a preconceived American policy to remove Saddam forcibly. There was a bigger worry that Britain would end up as a “discredited and powerless partner” in an illegal war (Alani, 2009, p16).

Interestingly, even in British official circles, there was also a sense that “Americans were determined to invade Iraq before it happened” (Prescott, 2009, p282). But did public opinion and pressure from the mass media compel the British government to reconsider its alliance with the American government on Iraq? In the face of American resolve, was it possible for Britain to sway the United States if it tried? Was Britain ready to sacrifice its relationship with the United States over Iraq? These difficult questions point to why British officials opted to resist pressures to break from allying with United States ahead of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Britain signed up to both tasks of restraining Saddam and weakening him by several means. The British equally stood for the use of tough measures against Saddam and Iraq. Albright (Ibid, p277) assuredly noted that from the outset of the Labour government, United States counted on an unequivocal support from Britain: “(British Foreign

Secretary Robin) Cook helped ensure Great Britain's position as a stalwart ally in backing an appropriately tough line toward Iraq.”

In essence, the plan to remove Saddam forcibly was neither a transitional policy that faded with the Clinton Administration nor was it a happenstance that the Bush Administration chanced on in 2002 or 2003. It was a long-term policy which Britain signed up to from the outset. If United States had an unfinished business in Iraq dating back to 1991, so did Britain. Even if Britain had wanted to sway United States from this position it would have been nearly impossible. As far as the Americans were concerned, “Iraq abused its final chance” far back in 1998 (Clinton, 2005, p833). It was absolutely difficult to change that frame of mind. This policy stand only got tougher as time went on. So, my expectation was that it was bound to be absolutely difficult for Britain to discard its policy and the long-term role it had played along with the United States in Iraq.

When faced with public displeasure with Britain's unquestioning loyalty to the US, the British government apparently hurried through a Middle East agenda (a road map to Palestine) as a component part of the Iraqi issue. Clearly, that British gesture was an attempt to assuage public anger. Prescott (2009, p284) recalled: “I argued that Tony thought going into Iraq would help us and the Americans with a road map to Palestine.” It would be extremely naïve to think that President Bush would put the Iraqi and Palestinian issues on the same plate, considering his well-known negative attitude towards some members of the Palestine leadership. Mr Blair's move to throw up the Palestinian question

was a form of response to domestic British audiences, and an attempt to calm tension in Arab-Anglo-American relations which increased exponentially ahead of the plan to attack Iraq. This can be considered only as a procedural change as it does not constitute a change in policy.

4.6.4 Tony Blair's 'Presidential' Style

The final issue I will consider in this first stage of the case study is the public and the mass media's demands that the Cabinet and Parliament be recalled to deliberate on the war. It is a known element of the British constitution that a prime minister's power to take the nation to war is derived from the Crown Privilege. In essence it means that the prime minister has a procedural responsibility to inform the monarch of his intention to take the nation to war. He or she, while deciding to commit Britain's armed forces to war is not bound by any constitutional responsibility to take the matter before the rest of the government or the parliament. Accepted that a prime minister could possibly single-handedly declare a war when there is imminent danger, it is expected that no prime minister should attempt to use the powers in a democracy.

But the rule was the source of mounting apprehension through the summer of 2002. Britain was increasing its preparation for war while the Cabinet and the House of Commons were in a lengthy recess. The Prime Minister did not seem to be in a mood to recall the Parliament either. There was increasing fear that the Prime Minister was pressing ahead with his plan without the Cabinet and/or the Parliament deliberating on the merits or otherwise of engaging Iraq in war.

The apprehension over Mr Blair's intention to take the nation to war single-handedly would have been taken lightly but for his record of concentrating power in the office of the Prime Minister (Heffernan, 2005). Mr Blair's style was widely condemned in a number of opinion polls and newspaper editorials. Three of the four newspapers considered in this study wrote editorials demanding that Parliament and the Cabinet be recalled to decide on whether Britain should engage in war (for example, *The Guardian*, September 6, 2002; *The Independent*, September 14, 2002). *The Daily Telegraph* (September 4, 2004) wrote that in tune with convention, the British Prime Minister had the freedom of action in matters of foreign affairs and defence.

On the other hand, the opinion polls show a popular demand that Parliament should be engaged in the making of war policies. In line with some of those demands, Blair recalled both the Cabinet and the Parliament. However, both bodies only served as forums for Mr Blair to propound his own case for war. Also, it was evident that the Cabinet did not critically assess the case for war. I will once again draw from Mr Prescott's (2009, p284) account:

"My attitude was that Tony (Blair), having made up his mind, should be supported. I took one of the cabinet meetings on Iraq and got carried away, saying it was vital to stick together. We should do the brave thing and not be cowards."

Mr Blair may have fully responded to the calls to recall Parliament and the Cabinet but he used them to strengthen his own position.

In fact, Michael Foley (2005, p4) explained that Blair's perceived political clout, which showed features of a presidential style, evolved out of an

“enhanced emphasis upon individual leadership, personal communication and presentational style.” The result, he argued, was the apparent emergence of a de facto British president in a parliamentary system of government. Heffernan (2005, p1) added that Blair “rekindled interest in the old notion of prime ministerial government, the idea that power within British government was concentrated in the office of the Prime Minister.” The question is: will Blair concede those features of his personal style to public pressure? Because the response to public calls involved the use of some elements of statecraft, I consider the change effected here as a programme change

4.7 Summary

As regards the degree of changes to official policy, I expected no major strategic changes to British policy on Iraq at the policy initiation stage. On the other hand, I expected to see a number of procedural changes at this stage of policy. The level and scope of changes noticed in this stage (predominantly adjustment changes and a small number programme changes) will later be compared with the degree of changes within other stages of the policy process. I have summarized in Table 4:13 the nature and degrees of government responsiveness to some public and mass media demands.

| Policy Issue | Nature of Policy Change | Degree of Official Responsiveness (0 – 4) ⁵ |
|---|--|--|
| Britain should not launch attack but let weapons inspectors to continue | Adjustment Changes and elements of Programme Changes | 1 |
| Expand coalition and join combat only on UN approval | Adjustment Changes | 1 |
| Stop being overly supportive of American policy | Some Adjustment Changes | 1 |
| Explain rationale for war | Programme Changes | 2 |
| Change Blair's "presidential" style and recall Parliament and Cabinet | Programme Changes | 2 |

Table 4:13 Summary of Policy Changes and Degree of Official Responsiveness

⁵ Key to degrees of responsiveness: 0 – mere acknowledgement of public or media opinion but no action taken; 1 – Policy refinement but purpose is unchanged; 2 – changes in method involving new instruments of statecraft (e.g., diplomatic negotiations); 3 – initial goal is replaced; 4 – change in orientation and attitude towards world affairs.

The Iraqi question fits into the mould of the three cornerstones of the Blair foreign policy. They are: an activist policy of interventionism, maintaining a strong alliance with the United States and a desire to place Britain in the heart of Europe (Lunn, Miller and Smith, 2008). British Iraqi policy and the government's behaviour in the conduct of the policy is a good reflection of British foreign policy process. In the next chapter, I will highlight the state of public opinion and mass media policy choices and how government responded to them during the policy implementation stage

5 Mass Media, Public Opinion and Implementation of Britain's Policy on Iraq: March 2003

5.1 Introduction

In chapter four, I was able to identify the policy options that dominated British public opinion polls and mass media editorials at the initiation of the plan to invade Iraq. After noting the issues that dominated public attention at that stage of policy, I discussed how officials responded to those public and mass media policy preferences. Predominantly, I was able to identify several cases of procedural changes to the policy process at that stage of policy. I did not observe any far-reaching change in the strategic objective at the initial stage of the policy.

In this chapter, I will assess how officials responded to public and mass media policy preferences at the policy implementation stage. I will carry out the same lines of enquiry as I did at the policy initiation stage. First, I will identify the major issues that dominated mass media and public opinion and then measure and analyze how officials responded to those policy preferences. Specifically, the period covered in this stage of the policy is March 1 to 31, 2003. That was when the war on Iraq was launched. I have captured the trend in public opinion by means of opinion polls carried out principally in March 2003. The next step is to categorize newspaper editorials and how they framed official policy stands with the aim of identifying policy preferences canvassed in the mass media.

In chapter six, I will examine official responsiveness at the policy review stage. As I noted in preceding chapters, there will be an analysis of policy responsiveness in the three stages in chapter seven. The purpose of the comparison is to confirm or refute my thesis that the stage of foreign policy would determine how officials respond to public and mass media demands for change in foreign policy.

In this chapter, I will start by providing an overview of events that took place between the initiation of policy in September 2002 and March 2003, just before the implementation of the policy in March 2003. That background will provide the needed perspective to the public and media policy options. Further in this chapter, I will highlight the issues that dominated the policy implementation stage. That list includes issues that carried on from the policy initiation stage. As already noted, the most important step is to establish how officials responded to those public and mass media preferences. So, I will ultimately be searching for signs of those types of foreign policy changes I identified in chapter two. As a way of bringing these policy actions to life, I will highlight some government policy actions which illustrate government actions during this stage in the policy process.

5.2 Events between September 2002 and March 2003

As I demonstrated in chapter four, policy discussion at the policy initiation stage predominantly centred on six key topics. Those topics included whether or not Saddam Hussein constituted a threat to Britain. More specifically, for

months, the citizens wrangled over whether Britain should engage in war despite the unproven claim that Iraq possessed and was willing to use weapons of mass destruction. There were also debates on whether or not Britain's participation should be dependent on a United Nations' mandate for combat. Parliamentary oversight in Britain's participation in the war was equally debated. Similar concerns were raised over how close Britain should work with America's President Bush. Others demanded that Britain should work at broadening the alliance against Iraq.

Official response to those public concerns dominated the news from October 2002 up to the onset of war in March 2003. Senior officials of government, the security agencies and the Parliament also addressed the public's doubts over the validity of government's dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. A wary British people also raised concerns on the nature of military action to be waged and how the allied forces planned to meet the humanitarian needs of ordinary Iraqis if attacks were to be launched.

Perhaps afraid that opposition to the war was growing, the Iraq Communications Group (ICG) established in December 2002, and headed by the Prime Minister's director of communications and strategy Alastair Campbell, sought to highlight to the public “the organisation of deception, concealment and intimidation in Iraq” (Intelligence and Security Committee, September 2003, p36). But that new initiative further undermined government's credibility as fresh questions were raised over the ICG's sources of information. There were serious concerns that the government had deliberately put a spin on intelligence.

Mr Blair himself described one of those documents released in February 2003 as “further intelligence ... about the infrastructure of concealment,” (Hansard, Column 25, of February 3, 2003). It turned out to be one of the most ineffectual government cases for war on Iraq. In fact it was so unpopular that it was generally referred (in the terms used in a Channel 4 News scoop) as the “dodgy dossier.” The dossier was partly sourced from an intelligence-derived paper produced by the Secret Intelligence Service for the Coalition Information Centre. But a substantial part of it was recognised by Cambridge academic Dr Glen Rangwala as plagiarised passages from Mr Ibrahim al-Marashi's published article in the Middle East Review of International Affairs in September 2002 and made available on the Internet (Campbell, 2008, p664).

Campbell (2008, p664) recorded in his diary on February 7, 2003:

“The CIC dossier was causing a lot of embarrassment. Seemingly whole chunks were lifted off the Internet. I wrote a note to the CIC to emphasise the importance of quality control and to make clear that this shouldn't have happened. It was a bad own goal, especially as we didn't need it given the very good intelligence and other materials we had. Definitely (there will be) no more dossiers for a while. I called John Scarlett (Chairman of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee) who was very nice about it, but also emphasised how careful we had to be.”

The House of Commons' Intelligence and Security Committee (September 2003, p37) found the spin on intelligence material to have had a more damaging impact on the work of the intelligence community:

“It was a mistake not to consult the agencies before the material was put in the public domain. In evidence to us the Prime minister agreed. We have reported the assurance that we have been given that in future the JIC chairman will check all intelligence-derived material on behalf of the intelligence committee prior to publication. The publicity surrounding the document was such that it devalued the input of the agencies. It was

counterproductive in that attention was distracted from the concealment, intimidation and deception of the Iraqi regime.”

Overall, government's case for war, even after the September 2002 dossier, was seen as “flawed in its treatment of available evidence, giving undue weight to problematic and fragmentary intelligence” (O'Halpin, 2005, p89).

One other subject that occupied public attention included the handling of the Iraq question in the United Nations system and Iraq's response to the weapon inspection regime. Technically, war would be averted if Iraq cooperated with the weapons inspectors and disarmed. That analysis could perhaps be the source of the public's focus on how Iraq responded to the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In chapter four, I noted that the public seemed convinced that Saddam Hussein was a dangerous and troublesome man. But could Saddam's obstruction or cooperation with UNMOVIC sway public opinion and the media to support or oppose the war?

To optimists, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, should have paved the way for an amicable solution to the inspection disputes. Part of that optimism arose from the fact that the Resolution incorporated agreements reached between Iraqi representative, General Amir H. Alsaadi and Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, and International Atomic Energy Director General, Mohammed El-Baradei, in their discussions on how the inspections should proceed. Iraq was expected to provide “immediate and unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access” to all sites and officials that UNMOVIC and IAEA considered worthy of examining (S/Res/1441, 2002 p3).

But tellingly, in the Resolution, the Security Council directed the Executive Chairman of UNMOVI and the Director General of IAEA to report any case of defiance “immediately to the Council” which would convene immediately upon the receipt of such a report to consider the way to “secure international peace and security” (S/Res/1441, 2002 p5). The Resolution warned that Iraq would “face serious consequences” if it did not live up to its obligation following “this final opportunity to disarm” (S/Res/1441, 2002 pp1-5). On the part of British officials, they were clearly conflicted between hanging on to hope of a “20 percent chance Saddam would cooperate” and standing shoulder to shoulder with President Bush who was awaiting the opportunity to strike despite the Resolution (Campbell, 2008, p647). In response, President “Bush said he didn't know what cooperation (demanded by the Resolution) meant” (Campbell, Ibid).

The ambivalence of the Americans on Resolution 1441 was clearly apparent. But once the crisis heated up, Britain took up the diplomatic gauntlet in line with domestic demands. That was despite America's cool attitude to any more diplomatic moves to resolve the crisis. Britain's role in the diplomatic process that led to the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441 was partly a demonstration of Britain's willingness to seek legitimacy for the war - a combat that was approved by the United Nations.

In another development, a series of anti-war demonstrations marked a new dimension to the war debate. From February 15 through 16, 2003,

demonstrations were held in several world cities with one million reportedly marching in London and Glasgow. The magnitude of the demonstrations (recounted in detail in sub-section 5.3.2) was remarkable and it provided one big public pressure to sway the war debate (Beetham, 2003).

5.3 Dimensions of Public Opinion

After outlining the major events in the period between the official initiation of the British policy on Iraq and the beginning of combat, I will now seek to capture the dimensions of public opinion at the policy implementation stage. As in chapter four, I will include here national opinion polls on the key policy issues debated during the sample month of March 2003. Furthermore, I will highlight the dimensions of mass media policy demands. The final step will be to weigh government responsiveness or sensitivity to both public opinion and mass media policy demands.

Once again I will measure official responsiveness by weighing the quantity, nature and degree of official responses as well as the weight of officials making those responses. I will also measure the degree of policy change. The degree of responsiveness at the policy implementation stage will be compared with degrees of official responsiveness and policy changes at the policy initiation and review stages to determine whether responsiveness varied at the different stages of policy.

It was evident from the events leading up to the policy implementation stage that the British public were still concerned about how government conducted

the Iraqi policy. I will start by looking at how the public generally perceived the government's conduct of the whole Iraq policy. The public's attitude to the government's conduct of the Iraq policy could be a viable measure of the public's policy preferences. Equally, owing to the widespread assumption that the Iraq war was "Tony Blair's war" (Dyson, 2006, p289), I can conclude that the public's perception of the Prime Minister could be a good measure of the public's attitude towards his government's policies. Overall, the public's attitude towards the government's handling of the Iraq policy fluctuated throughout the process of the war but I will focus attention on polls conducted in March 2003.

5.3.1 Public Opinion Polls during Policy Implementation

In two IPSOS-MORI polls conducted from February 28 to March 2, 2003 and March 14 to March 16 only about a third of the public approved of the government's handling of the Iraq policy. Respondents were asked: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is handling the current situation with Iraq? Table 5:1 shows the public's attitude in the two periods.

| | 28 Feb. - 2 March 2003 | 14-16 March 2003 |
|------------|------------------------|------------------|
| Approve | 36% | 30% |
| Disapprove | 53% | 54% |
| Don't Know | 12% | 16% |

Table 5: 1 Government's handling of Iraq Issue

Source: ipsos-mori.com

While a majority of the public (53 to 54 percent) disapproved of government's handling of the Iraq policy, a considerable percentage of the respondents (12

and 16 percent) did not know how to categorize the government's preparation for war. A whole six months after the government started making its case for war, the government's performance was found to be either objectionable or confusing. The public's attitude implied that the government did not perform well in selling its own policy. Government's ineptude or insincerity clearly left a majority of the population either unsatisfied or confused.

After the onset of war, the public's rating of the Prime Minister's handling of the Iraq policy became more even. For instance, in one *Telegraph*, ITV News, YouGov poll, Mr Blair's handling of the Iraq policy was compared with other political and world leaders. Respondents appeared almost evenly divided as they rated the Prime Minister in terms of reliability, trustworthiness and ability to handle the Iraq war (*The Daily Telegraph*, March 21, 2003, p11). According to *The Daily Telegraph*, the respondents were asked: How would you rate (Mr Blair's) handling of the Iraq crisis as a whole so far? The response was:

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Excellent | 14% |
| Good | 33% |
| Poor | 30% |
| Very poor | 20% |
| Don't know | 2% |

Table 5: 2 Government's handling of Iraq Issue

Source: Telegraph 21.03.03 p11

From the the result shown in Table 5:2, the poll conducted five days into the launching of conflict, indicated that 47 percent approved of the government's handling of the Iraq policy. On the other hand, 50 percent were not satisfied with the government's conduct of the Iraq policy.

Although the reasons for the public's disapproval of the government's handling of affairs were not clearly outlined in the polls, questions were obviously raised once again about the credibility of the government's case against Iraq. The public had even more serious doubts about the credibility of the Iraqi government led by Saddam Hussein. But the British government did not get much credit for failing to satisfactorily address procedural issues championed by the public before the war. The government was repeatedly criticised for not coming clean with the public on the rationale for embarking on war.

In the *Telegraph/ITV News/YouGov* poll, the respondents were asked: How much do you trust them (British officials) to tell the truth about the war? A majority (51 percent) either did not trust the British officials very much or did not trust them at all. They responded as shown in the Table 5:3 below:

| | British Government | US Government | Saddam Hussein |
|------------------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------|
| Trust a great deal | 6% | 4% | 0% |
| Trust a fair amount | 41% | 32% | 0% |
| Do not trust very much | 34% | 29% | 14% |
| Do not trust at all | 17% | 33% | 84% |
| Don't know | 2% | 2% | 1% |

Table 5: 3 Degree of Trust. Source: *Telegraph* 21.03.03 p11

Although a majority of the respondents did not trust the British government on the case for war, the government fared better than the Americans and the Iraqis. One way of explaining a few good ratings of the government is to look at the government's attitude to public opinion at the time of polling. The

highest recorded approval of the government's conduct (40%) was recorded in the Ipsos-Mori poll of 24 - 25 September 2002. This was the same period in time when the Parliament was convened, when the Cabinet met for the first time after a couple of months, and when the government indicated that it would follow the UN route and allow for further weapons inspection. Those were the key demands made by the public in the first stage of policy. At that point in the process when the government took positive steps to address those concerns, the public's approval of the government was at its highest point.

I will proceed by looking at the degree to which those key demands were supported by the public at the policy implementation stage. According to Ipsos-Mori polls, when respondents were asked at the policy initiation stage if they supported or opposed an American-led war with United Nations approval, a remarkable 71 percent supported the move. Only 22 percent supported a war led by United States without United Nations backing. An equally remarkable 70 percent opposed a war without UN approval. By January 2003, opposition to such a war without United Nations backing had increased to 77 percent of those polled, perhaps because no weapons of mass destruction were yet to be found in Iraq.

Between February 28 and March 2, 2003 and March 14 to 16, 2003, different aspects of the war policy were tested in an Ipsos-Mori poll. Respondents were asked if they would support or oppose British troops joining any American-led

military action against Iraq in a number of circumstances. When asked whether they would support a military action if the UN inspectors found proof that Iraq was trying to hide weapons of mass destruction and the UN Security Council voted in favour of military action, the respondents were overwhelmingly supportive. They responded as shown below:

| | 28 Feb - 2 March 2003 | 14 - 16 March 2003 |
|------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Support | 75% | 74% |
| Oppose | 18% | 17% |
| Don't know | 7% | 7% |

Table 5:4 Evidence Iraq was hiding WMD and with UN approval

Source Ipsos-mori.com

Three quarters of the respondents were supportive of military action if weapons of mass destruction were found and the UN approved of military action. It could be argued that the public seemed resolved on this question because, over the two weeks between the polls, not much changed in terms of support or opposition to a war sanctioned by the United Nations. Public support for military action seemed steadily high, on the basis that those set conditions were met.

On the other hand, when asked if they would support a United States-led war if the UN inspectors found proof that Iraq was trying to hide weapons of mass destruction, but the UN Security Council did not vote in favour of military action, the level of support fell considerably. The result clearly shows that the public was very concerned about the legality of the war. Having earlier questioned the credibility of United States' Iraq policy, it is hardly surprising that respondents were not in support of an American-led combat even when Iraq was still under suspicion. Table 5:5 shows details of the responses:

| | 28 Feb - March 2, 2003 | 14 - 16 March 2003 |
|------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Support | 42% | 48% |
| Oppose | 41% | 37% |
| Don't know | 13 | 15 |

Table 5:5 Evidence of WMD but no UN approval

Source Ipsos-mori.com

Approval of the war fell by 33 percent and 26 percent respectively if there was proof that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction but the UN Security Council did not approve of military action. Therefore, it would appear that while the British public supported military action, they would do so with little reservation if it had UN backing. Opposition to military action without UN backing respectively grew by 24 and 20 percentage points.

The respondents were asked to reconsider their support if faced with yet another scenario. They were asked if they would support a US-led war if the UN inspectors did not find proof that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction but the UN Security Council voted in favour of military action. In the first instance, a majority of the respondents were opposed to military action. The details appear in Table 5:6 below:

| | 28 Feb - 2 March 2003 | 14 - 16 March 2003 |
|------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Support | 42% | 46% |
| Oppose | 46% | 41% |
| Don't know | 12% | 12% |

Table 5:6 UN Approval but without WMD

Source: Ipsos-mori.com

Responses in Table 5:6 clearly show the two key criteria as prerequisites for the public's support for military combat: a UN sanction for war and evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, the respondents were asked to indicate how they would respond to a US-led war started without UN inspectors finding proof that Iraq was trying to hide weapons of mass destruction and without the UN Security Council support for military action. If such a situation arose three quarters of the respondents said they would oppose the military action. The rest of the results can be found in Table 5:7 below:

| | 28 Feb - 2 March 2003 | 14 - 16 March 2003 |
|------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Support | 24% | 26% |
| Oppose | 67% | 63% |
| Don't know | 10% | 11% |

Table 5:7 No WMD and no UN support

Source Ipsos-mori.com

A review of responses to the four scenarios confirm that members of the public were supportive of war if it was proven that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and military action had UN backing. The public clearly opposed military action if there was no evidence of the existence of the weapons of mass destruction and if the United Nations did not give backing to such an action. If either of those conditions were met, the public gave a measured degree of approval. But overwhelming public support would only be given if there was evidence that Iraq concealed weapons of mass destruction and the United Nations backed such a combat.

It could be recalled that during the policy initiation stage the public demanded that the weapons inspectors should be given all the time they needed to search for weapons of mass destruction. By then officials argued that, based

on Saddam's record of lack of cooperation, it would be unrealistic to allow for weapons inspection to continue without deadlines (Blair, September 2002). In an ICM-Guardian poll on 13 March, 2003, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the French government which demanded that UN inspectors should be given as much time as they needed. A narrow majority of the respondents representing 48 percent agreed, 44 percent disagreed and 8 percent either did not know or refused to answer. Although the question asked was directly aimed at finding out the public's understanding of the usefulness of the weapons inspection regime, it also touched on the need for a broader alliance for nations to confront Iraq.

Evidently, at the beginning of the war, the UN weapons inspection team did not find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the UN did not expressly sanction military action - two conditions that received overwhelming public approval in earlier polls. In an ICM/*The Guardian* poll from March 28 to 30, 2003 (a little over a week since military combat started), respondents were asked if they approved or disapproved of military attack on Iraq to remove Saddam. Of those polled, 52 percent approved of military action while 34 percent disapproved. Fourteen percent of the respondents were still undecided.

The percentage of respondents disapproving of war coupled with those who were undecided pointed to a substantial degree of uncertainty among the British public, at least at the this stage of conflict. It is most important,

however, to note that for the first time a majority of those polled supported the war plan. Some scholars (for example Allen, O'Loughlin, Jaspersen, Sullivan, 1994; Schubert, Stewart, Curran, 2002) have attributed similar upsurge in support of a war to the citizens' inclination to rally around the national flag at the onset of a war (the Rally Hypothesis).

While a majority of those polled did not oppose military action, there were some preconditions for the public's support of combat. The preconditions included the requirement that weapons of mass destruction be found in Iraq or that there was evidence that Iraqis concealed them. They also preferred to have a United Nations mandate to provide the legal basis for war. There were also public demands that the British government should cooperate with other allies. Additionally, prompted by a deep distrust for the government of the United States, British officials were urged to come out of the shadows of the United States to seek to legalize the war and build a broader alliance of friendly nations to confront the Iraqi regime. Leading up to the war, fears were expressed that an unquestioned alliance with the United States was damaging Britain's reputation in the world. From the wide range of issues polled, it appeared that the public was more concerned about the procedure leading up to military combat.

In summary, there were demands on the government to de-emphasise the use of spin when making its case for war. Also, a majority of the public wanted the Parliament and the Cabinet to be fully involved in the preparation for and

management of the war. It is instructive that those demands were procedural and not aimed at changing the strategic goal of the government which was to end the threat Saddam Hussein allegedly possessed.

5.3.2 Anti-war Demonstrations

In less structured forms of public discontent, more anti-war demonstrations were held in different parts of the United Kingdom in March 2003. On February 15 and 16 2003, there were anti-war demonstrations in London, Glasgow and Belfast as part of a worldwide weekend of demonstrations aimed at stopping the war. It was significant that up to two million people turned up in what was arguably the largest ever public demonstration witnessed in Britain (Beetham, 2003). It was equally significant that the marches increased in spread and frequency in March 2003.

On March 8, 2003, there were anti-war demonstrations in Manchester. Similar marches were held on March 15 in London, Portsmouth, Leeds, Exeter and Newcastle. Four days later, marches were held across the United Kingdom, with the biggest turnouts recorded in Birmingham, Leeds, Bradford and Manchester. Following the launching of war against Iraq on March 20, 2003 anti-war demonstrators besieged the house of parliament. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators once again marched in London on 22 and 23 March 2003.

The trend of open discontent continued with demonstrations in parts of the United Kingdom on March 25. The United States Embassy in London and

Cardiff were major centres of anti-war demonstrations on March 27. Many more parts of the United Kingdom witnessed demonstrations on March 29. This time marchers took their protests to Oxford, Edinburgh, Coventry, Southampton, Cambridge, Cardiff and parts of London to express their anger with the British policy on Iraq. One demonstrator summed up the motive of most of the protesters: "I thought I needed to show that we were against the war so the prime minister can't say that he has the backing of his people" (Francesca Morrison in <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/2765041.stm>).

5.4 Trends of Public Opinion and Theoretical Framework

Contrary to the popular claim that the public's view on foreign policy is volatile and "lacking in structure and coherence" (Holsti, 1992, p442), I found a trend of consistent and steady public opinion at the policy implementation stage. The finding is similar to what I observed at the policy initiation stage. Besides the uncompromising approach of Stop the War Coalition to military action, opinion polls showed the British public was willing to back its government provided there was evidence that Iraq was still a threat and that such an action was legalized by means of a United Nations mandate. That trend of public opinion was no doubt logical, consistent, rational and reasonable. The British public opinion at the policy implementation stage met those qualities Holsti (1992) and others identified as required in foreign policy making.

In terms of the theoretical framework for this study, some of my expectations of the public attitude at this stage of policy were met. For instance, I expected the public to be very aware of the policy issues. I predicted that public

awareness would determine whether or not the public could make meaningful input into the policy debate. The degree of public involvement in the anti-war campaigns, as noted before, was overwhelming. As a consequence of those large demonstrations and the fact that the degree of change in public opinion in support of the war was not dramatic (56 percent in one poll) (Lewis, 2004), my expectation that the public would be guarded in their opposition to the war was not fully met. I expected that public opposition to the war would whittle down once the war started because citizens would be more mindful of the national interest. There was no dramatic change in the degree of opposition to the war. How did the mass media participate in that process? Before finding out the nature of official response to public opinion, I will examine the quantity and nature of mass media demands on policy makers at the policy implementation stage.

5.5 Frequency of Editorials Demanding for Changes in Policy

One understanding of the mass media effect on policy is that much is achieved by the media when they “keep the pressure” on policy officials (Kelly, 1994, p8) and by “the concerted application of the norms of the news” (Cohen, 1994, p9). These arguments are based on the theory that the more the media consistently pursued a policy idea the more likely they would be able to influence policy makers. Also, on the basis of the same theory, an examination of the quantity of editorial comments in newspapers is a useful way of measuring mass media policy demands. To verify their impact we can also measure how officials were responsive to those pressures from the mass

media. Following those principles, the quantity of the editorial comments at this stage will be examined and later compared with what was recorded at the other stages of policy. As earlier noted, my analysis of media demands will cover the entire policy implementation stage. I will not analyze the trend on a daily basis. Table 5:8 shows a distribution of newspaper editorials in March 2003. A daily distribution of the editorials can be found in Appendix 1.

| March 2003 | <i>Times</i> | <i>Telegraph</i> | <i>Guardian</i> | <i>Independent</i> | |
|------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Total | 29 | 23 | 29 | 20 | Grand Total: 101 |

Table 5:8 Frequency of editorials in March 2003

It is significant, as Table 5:8 above clearly shows that the policy implementation stage witnessed a tremendous upsurge in the number of editorial comments written in the sample British newspapers. While at the policy initiation stage (September 2002) 25 editorials were recorded, there were 101 editorial comments recorded at the policy implementation stage. That marked a 75.2 percent increase in editorial comments at the policy implementation stage. The frequency of the publications is also significant. In September 2002, editorials on British Iraqi policy appeared in eleven out of a possible 25 weekday editions. In comparison, at the policy implementation stage, editorials on British Iraq policy appeared on 24 out of a possible 25 editions of each of the newspapers. No editorial on the Iraq policy appeared in any of the four sample newspapers on March 1, 2003.

From the data in Table 5:8, I can conclude that there was an intensified media interest in British Iraq policy at the policy implementation stage. The upsurge

is in line with my projection in the theoretical framework for this study. It will be further confirmed in chapter six (policy review stage) that the aggregate quantity of editorial comments would be highest at the policy implementation stage. The understanding of the CNN Effect theory (Cohen, 1994 and Kelly, 1994 for example) is that such increased media intensity would compel officials to act in line with the policy options proposed in the media. Therefore, it would be remarkable if the noted significant increase in newspapers editorials was not matched by equally significant increase in (a) official responsiveness and (b) remarkable change in policy as demanded by the media.

If there were no significant changes in the official responsiveness and/or official adherence to mass media demands in line with the increased mass media interest, my claim that the intensity or weight of mass media pressure is not primarily responsible for official responsiveness will stand supported. The result will be clearly in support of my initial argument that responsiveness would depend on the stage of the policy and the environment in which policies are made and not necessarily on the intensity of mass media pressure.

It could also be recalled that combat officially commenced on March 19, 2003. From the data in Appendix 1, it would also appear that as policy implementation intensified, mass media engagement increased. In the first week of March 2003, there were 15 editorials. But as soon as it became clear that the diplomatic options could no longer be pursued at the United Nations, and the war debate intensified in the Parliament, editorial comments on Iraq

increased to 25 in the second week. When the war commenced in earnest in the third week of March, the newspapers wrote 26 editorials on the Iraq crisis. By the fourth week when combat was in full swing, there were 30 editorials on the Iraq crisis. The reason might be that the media became more concerned as the drama and the cost of the war evolved during the policy implementation stage. But realistically, at this stage of the policy process I expected officials to be focused on policy goals set at the initiation stage of policy.

Meanwhile, as from March 19, 2003 when combat was launched, the liberal *The Guardian* published two editorial comments on Iraq in each of eight editions during the last 10 weekdays of March. Similarly, there was increased interest in *The Times* as policy implementation intensified. In the last 10 weekdays of March, *The Times* published two editorials on Iraq in each of eight daily editions. It is surprising though, that *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph* did not carry any editorial comments on the Iraq question the day after combat commenced. Some might judge the two newspapers' silence at this stage as a sign of satisfaction with the invasion of Iraq which both conservative newspapers had for months encouraged.

In terms of the ideological nature of the comments, once again, conservative-leaning newspapers showed more interest in the Iraq policy as is evident in the number of editorials published. *The Times* published 29 editorials while *The Daily Telegraph* published 23 editorials, amounting to 52 editorials in the more conservative newspapers. On the other hand, *The Guardian* and *The Independent* published 29 and 20 editorials respectively, amounting to 49

editorials in the two liberal newspapers. At the policy initiation stage, the conservative newspapers tended to support the planning for war while the liberal press consistently urged for caution. Although the newspapers held different policy positions, my main goal is to identify the dominant policy issues in the editorial comments and how they assessed the government's policy at the policy implementation stage.

Also, I will add that the key question persists: will intense mass media interest in the British Iraq policy at the policy implementation stage lead to significant increases in government responsiveness in terms of degree and in the direction that the media championed? Before I weigh official responsiveness, I will examine the dimensions of views expressed in newspaper editorials at this stage of policy. To be able to measure the similarity between mass media demands and official action, I have to identify those demands and how they were framed in the newspaper editorials.

5.6 Newspaper Policy Demands and Issue Framing

In this section of chapter five, I will focus on the policy demands in the editorials of the sample newspapers and how the newspapers framed official policy initiatives. In both cases, I will use tables to demonstrate the frequency of those demands or frames. My goal is to identify the major policy options preferred by the newspapers which I will use as the bases for assessing official responsiveness. The policy issues identified in the newspapers are

mostly similar to those I have already shown to be dominant in opinion polls conducted in March 2003.

One of the most debated issues was whether or not Britain should join in a military intervention in Iraq. At the initial stage of policy, I found that no newspaper openly opposed the plan for combat. In September 2002, there were four editorials expressing support for military action and three others calling for caution. As the implementation stage began, there was an upsurge in editorial comments on whether or not Britain should engage in war. Table 5:9 clearly shows that for the first time, a majority of editorials were found to be opposed to military intervention.

| | |
|--------------------------|----|
| On military intervention | |
| In support | 10 |
| Caution | 8 |
| Opposed | 13 |
| Urgent action | 3 |

Table 5:9 Editorials on military action

It was mainly the more liberal newspapers that opposed the war with Iraq. Alternatively, they called on officials to adopt a more cautious approach if military intervention was inevitable. *The Guardian* opposed the march to war in seven editorials while *The Independent* wrote six editorials in opposition to military action. The more conservative newspapers, *The Times* (in 4 editorials) and *The Daily Telegraph* (in 6 editorials) came out in support of the war. In one of its editorials which coincidentally appeared on the same day ground assault was launched, *The Independent* commended Mr Blair's leadership but announced it was opposed to the war. *The Independent* wrote:

“For as long as war was in our view avoidable we have opposed it, as we thought Ms Short (*International Development Secretary*) did. It remains deeply regrettable, perhaps tragic, that - largely because of a military timetable set by Washington - Hans Blix and his team of inspectors were not allowed the limited but additional period of time they sought.”⁶

In a similarly critical tone, *The Guardian* wrote pointedly in its own editorial on the morning after the military assault was launched:

This war is wrong. It did not need to happen; it is unnecessary and was avoidable. There was still time; there were other ways and reasonable alternatives. But they were not honestly explored. In the mad, maddening rush to arms, the point of last resort was not reached. The case was not made; indeed, the wider international and domestic argument was lost.”⁷

For emphasis, Table 5:9 shows editorials calling for caution or in opposition to war, totalling 21, were in the majority. Therefore, in terms of numbers, the dominant demands in the newspapers were that the war effort be abandoned or that officials should be cautious in its pursuit of the Iraq policy. Significantly, a total of 13 editorials were in support of the war or called for action to be launched urgently. The implication is that the more conservative newspapers also showed strong support for official plan to attack Iraq. In one such editorial entitled “Dangerous Delays”, *The Daily Telegraph* wrote that while it appreciated the Prime Minister's difficulties, "we doubt whether further delay will do anything but underline divisions within the Security Council.”⁸

In the same editorial, *The Daily Telegraph* dismissed the suggestions that Iraq could be pressured through diplomatic channels to destroy its weapons of

⁶*The Independent Leader*, March 19, 2003, p18

⁷ *The Guardian Leader*, March 20, 2003, p27

⁸ *The Daily Telegraph Leader*, March 12, 2003, p27

mass destruction and argued that "Saddam considers them essential to his political survival." The newspaper continued:

"Further attempting to delay an invasion might help Mr Blair at home. But it betrays the dismal reluctance of the Security Council to acknowledge the challenge to international order thrown down by the Islamist terrorists and their state sponsors."⁹

The Times similarly declared: "Closure is urgent. The law of diminishing return has set in."¹⁰ Continuing, the newspaper argued that "delays bought Saddam time not to yield, but to mine oilfields, and it adds to the strains of Iraq's neighbours."

Additionally, the debate on whether or not a second United Nations resolution was needed to approve military combat received close attention in the editorials. At the initial stage of policy, only two editorials were written on this subject. In March 2003, mass media attention on this subject increased significantly. In Table 5:10 I show the preferences of the newspapers and how often those policy options were called for in the editorials.

| | |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| Second UN resolution to approve war | |
| Necessary | 15 |
| Helpful | 2 |
| Unnecessary | 5 |

Table 5:10 Editorials on Second UN Resolution

The demand for a second United Nations resolution expressly approving military combat - a dominant feature of public opinion at this stage of the Iraq

⁹ *The Daily Telegraph* Leader, Ibid

¹⁰ *The Times*, March 14, 2003, p27

policy - was also dominant in newspaper editorials. In 15 editorial comments, the newspapers thought that a second United Nations resolution authorising military action was necessary. Again, it is noteworthy that those 15 editorials appeared in the two liberal newspapers: *The Guardian* and *The Independent*.

In fact, *The Independent* went as far as demanding that “a second UN resolution should set final deadlines, rather than authorise war.”¹¹ The newspaper argued that it was possible to disarm Iraq peacefully. In the same editorial of March 6, 2003, the newspaper maintained: “If there is to be a second UN resolution, it should increase the number of inspections, define specific objectives and set deadlines that Iraq must meet.” As for the chances of disarming Iraq peacefully it demanded: “If there is a chance to disarm Iraq peacefully, this should be seized.” It argued that there was “no justification for risking lives, national economies and regional stability in military action that was not the absolute last resort.”

The Guardian was even more resolute in demanding that Britain must seek a second United Nations resolution. It argued: that “the central reality is that Mr Blair has little alternative, in his own terms, than to continue to focus on getting a better, more consensual, more principled second resolution, on a more realistic timetable”¹² It concluded that one of the realities that faced Mr Blair was that “British participation in an Iraq war lacking proper UN

¹¹ *The Independent* Leader, March 6, 2003, p20

¹² *The Guardian* Leader, March 13, 2003, p25

backing and lacking the authority of parliament could be catastrophic for everything that Labour was elected to do.”

The newspapers also wrote several editions discussing how a combat with Iraq should be waged. As soon as it became apparent that the British government was determined to engage Iraq in combat, the newspapers started editorializing on how that war should be conducted. Should Britain and the United States face Iraq or seek to build a broad alliance of national forces to confront Iraq? How should Iraqi civilians be treated? Although these issues hardly received the attention of the media at the initiation of the Iraq policy, a considerable number of editorials were devoted to these questions at the policy implementation stage. Table 5:11 shows the newspapers' demands on how the war should be fought.

| | |
|------------------------------|----|
| How war should be fought | |
| Alliance of US and UK enough | 3 |
| Multinational force needed | 17 |
| Involve Iraqis and Arabs | 11 |
| Be steadfast | 7 |
| Adequate troops needed | 8 |
| Shield Iraqi civilians | 12 |
| Provide humanitarian aides | 8 |

Table 5:11 Frequency of editorials on how war should be fought

Demands for a broad alliance of nations to confront Saddam was the most frequent call made in newspaper editorials discussing this aspect of the Iraq policy. Seventeen editorials made demands for a concerted effort to broaden the alliance of nations willing to attack Saddam. The conservative newspapers

only marginally supported this call. For example, *The Times* wrote one editorial in which it claimed that an alliance of US and Britain is good enough for the war.

Concerns for Iraqi civilians also received a good measure of attention from the newspapers. They did not only demand that efforts be made to shield Iraqi civilians (12 editorials) when combat ensued but also called for the inclusion of Iraqis in the effort to remove Saddam (11 editorials). There were demands in 8 editorials for the provision of humanitarian support for Iraqi civilians who might be affected by combat. Similarly, when discussing post-war plans, the newspapers on 9 occasions called for United Nations' involvement in humanitarian efforts. Other editorial comments included calls for parliamentary oversight on all war plans (6 editorials) and demands for the United Nations weapons inspectors to be allowed to continue work (4 editorials). Also, there were calls for the government to explore all possible diplomatic options rather than make war an inevitable end of the crisis (7 editorials).

Aside making direct demands in editorials, the mass media can also influence officials by the way they evaluate or frame official actions. During the policy implementation stage, the British government received both critical evaluations and commendations. In 20 editorials, the newspapers empathised with the difficult situation the government had found itself but in 16 editorials they expressed worries that Britain was in a rather subservient relationship with United States on the Iraq policy. *The Independent* noted on March 18, 2003 that British partnership with United States on this issue would cost both

Mr Blair and the country dearly. Of Mr Blair and the country *The Independent* wrote:

“Any ambition he might have had to lead Europe in the future is at an end. Britain's reputation and influence in the Arab world cannot but be diminished. Britain risks been seen once again as Washington's junior partner and no more.”¹³

Despite several such critical comments, 16 editorials noted that the government was actually purposeful on a number of occasions in the course of executing the Iraq policy. By also commending several government policy actions on Iraq, the newspapers showed reasonable degrees of balance in their editorials. The question is, would that sense of balance compel policy makers to pay more attention to those policy areas the newspapers were calling for change?

I also verified the tone of editorials carried in the four sample newspapers. If the editorials largely appeared flat and undemanding, officials might have a tendency to ignore them. Table 5:12 below shows that the editorials tended to be very proactive on a considerable number of occasions.

| | |
|------------------|----|
| Derisive | 14 |
| Supportive | 11 |
| Tough | 3 |
| Insightful | 5 |
| Neutral | 3 |
| Demanding action | 27 |
| Persuasive | 8 |

Table 5:12 Frequency mode/tone used in editorials

¹³ *The Independent*, March 18, 2003, p18

As shown in the Table 5:12, on 27 occasions the editorials demanded a definite line of policy action. It means that most editorials at this stage were aimed at making definite policy demands. In 14 editorials, newspapers used derisive tones to question official policy. Also on 3 occasions, the newspapers used outright tough tones to express their disappointment with officials. In continuation of the same sense of balance displayed in several other categories studied, the editorials tended to be supportive of officials on 11 occasions.

The editorials were in more proactive tone at this stage of policy than at the policy initiation stage. If my assumption that officials would be more responsive to proactive editorials were to be right, then at this stage of policy officials should be most responsive and be more inclined to take on board ideas put forward by the mass media. My next step is to measure how officials responded to those key issues I have identified in public opinion polls and in newspaper editorials.

5.7 Frequency, Weight and Nature of Official Responsiveness

As I noted in the methodology chapter and in chapter four, my strategy is to weigh official responsiveness or sensitivity in the first instance by adding the frequency of those official responses. In simple terms, my first task is to identify when officials responded most in the policy process. The next level is to identify the nature of response or nature of sensitivity officials have shown.

In this category, I have six forms of responses: press statement, press

conference, press interview, public statement, parliamentary and policy announcement. I have another form categorisation of responses which helps me to identify the importance officials placed on public and mass media demands. Terms used in this category are: acknowledgement, dismissive, defensive, conciliatory, persuasive and extensive case. Policy responsiveness is further divided into two categories. The first category is “negative”, which describes when officials made a statement or took an action that was opposed to public and mass media demands. The second category is “positive”, which is an indication that officials made a statement or took an action which was in line with the public's or mass media's policy demands.

The next step is to weigh the position or importance of the responding official. Officials are assigned weights equivalent to their positions in government. The weights are allocated in ascending order to “undisclosed sources”, “senior official”, and “Downing Street”, “Cabinet Member”, “Prime Minister” and “the Cabinet.”

The final means of evaluation is to measure the degree of policy change. Types of policy change introduced in the theory chapter are used here and they are: dismissive, adjustment, programme, problem/goal and orientation change. Each of those categories are allocated numbers, with the highest number assigned to the most profound change of policy. A collation of the numbers in each category is done to get an idea of the frequency, nature and weight of official responsiveness. The numbers in brackets represent the

frequency that each category of response occurred. While a comprehensive table of official responsiveness is presented in Appendix two, a summary of the British government's response to public demands on Iraq policy is presented in Table 5:13.¹⁴

| March 2003 | Nature of response (I) | Number of responses (II) | Type of response/ sensitivity (III) | Number of positive responses (IV) | Number of negative responses (V) | Weight of official (VI) | Degree of change (VII) |
|------------|---|--------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|------------------------|
| Totals | 1(3),2(8), 3(7), 4(3), 5(8),6(11) | 44 | 1(8),2(22), 3(9),4(2), 5(2),6(1) | 5 | 39 | 8(13), 6(16), 4(4),3(1) 2(2), 1(6) = 229 | 1(5), -1 (39) |

Table 5:13 Frequency, nature and weight of official responsiveness

Note: The numbers in bracket represent the frequency of occurrence

As shown in Table 5:13 above, officials directly responded 44 times to the dominant issues in public opinion and newspaper editorials. I recorded 34 such responses in the first stage of policy. In terms of the quantity of official responsiveness, it is clear that officials were more sensitive at the time of combat (policy implementation stage), than at the policy initiation stage. Government was more sensitive in the sense that it was more willing to explain and defend its policy.

In terms of the weight of officials who responded to public concerns, I recorded 229 as against 165 in the first stage of policy. In this regard, the

¹⁴ Key to table: (I) Nature of response – 1: press statement; 2: press conference; 3: press interview; 4: public statement; 5: parliamentary statement; 6: policy announcement
(III) Type of response: 1: acknowledgement; 2: dismissive; 3: defensive; 4: conciliatory; 5: persuasive; 6: extensive case
(VI) Weight of official: 1: undisclosed source; 2: senior official; 3: Downing Street; 6: Cabinet member; 8: Prime minister; 10: Cabinet
(VII) Degree of change: -1: dismissive; 1: adjustment; 2: programme; 3: problem/goal; 4: orientation

sheer weight of officials who engaged in public discussion of the key issues indicated the government's sensitivity to public concerns. While the prime minister personally responded 13 times, cabinet ministers responded 16 times with the combined aim of actively addressing the public's concerns. In a quantitative sense, officials would be deemed to be more sensitive at this stage of policy than at the policy initiation stage when I recorded 34 direct official responses to public and mass media concerns. However, the quantity of responses is only one way of measuring sensitivity.

In a qualitative sense, the public and mass media made little impact on British officials at this stage of policy. As Table 5:13 shows, officials made only five positive responses by speaking or acting in agreement with the dominant public and mass media opinion. That means that officials were in agreement with popular opinion on only 11.3 percent of the occasions they spoke on those dominant issues. On 39 occasions representing 88.6 percent of the cases, officials responded negatively because they made comments or took actions in opposition to public's and mass media's policy demands. In comparison, officials made far more positive responses to public and mass media opinion at the policy initiation stage than what obtained at the policy implementation stage. At the initial stage there were 17 positive official responses against 19 negative responses.

Just as I noted that the number of occasions officials positively responded at the initial stage of policy did not support the manufacturing consent theory, the

number of negative responses at the policy implementation stage does not support the CNN Effect theory either. It could be recalled that the number of newspaper editorials in my sample newspapers jumped from 25 at the policy initiation stage to 101 at the policy implementation. Rather than bow to the will of the public and mass media, officials spoke or acted contrary to public and mass media demands in 88.6 percent of the cases. The reaction of officials in both stages indicates that they are not rigid in their manner of response to public or mass media policy demands. It also means that the nature of their response does not depend on the magnitude of mass media interest.

Another pointer to official resistance to public and mass media demands at the policy implementation stage is evident in the 22 occasions that officials were actually dismissive of those demands. For example, only a few days after the commencement of combat, Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Geoffrey Hoon, apparently called on members of parliament to be circumspect of the mass media during the war. In a House of Commons statement about military action in Iraq, Mr Hoon declared:

“Events over the coming days will dominate the 24-hour media. The House will recognise that we must all be wary of jumping to conclusions on the basis of 'breaking news' before there has been time to conduct a proper investigation. Similarly, the House will understand - and I hope the media will too - that if we respond to media pressure for instant operational detail, we could risk the security and safety of our forces. We cannot, therefore offer a running commentary on media reports.”¹⁵

Although Mr Hoon argued that it could be dangerous to pander to mass media demands at this stage of policy, in the same statement to the House, the defence secretary announced measures Britain and its allies had taken to

¹⁵ Hoon, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 20 March 2003, Column 1088

address another concern of the mass media and the British public opinion. He assured that the “coalition forces will take every possible care to minimise civilian casualties or damage to civilian infrastructure.”¹⁶ There were only two substantial conciliatory remarks recorded at the policy implementation stage. In addition to being mostly dismissive (39 cases), the other dominant feature of official response at this stage was “defensive” (9 cases). On 8 occasions, officials acknowledged mass media and public concerns at this stage of policy.

There were clearly increased policy activity at this stage but as noted earlier, the goal was to defend the official policy. There were 11 policy announcements, 8 press conferences, 8 parliamentary statements, 7 press interviews, 3 public statements and 3 press statements. Clearly those increased policy activities did not lead to any remarkable change in policy. There were only five occasions when officials offered to make “adjustment changes”, in other words, make procedural changes in policy.

Unlike in the first stage of policy, Table 5:13 shows that there is a substantial degree of agreement in the way officials responded to public and mass media demands. In the first stage of policy, there were several cases when government officials responded differently on the same issues or the same officials responded differently on the same issue. In those cases, some officials positively responded to public policy option while others facing similar situations responded negatively. In line with Robinson's (2002) claim, when the elite are not in consensus, officials tend to be more open to mass media

¹⁶Hoon, House of Commons Debates for 20 March 2003, column 1087

influence. If Robinson's analysis is applied to this study, officials would be more open to influence at the policy initiation stage when policy was not fully formed than at the policy implementation stage.

However, there were hardly long-term signs of elite consensus on the Iraqi policy even at the point of policy implementation. For example, the divisions among the political elite were clearly evident in the outcome of parliamentary vote on the government's March 18, 2003 motion seeking authorization to invade Iraq. According to House of Commons records (Mellows-Facer, 19 March, 2003), voting outcome on Division 118 (Government Motion) shows that 52 Liberal Democrat members of parliament (98%) voted against the motion and one did not vote. Of the governing Labour Party, 254 (62%) members of parliament voted for the motion, 84 (21%) voted against the motion and 69 (17%) did not vote.

The only semblance of a consensus in support of invasion of Iraq was among the leading opposition party, the Conservatives. Conservative members of parliament voted 90 percent (147) in support of the government motion. The invasion of Iraq remained a divisive subject, especially among the ruling Labour Party at all stages of the policy. In this case study, government's resistance to public and mass media influence cannot be attributed to elite consensus because elite disagreement marked every stage of the Iraq policy. Rather, I would argue that foreign policy officials changed from what was an open, responsive mode at the policy initiation stage to a focused or closed, defensive mode once military combat was launched on Iraq. The dissimilar

policy environments which marked the different policy stages influenced official responsiveness or sensitivity.

The divisions in the elite ranks notwithstanding, officials acted as I projected in my theoretical framework. Data in Table 5:13 shows that officials were defensive (closed) rather than open to new policy suggestions at the policy implementation stage. Officials were focused on policy implementation at this stage as I projected. Another of Secretary of Defence, Mr Hoon's statement to the House of Commons on 26 March 2003 clearly pointed to officials' determination to remain focused on the policy rather than pander to mass media demands. Mr Hoon stated:

“We have all seen the reporting from the 24-hour media over the past few days. Inevitably, such reporting reflects the immediate situation around specific journalists. It does not always give an overall picture or strategic perspective. I would like, therefore to set out the context by reporting progress against the tasks identified in the government's military campaign objectives published on 20 March.”¹⁷

It is also evident in Mr Hoon's statement, as it is in Table 12:13, that officials can hardly avoid mass media and public opinion pressure. As a result, at the policy implementation stage they are quick to acknowledge public and mass media concerns. But instead of opening up to those external policy ideas, officials tended to be on the defensive and focused on official policy. As a result, there was an increased sense of official sensitivity which did not translate to official consent to public or mass media demands.

¹⁷ Hoon, House of Commons Hansard, Debates for 26 March 2003, Column 291

5.8 Instances of Responsiveness, Resistance and Government's Defence of its Policy Options

In this part of the chapter, I want to consider how the British government responded to some of the key policy issues of the policy implementation stage. I will look at the handling of concerns over Tony Blair's presidential style and how he incorporated the Parliament and Cabinet in the policy process. I will also look at the handling of the Iraqi weapons inspections and the United Nations, British-American relations, the launching of the war and post war planning.

Clearly, the key policy question was whether or not Britain should join in the invasion of Iraq. It was obvious that government used several months leading up to March to sell the war to the British public. Although the government hardly won over the public, Britain started deploying forces to the Gulf in December 2002 (Taylor and Youngs, May 2003). By mid-March 2003, 46,000 British military had been deployed as part of a 467,000 coalition personnel. Also deployed were 19 warships, 14 Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels, 15,000 vehicles, 115 fixed-wing aircraft and nearly 100 helicopters.¹⁸

Despite opposition by anti-war coalitions, labour unions, Labour Party members and threats of resignations from the Cabinet, deployments continued. The British government never really slowed down planning for action. According to a House of Commons Defence Committee report, "the

¹⁸ List based on Ministry of Defence: Operation TELIC - United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq, a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 11 December 2003

British, who had had embedded staff officers at Centcom (United States Central Command) from September 2001 were the first foreigners to be brought into the American planning process” and clearly had impact on the final shape of the war plan.¹⁹ The Defence Department itself “believes that the contribution made by embedded UK officers was influential in the overall shape of the plan.”²⁰

The Department added in the same communication to the House of Commons Defence Committee:

“Bilateral engagement between Commander CENTCOM and the UK Chief of joint Operations provided the most effective and immediate path of influence throughout the planning stages. Below this, the UK had two principal liaison officers fully engaged at the military-strategic and operational levels of command: CDS' Liaison Officer in the Pentagon, and the Senior British Military Adviser and his staff at CENTCOM. The final plan was therefore the product of both US and UK thinking, discussion and ideas.”²¹

Although for months the government focused on the strategic policy objectives which were to enhance its cooperation with the Americans and be prepared for combat, publicly it was willing to defer to public opinion and other actors in the policy arena. The evidence shows that government became even more focused on the strategic objective as military combat became more imminent.

The National Audit Office described the initial planning of United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq as “responsive” and “flexible”:

¹⁹ House of Commons Defence Committee, 8 June 2004, p2

²⁰ House of Commons Defence Committee, Ibid

²¹ House of Commons Defence Committee, 8 June 2004, p2

“In planning for the operation the (Defence) Department had to balance the possibility of overt preparations prejudicing the diplomatic process against the need to be ready to take action if the diplomatic process failed. Consequently, the Department did not begin enabling activities for a potential large-scale deployment to the Gulf region until early December 2002. In the event, deployment started on 16 January 2003, with the last deployment vessel arriving in Kuwait on 17 March 2003”²².

In early March 2003, Britain continued with diplomatic overtures to other members of the Security Council of the United Nations and some other strategic countries like Turkey but apparently those diplomatic overtures were weakened by an “overall objective of serving as a `transatlantic bridge” (Rangwala, 2007, p293). British effort to build a broader alliance was ultimately compromised by the widely held belief that it was bent on “uncritically following the US lead, having forsaken its autonomy when making the decision to support the US invasion” (Rangwala, Ibid).

Even locally, the sincerity of the government's effort at broadening the coalition against Iraq was questioned. Mr Robin Cook, the former foreign secretary and Leader of the House of Commons, echoed public scepticism when he resigned his position on March 17, 2003. Mr Cook particularly criticised Britain's apparent recourse to unilateralism in his resignation letter to the Prime Minister. He argued that Britain's interests would be compromised if it created a precedent for military action. “I was impressed by the energy and skill with which you ended Britain's isolation in Europe,” Mr Cook noted, but

²² Ministry of Defence: Operation TELIC - United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq, a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 11 December 2003; p2

regretted that “once again Britain is divided from our major European neighbours.”²³

Mr Blair was typically defensive in his reply to Cook. “I have always tried to resolve this crisis through the UN,” he wrote, “but I was always clear that the UN must be the way of dealing with the issue, not avoiding dealing with it.” As it was his common refrain, the Prime Minister claimed that the government was “staying true to Resolution 1441. Others, in the face of continuing non-compliance, are walking away.”²⁴ That argument was more frequently repeated when a frustrated Blair could not win a second UN resolution to sanction war against Iraq. Resolution 1441 was also the main basis of government's parliamentary motion for a declaration of war on Iraq. On March 17, 2003, a day before the House motion to declare war, the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, controversially declared that Resolution 1441 was enough UN mandate to invade Iraq.

Obviously, on several fronts the government was only ready to respond to public demands at procedural levels while focusing on its strategic objective. For instance, after giving a go-ahead to the UN weapons inspection team to return to Iraq, British officials remained suspicious of the teams' motive. Some British officials were reported to be disappointed when the team returned a positive report that Iraqi cooperation had improved since January 2003 (Campbell, 2008, p666).

²³ Robin Cook, The Independent, 18 March 2003, p2

²⁴ Tony Blair, The Independent, 18 March 2003, p2

Overall, many viewed government's willingness to seek the House of Commons' approval for war and to regularly report progress of combat to the parliament as important procedural steps. Also, the Cabinet was also engaged in deliberations, apparently, as a means of public courtesy. It emerged that the Cabinet's deliberations never really affected government strategic objective. According to insider accounts, the War Cabinet hardly lived up to that name. Meetings were said to be "scratchy" and "awful" (Campbell, 2008, pp671 and 684). Campbell (Ibid, p683) further recorded the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, as saying that the "War Cabinet meetings were hopeless" and needed to be more focused. But despite the dysfunctional nature of the War Cabinet, it continued to meet perhaps as a re-assurance to the public that the Iraq policy was not handled in Blair's so called presidential style.

5.9 Summary

In this chapter, I was able to identify the key issues that dominated the newspapers and the public's concern at the policy implementation stage. Overall, there were demands that the government should seek a UN mandate before proceeding to war, allow weapons inspectors to continue their work and also seek to broaden the war coalition. There were also demands that the Parliament and the Cabinet have oversight on the Iraq policy. In terms of responsiveness, the government showed increased sensitivity to public opinion and mass media demands. However, increased government sensitivity did not translate to consent to public and mass media demands. Predominantly, the government was defensive of its position. There were official gestures as signs of government's acknowledgement of the British people's anxieties. Unlike at the policy initiation stage when there were cases

of programme changes (employing new instruments of statecraft to attain diplomatic goals), at the policy implementation stage, I only identified cases of adjustment change (changes occurring in effort put to a cause).

Expectations I set out in the theoretical framework in terms of changes in policy were met. As I predicted, officials have proved to be, first, defensive of government position and secondly, resistant to public opinion and mass media demands. The level of resistance is noteworthy because there was over 75 percent increase in the number of published editorials on the Iraq policy at the policy implementation stage. So, the quantity and quality of public and mass media demands led to increased policy activities (official responsiveness or sensitivity) at the policy implementation stage but officials did not succumb to those pressures. In short, officials were more sensitive at the policy implementation stage but they were far more resistant to change at this stage than at the policy initiation stage.

In terms of policy making, once military combat was launched, the policy making process became more centralized and demanded more urgency. The nature of policy making at this stage of policy compelled officials to focus on the strategic goal. In the case of Iraq, officials repeatedly claimed that pandering to popular opinion at this stage of policy could cost British lives. Therefore, I would argue that the environment of the implementation stage of the Iraq policy had a direct impact on official responsiveness to mass media and public demands. In chapter six, my third and final case study chapter, I

will examine how British officials responded to public and mass media opinion during the review stage of the Iraq policy.

6 The Media, Public Opinion and Review of Britain's Iraq Policy - December 2003

6.1 Introduction

In chapter four, I examined how British officials responded to public opinion and the mass media during the initiation of Britain's Iraq policy. It showed that officials mostly made adjustment changes to its policy (changes occurring at the level of effort put to a cause). Also, several programme changes (employment of new instruments of statecraft) were recorded (Hermann, 1990). On the other hand, in chapter five I noted increased official sensitivity at the policy implementation stage but little in the form of policy changes were recorded at that stage. In this chapter, I will examine how officials responded to public opinion and the mass media when Britain's Iraq policy was reviewed. This is my third and final case study on how officials responded to mass media and public opinion in the process of that policy.

In terms of my approach to studying this stage of policy, I will follow similar lines of enquiry as in chapters four and five. First, I will identify the major policy issues championed by the public and in newspaper editorials. To capture the trend in British public opinion, I will be drawing from public opinion polls and other forms of public display of consent to or disapproval of policy actions during the policy review stage. As in the first two stages of policy,

mass media opinion will be measured by the quantity and content of newspaper editorials in support or in opposition to government's Iraq policy. The next step will be to measure and analyze how officials responded to those public and mass media demands.

The focus is on December 2003, my chosen sample month: when the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Defence announced in press conferences and in the Parliament that they were reviewing British policy on Iraq. My main goal is to verify if any of the kinds of foreign policy changes and/or sensitivities I identified in chapter two took place at the policy review stage. The degree of change is also compared with the policy initiation and implementation stages. However, I will start by looking at the background to the policy review, with the aim of highlighting the rationale for government's decision to evaluate the progress of the Iraq war.

6.2 Background to Policy Review

In this section, I will examine three key issues which engaged the attention of the British government. For example, the government was constantly criticized on its handling of the war in general and the handling of its vision for Iraq and its people in particular. There were also the lingering credibility problems arising from the disputed dossier on Iraq. I will examine how each of those issues prompted an evaluation of the war.

6.2.1 British Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People

Perhaps the right step would be to start by highlighting British policy objectives in Iraq and then weigh how those policy objectives were met. This

comparison will explain why there was a need to review the policies and also put into perspective public opinion and mass media comments.

On 17 March 2003, ahead of the onset of combat, the British government outlined its vision for Iraq and the Iraqi people. Primarily, Britain's stated aim was "to disarm Saddam of his weapons of mass destruction, which threaten his neighbours and his people."²⁵ The government's vision went further. It identified five key areas Britain planned to support the Iraqi people to meet their aspirations in the long term. It also pledged to support Iraq and the Iraqi people in ten areas ranging from humanitarian aides to the lifting of the lingering sanctions imposed since the end of the first Iraq war. In the first part, Britain pledged to support the Iraqi people in their desire for "peace", "prosperity", "freedom", "good government" and "international respect."

In terms of peace, the government pledged to support the people in their desire to have "a unified Iraq within its current borders, living at peace with itself and with its neighbours." As regards freedom for the Iraqi people, the pledge was to help see to the emergence of "an Iraq which respects fundamental human rights, including freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the dignity of family life, and whose people live free from repression and fear of arbitrary arrest."

²⁵ Contents of British vision for Iraq are culled from Number 10 website <http://www.number10.gov.uk/page3280>

To bring about good governance, Britain also pledged to support Iraqis in their search for an independent Iraq respecting the rule of law, whose government reflected the diversity and choice of its population and helped rebuild Iraq's security and provided its people with food, water and high quality public services, especially health and education. It also vowed to support Iraqis to bring about a country “respected by its neighbours which plays its full role as a member of the international community.”

Six months into the war, there was likelihood that part of the public's assessment of the government's performance in Iraq was based on their perception of how the government performed on those pledges made to the Iraqi people. But, perhaps, the government's biggest problem was how to win and maintain public confidence after the withering criticisms received on its own credibility and the credibility of its case for war.

6.2.2 Lingerinɡ Credibility Question

As already noted, in the months leading to the onset of war, the government faced unending questions on the reliability of its dossiers on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. Doubts over the credibility of the dossiers on Iraq took even more damaging twists at the end of May 2003. The government's case for war was further damaged by a series of media reports, attributed to a security source, which claimed that the government deliberately

“sexed up” the dossier.²⁶ Issues came to a head with the suspicious death of scientist Dr David Kelly, the alleged security source.

Besides the findings of the Hutton Inquiry, the death of Dr Kelly made a “totally grim” press for the government (Campbell, 2008, p723). Even the usually pro-Labour Daily Mirror was upset by the incident. According to Campbell (2008, p723) “Piers Morgan (then editor of the Daily Mirror) was not totally unsympathetic but felt there was no escape for me or for Tony (Blair). He felt the mood had just turned, and people would keep going on it.” By December 2003, suspicions over the government's part in the death of Dr Kelly and its transparency in the preparation of the Iraq dossier of September 2002 received maximum public attention. The conduct of the war itself was no less controversial.

6.2.3 British Conduct of the Iraq War

Overall, the initial phases of the combat received positive reviews from both military and political authorities. In fact, the supposed success of the Coalition in the early days of combat clearly led to a sense of “understandable euphoria at the progress made.”²⁷ There was an air of an easy triumph on both sides of the Atlantic.

Starting with “decapitation” air strikes which involved mainly limited targeting of the Iraqi leadership²⁸, subsequent troop actions led to the seizing of Al Faw Peninsula (20 March 2003), and the seizure of Basrah International

²⁶ Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G., 2004 section 32; hereafter ‘Hutton Inquiry Report’

²⁷ Jack Straw, House of Commons Hansard, 10 April, 2003, Column 405

²⁸ G. Hoon, House of Commons Hansard, 20 March, 2003, Column 1087

Airport (24 March 2003). In a rather optimistic move, by April 1, 2003, the United Kingdom began transition to peace operation in Az Zubayr. Four days later, United States forces entered into Baghdad for the first time and on April 6, 2003, United Kingdom forces entered and held Basrah. Then on April 13, 2003, United Kingdom/Iraqi joint patrols began in Basrah.

The same air of triumph greeted the United Nations' declaration on April 22, 2003 that United Kingdom Areas of Operations were “permissive” environment for beginning of humanitarian operations.”²⁹ A very optimistic President Bush announced on May 1, 2003 that major combat operations in Iraq had come to a successful end. Some accounts claimed that British military casualties (numbering 27 killed and 55 wounded) in the first month of action were “low” and resulted mainly “from operational accidents.”³⁰

The initial audit of military operations declared:

“United Kingdom and Coalition forces had achieved nearly all their military objectives including the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime and the securing of key infrastructure within four weeks of crossing into Iraq from Kuwait. The major exception was that no weapons of mass destruction were located. Success was achieved with few United Kingdom combat or Iraqi civilian casualties due in part to stringent targeting criteria and the use of precision weapons. The coordinated focus of Coalition combat power led to the regular Iraqi forces having, in the main, little will to fight in a concerted fashion. This represents a very considerable military success.”³¹

In his assessment of the war, an optimistic but cautious Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared in a statement to the House of Commons:

²⁹ Comptroller and Auditor General's Report, 2003, p40

³⁰ Comptroller and Auditor General's Report, 2003, p8

³¹ Comptroller and Auditor General, Ibid, p2

“The south of Iraq is now largely under British control. The west is secure, and in the major town of Al Qaim fighting is diminishing. In the north, Kurdish forces have retired from Kirkuk and Mosul, leaving US forces in control. US forces are in and around Tikrit. They are meeting some resistance. But in essence, all over Iraq, Saddam's forces have collapsed. Much of the remaining fighting, particularly in Baghdad, is being carried out by foreign irregular forces.”³²

In a more realistic note, Mr Blair added:

“In Baghdad itself, the Americans are in control of most of the city but not yet all of it. As is obvious, the problem now is disorder following the regime's collapse. Some disorder, frankly, is inevitable. It will happen in any situation where a brutal police state that for 30 years has terrorised a population is suddenly destroyed. Some looting, too, is directed at specific regime targets, including hospitals that were dedicated for the use of the regime. But it is a serious situation and we need to work urgently to bring it under control.”

Perhaps to the shocking surprise of both British and American officials, those protests and lootings escalated and led to a total breakdown of law and order. Attempts to quell the protests led to civilian deaths which in turn led to more protests. Soon afterwards, the formation of an interim government became more problematic following boycotts and increasing resistance prompted by claims that “US forces would remain a presence in Iraq for the long term” (Myers, 16 April 2003). The dissolution of the Ba'ath Party and subsequent discharge of military and security officials with links with the party led to even more chaos.

Above all, in the face of the ensuing crisis, most other peace building overtures appeared doomed. Also seemingly doomed were Coalition plans on 16 April 2003 “to turn from offensive to civilian military operations, including

³² Blair, Hansard of 14 April 2003, Column 615

provision of humanitarian assistance and conducting joint patrols with Iraqi police in order to maintain law and order” (Taylor and Youngs, 2003, p58).

The precarious situation was made worse by the failure of the international community to support the Coalition's military action in Iraq. International opposition to the conflict didn't seem to constrain military action, “but did make it more difficult for the coalition to restore law and order and to administer Iraq once hostilities were over.”³³ So, when policies were being reviewed at the end of the main conflict, the size and nature of the Coalition was still an issue of concern to officials and the British general public. However, there were peculiar difficulties which the British forces had to contend with.

For example, in terms of the operation of the war, there were problems of equipment supplies and distribution which resulted in shortages and limitations in operational abilities. In a press statement on 11 December 2003, the National Audit Office noted that “the rapid deployment revealed areas where there were gaps in capability.” The press release continued:

“There were not enough nuclear, biological and chemical warfare protection equipment, spare parts for tanks and armoured vehicles, medical supplies, helicopter spares or desert combat clothing and boots. Urgent action was largely successful in rectifying shortfalls but, for a few equipments, training time and supply of ancillary equipment was curtailed.”³⁴

Some experts suggested that the logistic problems did not arise just because of lack of funding. Betz and Cormack (2009, p321) claimed that government's

³³ House of Commons Defence Committee Report, 26 May 2004, paragraph 179, p42

³⁴ Press release can be found on-line at <http://www.nao.org.uk/news/0304/030460.aspx>

anxiety over public opinion might have hampered official support for pre-war preparation of the armed forces. The result was a hurried deployment of men and equipment which in turn led to operational difficulties.

As regards humanitarian intervention, the House of Commons Defence Committee believed that “it was a misjudgement by government to have decided that planning to meet the needs of the Iraqi people” after the onset of conflict “was particularly sensitive.”³⁵ According to the committee, the government reasoned that openly preparing for post-conflict phase was “more sensitive than the deploying of military forces,” a miscalculation that the committee attributed the “constrained planning for the post-conflict phase.”

The nature of relations between American and British troops was another issue of concern in both countries' management of conflict and post-conflict operations. In the assessment of the *New Scientist*, on the surface the loss of several British troops to the so called friendly United States' fire bordered on sheer careless or as a result of difficulty in managing new technology. But to some more discerning eyes, “the truth may lie deeper. Blame for such accidents usually lies with the culture of rivalry that pervades the armed services” (*New Scientist*, found in Taylor and Youngs, 2003, p79).

With the role of British military and civil servants in Iraq clearly subordinate to their American counterparts, understanding the role of the British Cabinet in

³⁵ House of Commons Defence Committee Report, 3 March 2004, paragraph 357, p147

the decision making process was very vital. Would the Cabinet be seriously engaged in policy making? Before the Cabinet met in September 2002, to hear the case against Iraq, Prime Minister Tony Blair was criticised as acting in a presidential manner by planning to take Britain to war without engaging the rest of the Cabinet in the process. The other concern was that the prime minister was merely taking the cue from the Americans. Thereafter, the political direction was reportedly provided by Cabinet which met weekly. Subsequently, from mid-March to late April 2003, a smaller group, making up the war cabinet, reportedly held daily ad hoc meetings (House of Commons Defence Committee, 3 March 2003, paragraph 76, p51). However, as noted earlier, several of those meetings ended acrimoniously (Campbell, 2008).

Campbell (2008) claimed that the meeting of the war cabinet were acrimonious principally because some members of the Cabinet found the highly critical voice of Claire Short, the former International Development Secretary, intolerable. Ms Short left the government on May 12, 2003. With Ms Short and Robin Cook out of the government, the remaining cabinet members opted to “stick together” (Prescott, 2009, p28). The implication was that the Prime Minister held sway. I have already noted that Mr Blair's faith in Britain's special relationship with the US was reported to be unshaken (Prescott, Ibid). With no robust Cabinet control of the Iraq policy in place, the public, perhaps justifiably, demanded to know who controlled British policy in Iraq.

From the foregoing discussions, it can be deduced that the same issues dominated all the three stages of the policy process. First, members of the public were steadfast in demanding the justification for military combat or gradually began to oppose Britain's participation in the war. Also, the preparedness of British soldiers, in terms of both the number of men deployed to war and the level of equipment, was a topical issue. Questions were also asked on the preparedness of the Coalition to deal with humanitarian and all post-conflict needs of the Iraqis.

The degree and manner of Cabinet involvement in the war policy were as well issues of public interest. The public and the newspapers were also concerned about the nature of the command and control of the coalition forces and civilian operations. It was increasingly apparent that the United States had a dominant control of the direction of the policy. There was little gain made in the effort to bring in other European allies into the coalition to broaden the alliance against Iraq. These recurring issues must have had impact on both public and mass media opinion at the policy review stage.

In the next sections of this chapter I will quantify public and mass media opinion on the Iraqi policy at the policy review stage. Also, I will use data and narrative accounts to demonstrate official responses to both public and mass media opinions at this stage of policy. As noted earlier, the degree of official responsiveness at the policy review stage will be compared with what has been discovered at the policy initiation and implementation stages.

6.3 Trends of Public Opinion at Policy Review Stage

Opinion polls conducted in December 2003 - my sample month for the policy review stage - indicated that a majority of the population thought that military attack on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein was justified. It could be recalled that public opinion polls indicated that opposition to the war whittled down once combat started in March 2003. However, acceptance of the invasion did not translate to public approval of the government's handling of the Iraq policy. In fact some other polls indicated that the public felt the government was untrustworthy and that Prime Minister Blair's position had been so undermined he was expected to quite office in a matter of months. Although there was sustained pressure to force Mr Blair to step down, he did not leave office until almost four years, later on June 27, 2007.

Two pollsters directly asked their respondents if they thought the Iraq invasion was right. In an ICM poll conducted on December 17, 2003, the respondents were asked: From everything you have seen and heard, do you think the military attack on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein was justified or unjustified? The response appears in Table 6:1.

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Justified | 55% |
| Unjustified | 30% |
| Don't know/not stated | 15% |

Table 6:1 Invasion justified or unjustified?

Source ICM Research Limited

In a similar poll, YouGov asked respondents from December 18 through 19, 2003 whether or not the invasion was still justified. YouGov asked the

respondents: What is your current view: do you think the war was justified or not. Table 6:2 shows approval was slightly lower than found in the ICM poll.

| | |
|-------------------|-----|
| Right/Justified | 53% |
| Wrong/Unjustified | 33% |
| Don't Know | 14% |

Table 6:2 Invasion is still right or wrong?

Source YouGov Ltd.

The degree of public approval at this stage of policy was consistent with what was recorded during the invasion in March 2003. The policy received hypothetical approval ratings at the policy initiation stage when respondents were asked if they would back the war when or if the plan met all diplomatic and legal requirements. The fact that the trend of public opinion was replicated during the policy review stage further confirmed that public opinion could be consistent through the entire process of foreign policy. Consistent, structured and rationale public opinion (Holsti, 1992, p442) should to some degree influence official policy.

In terms of specific aspects of the Iraq policy, the public rated the government poorly. As I noted earlier, the trustworthiness of the government was always in doubt. Government was consistently rated low on credibility in YouGov polls from January 2003 to March 2005. In December 2003 respondents were again asked: Do you think the government has, on balance, been honest and trustworthy or not? As shown in Table 6:3, nearly two-thirds of the respondents saw the government as “not honest and trustworthy.”

| | |
|----------------------------|-----|
| Honest and trustworthy | 28% |
| Not honest and trustworthy | 64% |
| Don't know | 8% |

Table 6:3 Government trustworthiness in December 2003

Source: YouGov Ltd.

The government's unpopularity was also reflected in another ICM poll for *The Guardian*. One of the questions in the poll conducted from December 12 to 14, 2003, was: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the job Tony Blair is doing as prime minister? In response to the question 39 percent of the respondents said they were satisfied but 52 percent were dissatisfied and 9 percent did not know or refused to answer the question.

Respondents were more evenly balanced when they were asked: Do you think it is likely or unlikely that Tony Blair will be Prime Minister in a year's time? Forty-eight percent of the respondents thought he would still be in office in a year. The number was only marginally higher than those who thought he would be forced out of office within a year. His own Labour Party supporters made up nearly a third (27%) of the 46 percent of respondents who thought Mr Blair was unlikely to be in office much longer. Finally, 6% of respondents didn't know.

In his analysis of the poll for *The Guardian*, Alan Travis,³⁶ noted that Mr Blair's personal ratings had taken a "battering" since August 2003 when the daily Hutton Inquiry "hearings laid bare the Whitehall intrigues that lay behind the

³⁶ The Guardian December 17, 2003 online

decision to invade Iraq and the death of the weapons inspector David Kelly.” The worst performance of the government in public rating to date was recorded in September of that year when Mr Blair's rating fell by 29 points. As much as 61 percent of the poll respondents claimed they were unhappy with the job he was doing. The Prime Minister's net rating was still very much low when the government commenced the review of its policy.

If the fear of an electoral loss could be an impetus to government responsiveness (Manza and Cook, 2002) as I assumed in the theoretical framework, the gloomy ratings of the British government at this stage of policy should have prompted the government to respond positively to public opinion. Would that be the case? Before looking at how the government responded to those issues of public misgivings in its Iraq policy, I will weigh the public attitude against some of the projections I made in my theoretical framework.

The manner of public expression of policy preference at the policy initiation and implementation stages was not replicated at the policy review stage. For instance, trade union organisations did not threaten strike action and there were no demonstrations in parts of Britain as was the case in the first two stages of policy. However, my expectation that the public would be non-attentive or indifferent was not supported. Although interest in Iraq and other foreign policy and security issues was slightly lowered, there was still a considerable interest in those policy areas. For example, in a December 11 to 17, 2003 poll, Ipsos-Mori found that 12 percent of British adults considered

defence/foreign affairs/international terrorism as the most important issues facing Britain. Those policy areas were ranked as third behind Race relations/immigration/immigrants (15%) and National Health Service/Hospitals (13%) as the most important issues facing Britain.

Only a few weeks previously, Ipsos-Mori found in another poll that defence/foreign affairs/international terrorism constituted the most important policy area in the view of 25 percent of respondents. In the poll conducted from 20 to 25 November 2003, the National Health Service/Hospitals and Race relations/immigration/immigrants came joint, distant second in the order of importance. About 13 percent backed each of those policy areas as the most important issues facing Britain. What can be deduced from the poll results is that public interest in foreign policy dropped by more than half two weeks into the policy review stage. However, because foreign policy and its component policy areas came a close third in order of importance in the public's view, my assumption that the public would be non-attentive and indifferent at this stage of policy has not been supported.

In summary, while the public still backed the ouster of Saddam Hussein at the stage of policy review, by the same time (December 2003) public discontent with how the government made its case for war had mothballed into a general distrust of the government. I also found that contrary to my expectation there was a considerable degree of public attention to the Iraq policy during the policy review stage. But will public discontent at this time compel the

government to be more responsive to public opinion? In terms of public participation, there was no indication that the public engaged in the policy review process. In that sense, the public appeared to have played the role of attentive observers at this stage. Next, I will turn my attention to the frequency and nature of newspapers' demands for policy actions at the review stage of the Iraq policy.

6.4 Frequency and Nature of Newspaper Editorials on Iraq at the Policy Review Stage

In chapter one I noted the widely accepted theory that the mass media could have impact on policy and policy makers when they “keep the pressure on policy officials” (Kelly, 1994, p8) and by the “concerted application of the norms of news” (Cohen, 1994, p9). On those bases, I intend to use the quantity and quality of newspaper editorials as viable ways of measuring mass media desire to engage in the process of policy review.

In terms of the frequency of editorials, Table 6:4 clearly shows that the newspapers only recorded 16 editorial comments on the Iraq policy at this stage of policy.

| | Number of newspaper editorials |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| The Times | 3 |
| The Daily Telegraph | 4 |
| The Guardian | 4 |
| The Independent | 5 |
| Grand total for the month | 16 |

Table 6:5 Newspaper Editorials in December 2003

In chapter four, I recorded a total of 24 editorials at the policy initiation stage (September 2002). The policy implementation stage noticed a jump to 101 in the total number of editorial comments on Iraq and the Iraq policy. With an 84 percent drop in the quantity of newspaper editorials at the policy review stage, I can only conclude that the newspapers exerted the least influence on policy makers at this stage of policy. That result supports my claim in the theoretical framework that the newspapers would be least engaged in the policy process at this stage of policy.

Aside the dwelled number of editorial comments at this stage, the newspapers were most infrequent in addressing the Iraq policy at this stage. At the policy initiation stage, the 25 editorials appeared on eleven of the 25 weekdays in September 2002. The newspapers wrote editorial comments on Iraq even more frequently at the policy implementation stage. At that stage of policy, there were newspaper editorials on Iraq policy on 24 of the 25 weekdays of March 2003. During the policy review stage, the 16 editorials recorded in December 2003, appeared on seven of the 27 weekdays of the month. In terms of the quantity and consistency of mass media policy demands, I want to reiterate that the media were the least demanding at the policy review stage.

A majority of the editorial comments contained policy proposals on what should be the British government's stand on the trial of Saddam Hussein.

There were five editorials demanding for a fair trial for the deposed President Hussein. Four other editorials proposed that the nature of trial of the former president should be left to the Iraqis to determine. In fact half of the 16 editorials in December 2003 appeared in the three days after Saddam was captured on December 14, 2003, in a farmhouse in Al-Dawr, south of Tikrit.

In December 2003, only two editorials on Iraq were published prior to the capture of former President Hussein. Between 15 and 16 December, 2003, eight editorial comments were written on Iraq. One point that could be deduced from the concentration of the editorials around the dramatic events of Saddam's capture was that the media only become attentive when there were exciting and dramatic news events. The process of policy review is hardly dramatic and that could have been why there was a limited mass media engagement with the policy process at this stage.

The four newspapers wrote editorial comments on how Saddam's trial should proceed. *The Times* on December 15, 2003 described Saddam in uncomplimentary terms, claiming that he “terrorised”, “gassed” and “buried” his own people but concluded that he should be given a fair trial. In part, *The Times'* editorial supported his trial in Iraq. The newspaper continued along that same line:

“No Western leader wants a trial in The Hague bedevilled by international politics or deflecting the spotlight from Saddam's atrocities. But no Western country could accept a kangaroo court in Baghdad or flouting of the norms of criminal justice. Britain faces a particular dilemma: as one of the coalition powers, it shares ultimate responsibility for bringing Saddam to justice”

The Times continued:

“The West is in a strong position to help to set in place a proper legal framework, which would allow judges and lawyers free of past taint to conduct proceedings fairly. The coalition must make clear to the Iraqis that only a trial seen to be fair will satisfy world, as well as Iraqi, opinion.”³⁷

In the newspaper's opinion, “it will not be for outsiders to decide whether Saddam should hang; Iraqis know what their history demands.” Also *The Daily Telegraph*³⁸ concurred that the coalition authorities should ensure “that the initiative remains in Iraqi hands.” It further argued that it was “surely right that a people freed from a reign of terror should be able to prosecute those responsible for it...”

*The Independent*³⁹ declared that “even Saddam Hussein deserves a fair trial under international law.” It made a case for international supervision of the trial to ensure that there was no mob justice:

“...But it cannot be right that the Iraqis alone, before they have a sovereign government and before they have established democratic legal system, should decide Saddam's fate. Ideally, Saddam should be tried in Iraq and at least in part by Iraqis.”

To *The Guardian*⁴⁰, Saddam's trial should be “in public and preferably under international, UN-authorized auspices.” The underlining argument of the four newspapers was that Britain, along with the coalition, should not get unduly involved in Saddam's trial.

³⁷ The Times Leader December 16, 2003, page 19

³⁸ Daily Telegraph Leader 16 December, 2003 p21

³⁹ The Independent Leader, 15 December 2003, p18

⁴⁰ The Guardian Leader, 12 December 2003, p29

Addressing the policy review put forward by government more directly, *The Daily Telegraph* demanded that more men and equipment be engaged in Iraq and in future combats. It claimed that “our troops are underequipped and overstretched.”⁴¹ *The Guardian*⁴² while also contributing to the policy review declared that there should be a proper examination of the role of the British armed forces in the 21st century. With no weapons of mass destruction yet to be found in Iraq in December 2003, the newspaper demanded that Britain should look inwardly and switch resources to homeland security.

*The Guardian*⁴³ thought that the policy projection was wrong in “proposing to further develop ‘expeditionary force’ capabilities inter-operable with US forces.” It reasoned that such a development would increase “the potential for more all-out wars of conquest like Iraq under US/NATO command.” In a rather anti-American tone, the paper concluded: “Trying to keep up with the Pentagon Joneses is not a sensible idea financially or militarily. Politically, the war in Iraq was a regression, not a paradigm.” The tone of *The Guardian's* editorial was very much in line with its overall thinking that the government needed to step back from an unquestioning support for United State's policy on Iraq. On 16 December 2003 it used the debate on Saddam's future as basis to demand that Britain should oppose some of the United State's policy lines in Iraq “or else suffer further gross distortion of its policy aims at US hands.”

⁴¹ The Daily Telegraph Leader, 12 December 2003, p29

⁴² The Guardian Leader, Ibid

⁴³ The Guardian Leader, Ibid

The Guardian further outlined its disappointment:

“The dismaying degree to which established British policy aims have been distorted by the government's unstinting support for George Bush on Iraq and his `war on terror' is well known. Unfortunately, even though the war has officially ended and Saddam Hussein is a prisoner, these unseemly contortions continue.”⁴⁴

So far, I have been able to identify the mood of the mass media during the policy review stage. First, the quantity and frequency of editorials were far less than they were in policy implementation stage and also less than the quantity and frequency of editorials at the policy initiation stage. In fact, the newspapers were active in only 24 of the 89 criteria or units of assessments I used in measuring mass media activities at each of the three stages of policy. The newspapers were active in 72 areas of assessment at the policy implementation stage and in 57 areas at the policy initiation stage. The subdued nature of the mass media at this stage did not stop them from making very clear policy suggestions, although in very limited numbers.

From the review of the newspaper editorials, a number of issues appear to have taken precedence in mass media attention. One opinion that ran through the newspapers was that Britain should not get entangled in the politics of Saddam's trial but that it should help create an atmosphere for a fair trial. There were also calls for the increasing of the troops in Iraq and a better equipping of the soldiers. Also highlighted was a need to review British partnership with United States in Iraq. There was no mention of the even more precarious concerns for Iraqi humanitarian needs as was recorded in earlier

⁴⁴ The Guardian Leader, 16 December 2003, p21

stages of policy. My next step is to assess how officials responded to those demands.

6.5 Frequency, Nature and Weight of Official Responsiveness

As I outlined in the theoretical framework and in chapters four and five, I measure official responsiveness in two ways: first, by simply adding the number (quantity) of occasions officials responded to the issues raised by the public and in newspaper editorials. Secondly, I weigh the nature (quality) of those responses to ascertain to what degree officials actually responded positively or in line with public and newspaper demands. In this chapter, I have adopted the same characterizations I used in chapters four and five. I will use those characterisations to reflect the forms and categories of official responses.

I have six forms of responses identified in this study. They are press statement, press conference, press interview, public statement, parliamentary statement and policy announcement. The types of policy responses identified in this study are acknowledgement, dismissive, defensive, conciliatory, persuasive and extensive case. To illustrate, officials can acknowledge policy demands when they indicate they heard or read them. The response is dismissive when officials criticise the public or mass media policy options. They are defensive when they press forward with their own argument despite knowing the policy preferences of the public or the press.

In the same manner as I applied in the preceding chapters, I will allocate weights to officials who have made those responses according to the seniority of their positions in government. The next step will be to ascertain the degree of changes to policy as the ultimate measure of official responsiveness. Finally, I will compare official responses at this stage of policy with other stages so as to confirm whether or not official responsiveness depends on the stage of policy.

As noted above, I will start by carrying out a simple count of the number of official responses in the categories outlined above. The total of the categories of responses are presented in Table 6:6. Detailed data on official responsiveness can be found in Appendix Two.

| Number of responses (occasions) | Number of positive responses | Number of negative responses | Weight of responding officials | Number of policy changes (-1: dismissive) | Number of policy changes (1: adjustment) |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|--|
| 7 | 2 | 5 | 45 | 5 | 2 |

Table 6:6 Number, nature and weight of official responses in December 2003

In terms of the number of recorded responses, official responsiveness at this stage of policy was quite minimal. Table 6:6 above shows that there were only seven official responses to public and mass media demands at the policy review stage. When compared with the policy initiation stage (with 34 responses) and the policy implementation stage (44 responses) it is very

apparent that officials were least inclined to respond to pressure at the policy review stage.

Similarly, a look at the nature of responses shows that officials made only a couple of positive responses at the policy review stage. There were five negative responses recorded for the period. In comparison, at the policy initiation stage, there were 17 positive responses and 19 negative responses recorded. Finally, at the policy implementation stage, there were five positive responses and 34 negative responses. Although I will carry out a more detailed analysis in chapter seven, I want to note at this point that overall, officials were least inclined to respond in line with public and mass media demands at the policy implementation stage.

In one of the cases, officials clearly tried to go along with the public's demands by striving to work with other European countries in a broader coalition. Although disagreements between Britain and key European allies outside the coalition escalated in the build up to the Iraq war, the British government continued to press for some form of rapprochement to pave the way for those European allies to play some part in restoring peace to Iraq. On the subject, Mr Blair⁴⁵ said in early December 2003 that discussions would continue and added the he was sure to find a satisfactory solution in the not too-distant future.

⁴⁵ Mr Blair's statement was reported in The Guardian, December 5, 2003

Secondly, the government restrained itself and did not intervene directly in the trial of Saddam Hussein in line with public demand. The prime minister unequivocally declared that Saddam would be put on trial by an Iraqi court. He said: "We can put the past behind us. Where his rule meant terror and division and brutality, let his capture bring about unity, reconciliation and peace between all the people of Iraq."⁴⁶

Primarily, government continued to speak up in defence of its policy in Iraq. For instance, despite the non-discovery of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw, declared in an interview: "There is no doubt whatsoever that the decision to go to war was justified."⁴⁷ That robust defence was made only few days after Mr Straw had called members of the public to contribute to government's review of British foreign policy.

In the public's perception, the relationship between United States and British troops fighting in Iraq was not exactly warm. I have already noted the difficulties faced by British soldiers in the command and control structure of coalition's battle contingent. The problem received the attention of the House of Commons Defence Committee. In its report the committee noted:

"We recommend that MOD (Ministry of Defence) considers whether the highest levels of British command structures might be made more

⁴⁶ Blair, T, *The Guardian on line*, 14 December 2003. Report could be found at <http://guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/14/iraq.iraq1>)

⁴⁷ Straw, J. in interview with *The Guardian* 8 December 2003, p7

adaptable so as to operate more closely in parallel with their American counterparts, when UK and US forces are operating together.”⁴⁸

The government was unequivocal in its rejection of the suggestion for a review of how British troops worked in relation with American troops. It wrote back to the Defence Committee saying: “We do not agree. The Coalition command structures were closely integrated.”⁴⁹

Another look at Table 6:6 shows that the weight of officials addressing public and mass media concerns was 45. Although the prime minister continued to lead the response to public and mass media demands at this stage of policy (four occasions), the weight of officials who responded to public and mass media's policy demands dropped sharply from 165 at the policy initiation stage. The weight of responding officials was also a far cry from 229 recorded at the policy implementation stage. Over all, less number of officials were engaged in addressing public concerns at the policy review stage.

In terms of policy changes, officials were mostly dismissive of calls for policy change. In five of the seven incidents of responses, government officials were openly dismissive of calls to change its policy. In two cases, there were adjustment changes. In other words, officials were ready to make changes in the effort put into a cause. No far-reaching changes in policy were made.

⁴⁸ House of Commons Defence Committee Report, 3 March, 2004, paragraph 84, p54

⁴⁹ Government response contained in House of Commons Defence Committee Report, 26 May 2004, paragraph 25, p6

Data collated at this stage of policy mostly supported the projections I made in the theoretical framework in chapter two. With very limited public and mass media involvement in the policy review itself, the government initiated and dominated the process of policy review. In the theoretical framework, I projected that the mass media and public would be nominally active. I also projected that the public and mass media would make little impact on government policy at this stage of policy. On the other hand, officials instigated adjustment changes but received and accepted limited public and mass media policy proposals. By all criteria of evaluation, I found that the policy review stage was the least suitable stage for public and mass media influence on policy.

The setting during the policy review stage suits a foreign policy practice which would approximate the manufacturing consent theory. Although the public seemed attentive and openly upset with government, the public hardly engaged in the policy review process. Some may argue that public anger could be an impetus for official action, but there was no standard platform for the public to channel its anger within the bureaucratic setting that policies were reviewed. Within the period of the policy review, there were no strikes, no demonstrations or threats to embark on one. Demonstrations which were major forms of public expression of policy options during the first and second stages of policy were non-existent at review stage.

6.6 Summary

As noted earlier, the mass media were mostly cool and only got excited when events became dramatic. Otherwise, at the commencement of policy review, they only reported in their news columns that policy review was underway. Only two editorial comments were written at the commencement of the review and both of them barely touched on the issues. Just as proponents of the manufacturing consent theory would suggest, the media, at this stage of policy, were led by public officials who introduced the reviews. Their treatment of the issues was light, perhaps because they did not see the storyline as commercially viable, lacking in public appeal, or were lacking in knowledge on how to set their own policy agenda and push it through. More than in any other stage of policy, officials were clearly in control of the agenda. Ministers introduced the policy review and the terms of the process. Deliberations on the agenda were mostly held in controlled environments - the Parliament and in Whitehall, forums that best suited the political elites.

Notably, there is no evidence that officials conspired to or deliberately excluded public and mass media from engaging in the policy review process. In fact while introducing the foreign policy review, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made a call for public participation in the process. However, I maintain that the nature of the policy review stage led to the low-key public and mass media participation at this stage of the process. The bureaucratic and non-dramatic natures of this stage, in my judgement, were not attractive to the media and posed an access problem to the public. There was no obvious threat to the nation and its people at the policy review stage. Also, there

appeared to be no fear of an immediate cost (material and human) as would usually be the case when war was imminent or during the prosecution of one. Because the public and the mass media demands at this stage were at best spasmodic, officials could afford to dismiss them and focus on their own policy agenda.

From the foregoing, it is evident that officials made the most positive responses to public demands at the policy initiation stage. The policy implementation stage witnessed an upsurge of official responses but only five cases of positive responses were recorded. That means that officials were more inclined to be on the offensive and defend their own policies despite an upsurge in demands for policy changes by the media and the public. It is, therefore clear that officials responded to those pressures in different ways depending on the stage of policy.

Finally, evidence found at this stage supports my claim that the degree of responsiveness varied according to the stage of policy. In the next chapter, which will be my concluding chapter, I will summarise by answering the questions I set at the outset in more detail. Primarily I will summarize how my findings compare with the hypotheses and assumptions I made at the beginning of the study.

7 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

In this concluding chapter of my study, I will summarize the main results, my main claims and make recommendations for further research on how foreign policy officials respond to the public opinion and the mass media. I will start with an overview of the organization of the research by summarizing the research problem, questions and the hypotheses. Further, I will summarize the theoretical framework for the study and my research method. In relation to my findings in the case studies, I will draw conclusions on the research questions I posed and the hypotheses I raised in chapters one to three. Specifically, I will draw my conclusions on the broad research problems of state-media-public relations. Even in more specific terms, I will draw my conclusions on the research problem which sought to verify the impact of stages of the policy process on official responsiveness to public opinion and mass media.

7.2 An Overview of the Structure and Organization of Research

In chapter one, I was able to identify the two key groups of literature on the relationship between mass media, public opinion and foreign policy. I noted that proponents of the CNN Effect and Manufacturing Consent theories draw conclusions on the impact of mass media on foreign policy without paying much attention to the process through which policies emerge. Both groups

disregard the impact that dissimilar circumstances inherent in policy stages could have on how officials respond to other policy actors. While CNN Effect theory declares that the mass media have overwhelming control on officials, Manufacturing Consent theory, on the other hand, claims that the mass media and public opinion have no substantive impact on foreign policy.

In chapter two, I was able to examine a wider range of literature in policy studies, management and other aspects of public policy most of which duly recognize the complex nature of the policy-making process. In each of these other areas of study, there is considerable recognition that policies emerge in stages and that policy actors behave differently at each of those stages of policy (Soule and King, 2006). My objective was to find out if foreign policy officials responded differently to public opinion and the mass media at different stages of policy.

Before looking into that question, I examined in more detail the nature of the policy process and how they apply to different policy areas. I also compared and contrasted policy processes in several policy areas and political systems. After the comparisons, I came to the conclusion that, despite slight differences in policy areas and political systems, foreign policies, just like other policy areas, evolve in dissimilar stages. I further concluded that since policies emerge in dissimilar stages, there is a need to examine official responsiveness at each stage of policy.

To empirically test my hypothesis, I chose to study the responsiveness of British officials to mass media and public opinion at each stage of British policy on Iraq. Drawing from the type of activities that are expected at the different stages of policy, I was able to construct three stages of British policy on Iraq. The policy initiation stage started in September 2002, when the government began making its case against Iraq both to the public and before Parliament.

The second stage of the policy, the policy implementation stage, started with the launching of the war on Iraq in March 2003. Finally, the policy review stage started with the government's announcements of a review of foreign and defence policies on Iraq in December 2003. Because of the enormity of data that would have emerged from studying the entire process of British policy on Iraq, I chose three sample months to represent the three stages of policy. I chose September 2002 to represent the policy initiation stage, March 2003 as my sample period of policy implementation stage and December 2003 to represent the policy review stage.

Those three stages of policy provided the platform for me to test how policy responsiveness changed at different points in the policy process. To further test my hypotheses I constructed the stages of policy model which set out a characterization of the make up of each stage of policy and my expectations of policy actors at each of those stages of policy.

After using a combination of both quantitative and qualitative research methods to test responsiveness, I found substantial differences in official

attitudes to public opinion and mass media at each stage of policy. As I will report in more detail soon, the study also found different degrees of policy changes at the stages of policy. Both findings are in line with my expectation that the stage of policy would determine how much impact the mass media and public opinion would have on the foreign policy process.

In chapter three, I explained in more detail my research methods. Principally, I employed quantitative and qualitative analyses of mass media and public demands for change in the direction of British policy on Iraq at each stage of the policy. Conversely, I also carried out quantitative and qualitative analyses of official responses to those demands at each stage of policy. A simple computation of numbers or values assigned to various official actions or reactions in the policy process was used to gauge official responsiveness at each stage of policy. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods made it possible for me to identify the nature of official responsiveness (through qualitative methods) and the degree and magnitude of official responsiveness and foreign policy change (through quantitative methods).

In terms of data gathering, I opted to use archival records of official pronouncements and actions recorded at the time of each stage of policy. The option gave me a better picture of *how* officials responded to public and mass media pressure during the time in question. To some degree, documentary evidence from executive and parliamentary branches of government also provided answers to *why* officials responded in certain manners to public and mass media pressure.

To capture the public mood, I used a series of public opinion polls, conducted during each policy stage, as my main points of reference. At the same time, I studied newspaper editorial comments to capture the intensity (quantity) of demands and the nature (direction) of mass media policy options. I chose newspaper editorials as indicators of their policy preferences because it is only in their editorial or leader pages that newspapers unequivocally express their own views on policies and events of the day. The other option, which is commonly used in studies of mass media's role in foreign policy, is to assess the dimension and slants of news reports. I reasoned that drawing inferences from the slant of news stories would not explicitly define the opinions of newspapers as their editorials readily do. Furthermore, I am unaware of any major British broadcasting organization which broadcasts its editorial opinions hence this study was based on the print media.

7.3 Limitations of Study

In this section, I will highlight a couple of problems I faced in carrying out this study. First, I was concerned that one month might not be enough time to understand trends and the attitude of actors in each stage of the policy process. At the end of my initial field work, I was happy with my understanding of what transpired at the policy initiation and implementation stages. Taking a longer period to look at the policy review stage could be justified because, in theory, it is the stage that lasts the longest of the three stages. But I also feared that taking more time to study the policy review stage would have created a problem of balance. Perhaps, it would have undermined the

advantage derived from examining the nature of policy and policy activities in all stages for equal periods of time and similar settings.

Second, I had problems determining how to establish the linkage between mass media editorials, public opinion polls and official responsiveness. But this is not a new problem in the study of how, for instance, the mass media influence foreign policy. In line with O’Heffernan’s (1991, p xii) observation, the mass media and public opinion being external forces separate from the policy makers and their decisions, linkages to policies cannot be easily found. O’Heffernan (Ibid, p20) rightly noted that it is usually difficult to separate precisely the information the administration received from other actors in the foreign policy arena. As noted earlier I have based my study on finding congruences between mass media and public demands and official policy actions as evidence of responsiveness.

The other option would have been to employ interview methods and ascertain from former officials how much influence mass media and public demands had on their policy decisions. Earlier in chapter three I discussed the difficulties inherent in using interview methods in this case. There could be difficulties in former officials’ ability to recall and their ability to be objective in discussing their roles in what was a very controversial policy. Despite the inherent problems, perhaps adding the interview method as a complement to the mixed approaches I have used for this study might have brought additional insight into official attitudes in the policy process.

Finally, as has been the case in many studies on the stages of the policy process, defining the policy stages has posed a problem. They are complex processes that could be intermixed. So, any delineation of stages of policy could be considered to be mechanical. I have earlier addressed some of these issues in chapter two but the inevitable difficulty in managing the policy process in stages needs to be recognised. Next, I will summarize the research questions, my hypotheses and my findings.

7.4 Conclusions on Research Questions and Hypotheses

The broad goal of this study is to provide additional insights to the process of foreign policy change. In particular, I posed a key research question which asked: *Does the responsiveness of British officials to mass media and public opinion depend on the stage of policy?* To address that question I tried to find out how official responsiveness varied in the stages of policy.

First, I expanded that principal question into six parts upon which I drew up six hypotheses. The questions I posed were: (1) does the degree of responsiveness to media and public policy preferences change as the stage of policy change? (2) Were any tactics or strategies changed because of media and public policy preferences? (3) How much did policymakers' responsiveness change when the importance of an issue was raised? Does the responsiveness to salient issues change over the policy stages within the policy circle? (4) Was official responsiveness more procedural rather than strategic? (5) Was policy responsiveness more strategic in some policy stages than the other? Based on those questions I drew up five hypotheses. Now, I

will draw from the findings I presented in chapters four, five and six, to test those five hypotheses. My first hypothesis directly addresses the role of policy stages in the process of foreign policy change.

7.4.1 First Hypothesis

H1: Official responsiveness to mass media and public opinion depends on the stage of policy, with responsiveness more pronounced at policy formulation stage, less so at policy implementation stage and least at the policy review stage.

The findings I have presented in chapters four, five and six mostly support Hypothesis One. From my evaluation of the quantity and quality of responses made by British government officials to mass media and public demands at the policy initiation stage, I found that officials were “open” to public and mass media opinion as I projected would be the case at this stage of policy. During the policy formulation stage, officials actually made 17 positive responses. In other words, they spoke or acted in line with public and mass media demands 17 times.

At the same initial stage of policy, officials made 19 negative responses or took actions that countered popular opinion. Evidently, there was only a marginal difference of two occasions between when government responded negatively to mass media and public demands and when it positively responded to them. At this stage, officials were found to be responsive but not overly so. As I noted earlier, this is a far cry from the picture usually painted in the literature. The result is at variance with how foreign policy officials are

portrayed in some theories - as impervious to public demands (Manufacturing Consent theory) or helpless when they come under intense mass media pressure or under coordinated public pressure (CNN Effect theory).

Turning to the nature of responses recorded, on a majority of the occasions (11 times), officials were actually conciliatory to public and mass media demands. However, 9 times, the government was dismissive of the public position while also defensive of its own position on 9 occasions. Although in the 19 instances of negative and defensive responses, it was willing to explain its action to the public. As I noted earlier, government's readiness to explain its own position should be rightly recognised as a form of sensitivity or responsiveness.

A different picture emerges at the implementation stage of policy. Although there were 44 cases of official responses recorded, a majority of those responses were when officials either made a new case or defended their original policy position. After assessing the nature of official responses, the public and mass media are shown to have made little impact on British officials at the implementation stage of policy. At this point in the policy process, there were only five occasions when officials spoke or acted in agreement with the dominant public and mass media opinion.

That means that officials were in agreement with popular opinion on only 11.3 percent of the occasions they spoke on those dominant issues. On 39 occasions representing 88.6 percent of the cases, officials made comments or

acted in ways contrary to public and mass media policy demands. In comparison, officials made far more positive responses to public and mass media opinion at the policy initiation stage than what obtained at the policy implementation stage.

With only two positive responses recorded, the policy review stage witnessed the least mass media and public influence on officials. When assessed with Schumaker's (1975) tests of official responsiveness, the government fell short in most areas where they were expected to show sensitivity during the policy review stage. By starting the policy review process, the government showed signs of *agenda responsiveness*. As I noted in the chapter six, Iraq and the conduct of foreign affairs were high on the public agenda. However, there was clearly no sign of *access responsiveness* because the avenue for public and mass media participation in the review process was not created.

In terms of the frequency, official responses at the policy review stage were quite minimal. As shown in chapter six, there were only seven official responses to public and mass media demands at the policy review stage. As a result of the very limited level of public and mass media engagement and equally low levels of official responses, there was nothing significant in terms of *output* and *impact responsiveness*. Compared with the policy initiation stage (with 34 responses) and the policy implementation stage (44 responses), it is very apparent that officials were least sensitive to pressure at the policy review stage. In fact, only two positive responses recorded at the policy review stage in December 2003 can hardly be considered significant.

The degree (number of) and nature of responses at each of the three stages of policy are represented in Table 7:1.

| Stages of Policy | Total Number of Official Responses | Total Number of (Positive) Official Responses in line with Public and Mass Media Opinion | Percentage of Responses Considered Positive |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|--|--|
| Policy Initiation | 34 | 17 | 50% (39.5 % were offers to change policy) |
| Policy Implementation | 44 | 5 | 11.4% |
| Policy Review | 7 | 2 | 28.6% (Result diminished by limited number of responses) |

Table 7:1 Frequency and nature of official responsiveness in stages of policy

In view of the above result, I conclude that Hypothesis One is supported. Official responsiveness is mostly pronounced at the policy initiation stage. There were very minimal levels of positive responses at both policy implementation and review stages. I wil quickly reiterate that the degree of negative responses at the policy implementation stage does not support the idea that officials have an aversion for mass media or public contribution to foreign policy as proposed in the Manufacturing Consent theory. On the other hand, the fact that 50 percent of responses recorded at the initial stage of policy were positive does not mean that Britain had a public or mass media-led foreign policy as suggested in CNN Theory.

I also noted that the number of newspaper editorials in my sample newspapers jumped from 25 at the policy initiation stage to 101 at the policy implementation stage. Officials were not compelled by the more than four

times increase in mass media attention to the Iraq policy to accede to the will of the public and mass media. Rather, as I reported in chapter five, in 88.6 percent of the cases, officials spoke or acted in ways opposed to public and mass media demands. Most importantly, the reaction of officials in both stages indicated that they did not have a fixed attitude to the public or mass media at various stages of the policy process. It also means that the nature of their response did not depend on the magnitude of mass media interest. Official responsiveness or sensitivity varied according to the stages of policy.

My finding is in line with what other researchers (Burstein et al, 1995; Schumaker, 1975; Soule and King, 2006, p 1872 - 1873), found in other policy areas: that there is “stages of policy responsiveness.” I found that there were distinguishable stages of policy responsiveness in British officials’ attitude to mass media and public opinion. Whereas Soule and King studied the legislative process (part of policy initiation stage) and found officials to have responded differently through the legislative process, I can, in fact, add that the degree of responsiveness varies in all stages of policy. At the stages of policy initiation, implementation and review of British policy on Iraq, British officials responded differently to the public and mass media. My findings also give a qualified support to the democratic theory. As I noted in chapter two, the theory claims that public officials would carry out broad policies based on the majority opinion (Hughes, 1978, Walker, 1966). With such diversified sources of influence, power does not amass only in the hands of a few. The result of this study shows that the same trend found in domestic policies, to a substantial degree, subsists in foreign policy. At the policy initiation stage, the trend is most pronounced but at other stages of policy, it is subtle. My next

step is to find out if the variation in official response at those stages was significant.

7.4.2 Second Hypothesis

H2: There will be pronounced difference in the degree of official responsiveness as the policy stages change.

From the results in chapters four, five and six and the analysis in sub-section 7.4.1 above, I can also state that Hypothesis Two is supported. I used two ways to measure the degree of responsiveness at each stage of policy. The first step was to weigh the ratio of responses to the amount of pressure from the public and mass media (for example the number of newspaper editorials). Secondly I compared the degree of policy change witnessed at three stages of policy. In Table 7:2 below, I illustrate the first level of assessment of official responsiveness. The table shows the result of a comparison of the ratio of official responsiveness to the number of editorials at the three stages of policy.

| Policy Stages | Number of Editorials | Number of Official Responses | Ratio of Editorials to Official Responses |
|----------------|----------------------|------------------------------|---|
| Initiation | 25 | 36 | 1 editorial to 1.44 responses |
| Implementation | 101 | 44 | 1 editorial to 0.4356 responses |
| Review | 16 | 7 | 1 editorials to 0.4375 responses |

Table 7:2 Policy responsiveness - ratio of editorials to number of responses

The table clearly shows that officials were more responsive to mass media demands at the policy initiation stage. There was a ratio of 1.44 responses to each editorial on the Iraq policy at the policy initiation stage. At the policy

implementation stage, the number of editorials rose four times but official response did not match that increase. In fact, the ratio fell by more than three times as one editorial generated only 0.4356 responses. At the policy review stage, the ratio of editorials to responses changed marginally from what was witnessed at the policy implementation stage. At this stage of policy, one editorial prompted only 0.4375 official responses.

From that first level of analysis, I found officials to be significantly responsive at the policy initiation stage but not responsive at both the policy implementation and review stages. When I used the second level of analysis, I found the differences in official responsiveness at the stages of policy to be more pronounced. For the second level of analysis, I used the degree of policy change (Hermann, 1990) as a measure of official responsiveness at the stages of policy. I will use Table 7:3 below to illustrate the different degrees of responsiveness at each stage of policy.

| Stage of Policy | Type of Policy Changes (and frequency of those changes) |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Policy Initiation Stage | Programme changes (2) Adjustment changes (13) Dismissive of quest for change (23) |
| Policy Implementation Stage | Adjustment changes (5) Dismissive of quest for change (39) |
| Policy Review Stage | Adjustment changes (2) Dismissive of quest for change (5) |

Table 7:3 Types of policy changes by policy stages

In line with the categories of policy changes I set out in the theoretical framework for this study, I witnessed only three types of changes in the three stages of the Iraq policy. The most significant change was, however, observed at the policy initiation stage. It was at the initiation stage that I found two cases

of programme changes. As part of programme change, there were modifications in the methods and means of attaining government's goal in its Iraq policy (Hermann, 1990, pp5-6). At the policy implementation stage, there were a couple of cases when the government employed new instruments of statecraft to achieve its goal.

According to records, it was only at the policy initiation stage that the government significantly strived to use diplomatic means to attain its goal. Examples of those steps included British government's effort to get a second United Nations' resolution to expressly declare war on Iraq. The effort to get a second UN resolution was clearly in line with the demands of British mass media and the public opinion. The government also conceded to public pressure to let United Nations weapons inspections back to Iraq.

At the domestic level, the government was not only compelled to explain its policy in terms of the Iraq dossier issued by Prime Minister Tony, it yielded grounds in terms of Cabinet and Parliamentary oversight. Increased pressure on Downing Street led to the recall of both the Cabinet and the Parliament in September 2002. All these were changes or modifications made to policy processes but overall the policy objectives remained intact. At no other stage of policy were programme changes found.

It is also significant that the highest number of adjustment changes (13) were recorded at the policy initiation stage. According to the framework set out by Hermann (1990), adjustment changes occur at the level of effort put into a

cause, scope of recipients or targets of a policy. At the policy implementation stage of policy, only five of such changes were recorded. The result was worse at the policy review stage when only two of such changes were recorded.

On the negative side, there were 23 cases of open resistance to public and mass media pressure for change at the policy initiation stage. To put that number in perspective, it means that in 64 percent of the times when the government responded to public pressure, it objected to some form of policy change. There were 39 such objections to changes to the policy at the policy implementation stage. Those 39 cases made up 89 percent of government responses to the public and mass media. As Table 7:3 also shows, the government remarkably responded in a different way at the policy review stage. Out of the seven recorded cases of official responses, five of them, making up 71 percent, were official objections to change. By using those criteria to measure the degree of responsiveness, I found that the degrees of response at the policy stages were markedly different.

Also, It is worth noting that although there was increased mass media interest and a higher number of official responses (sensitivity) at the policy implementation stage, officials mostly defended the government's original policy goals. The implication is that the nature of official response to mass media demands does not depend on the magnitude of mass media interest. Overall my second hypothesis is supported when the criteria for measuring policy responsiveness are applied.

The idea that "the media in general have always been able to force an 'external' set of priorities on foreign policy makers" is discounted by this finding (Cohen, 1994, p9). The degrees of mass media impact vary from insignificance to substantial, depending on the stage of policy. The result is clearly in line with the general claim O'Heffernan (1991) made in discussing the Insider Model of Media Influenced Foreign Policy. He observed that the mass media carry out different functions in the foreign policy process but added that the functions are not performed at all times and every stage of the policy process. It is important to find out what circumstances make mass media or public role more pronounced. That is the issue addressed by the third hypothesis.

7.4.3 Third Hypothesis

H3: When the importance of an issue is raised (issue salience), officials would be more responsive and responsiveness will increase even within the same stage of policy.

As the literature shows, issue salience is considered to be a key element of democratic responsiveness in domestic policy circles (Burstein, 2003). It appears that it is also vital in the foreign process. Popular issues like the demand that the government obtained United Nations' mandate, seek parliamentary approval, and expand the coalition to fight Iraq received the most attention of officials. Issue salience represented in Hypothesis Three is also supported in the study.

The implication is that the theory of democratic responsiveness applies in both domestic and foreign policies. Table 7:4 below shows the most salient policy issues and how government responded them. One thing that is obvious is that the government responded positively on certain key issues. Some forms of changes were made in those most popular policy issues.

| Policy Issue | Nature of Policy Change | Degree of Official Responsiveness (-1 – 4) |
|--|---|--|
| Britain should let weapons inspection to continue | Adjustment changes and some programme changes | 1 |
| Combat only on UN approval | Adjustment changes | 1 |
| Expand coalition | Adjustment changes | 1 |
| Stop being overly supportive of United States policy | Adjustment changes | 1 |
| Explain rationale for war | Programme changes | 2 |
| Change Blair's style: | Programme changes | 2 |

Table 7:4 Salient issues and official responsiveness

While those key issues remained of interest at all stages of the policy, they were best addressed at the policy initiation stage. There was no evidence that official attention to those issues increased or decreased within the same stage of policy. But there is ample evidence in chapters four, five and six, that those issues considered important to the public received the most official attention.

The trend supports Ferejohn and Kuklinski's (1990) claim that people are likely to pay more attention to how politicians handle those issues that are very important to them. They added that politicians on the other hand pay more attention to those issues considered to be of most importance to the electorate for their own electoral interest. In view of electoral consequences,

Hill and Hurley (1999) thought that it was clearly in the politicians' interest to pay attention to those issues the public considers salient. The most important issues for the public and the media in foreign policy (Soroka, 2003, pp27 - 48) and domestic policies (Burstein, 2003, pp29 - 40) evidently attract more responsiveness. In summary, officials respond to the most important issues but the degree of their responsiveness varies over the stages of policy. So, I can conclude that the stage of policy is more important than issue salience as determinants of responsiveness. But can official responsiveness be linked with mass media or public demands? That is the question addressed in my fourth hypothesis.

7.4.4 Fourth Hypothesis

H4: There will be verifiable link between official changes in strategy and media and policy preferences.

In a number of cases, narrative accounts pointed to a link between official changes in strategy and policy preferences. For instance in his speech on Iraq at the Trade Union Congress on September 10, 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair assured: "I understand the concerns of people about precipitate military action. It should only ever be a last resort."⁵⁰ In the same September 10, 2002 address, Mr Blair acknowledged the public desire that the United Nations should lead any offensive on Iraq. Similar narrative accounts are noted at all stages of the policy process. In some cases, mass media attention is given as reason for government to be resolute (Hoon, 26 March 2003).

⁵⁰ Blair's address published in *The Guardian*, September 11, 2002, p3

To verify the link between mass media and public policy preferences and official responsiveness, I conducted a word search in the texts of official responses to identify expressions or words indicating awareness, acknowledgement or understanding of public and mass media concerns. Table 7:5 illustrates how many times those links were made. Majority of the responses could be categorized as unclassified because officials' word choices in one part of their speech indicated they tacitly acknowledged public concerns and in another part of the encounter disregarded public concerns. One of the key features was that officials tended not to acknowledge public and mass media concerns in comments made overseas and/or in the presence or in association with foreign dignitaries. When they addressed a domestic audience, they were more likely to acknowledge public concerns on the Iraq policy. No doubt, such deference to public concerns when the domestic audience were mostly attentive was a clear demonstration of official responsiveness.

| Stage of policy | Links established | No Links established | Unclassified |
|-----------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| Initiation | 10 | 5 | 21 |
| Implementation | 24 | 24 | 53 |
| Review | 3 | 3 | 1 |

Table 7:5 Links between official response and public concern

The number of links between official response and public concern shown in Table 7:5 is evidence that public opinion and newspaper editorials had direct impact on government's policy action. Hypothesis Four is also supported. But would those responses be strategic? That is the subject of Hypothesis five.

7.4.5 Fifthth Hypothesis

H5: *Official responsiveness is more procedural rather than strategic.*

Although there were numerous public demonstrations calling for a stop to the war in Iraq, majority of respondents in public opinion polls mostly demanded for changes in the process to war. The same trend was found in the newspaper editorials. However, in response to the demands, officials made only procedural changes in those issues that were of interest to the public. This Hypothesis was supported in terms of procedural steps taken to address the public's demands for a United Nations' mandate for war. Similar procedural steps were taken to ensure humanitarian needs were addressed. Such procedural issues like the recalling of Parliament and the Cabinet were readily received by government. The needed strategic changes, in terms of far-reaching steps in the process were not met.

When I measured the degree of policy changes, just a handful of procedural changes were noticed. I observed programme changes only on a couple of occasions at the policy initiation stage. Adjustment changes were recorded on several other occasions in all the three stages of policy. Fundamental changes in policy goals were expected to be at the level of problem or goal changes and international orientation changes. None of those far-reaching changes was witnessed at any stage of the policy.

However, government's effort to implement some of the key procedural changes won it some reprieve at least in the press at the onset of war. So, while the strategic policy of embarking on war with Iraq was unchanged, some procedural issues, which formed the bulk of newspaper editorial and public

opinion demands, received official attention. As the evidence shows, most attention was given to mass media and public concerns at the policy initiation stage.

7.5 Suggestions for Further Research

In recognition of the findings in this study, further application of the stages of policy model would definitely improve on what we know of the foreign policy process. For example, the stages of policy model can be applied to Steven Livingston's (1997) claim that the type of military intervention determined media effects.

In a major attempt at "clarifying the CNN Effect," Livingston (1997, p1) proposed that "we need to discriminate between different foreign policies" when studying sensitivities to media and public pressures. He argued that there was "a possibility that different foreign policy objectives will present different types and levels of sensitivity to different types of media" (Livingston, Ibid). To illustrate, Livingston examined media effects on different types of military intervention. Official sensitivity at the stages of those different military interventions studied by Livingston's could be further researched to see how responsiveness varied according to the stages of policy. In fact, more empirical studies on different foreign policy issues, with the stages of policy process in view, will further validate the model as useful in the study of sensitivity in a variety foreign policy issues.

Equally, claims that the characteristics of political leaders affected their government's foreign policies (Dyson, 2006; Parmar, 2005; Margaret Hermann, 1980) could be tested with the stages of policy model. The model could be used to look at the foreign policy processes under the prime minister or president of another country to clarify if such a prime minister or president would be similarly responsive to the public. If the mass media and the public mounted similar pressures as I observed in Britain, will the prime minister or president respond differently at the different stages of policy despite his or her personal character?

Additionally, it is helpful to further examine the British foreign policy processes during the reign of another prime minister or another political party. This should be motivated by the same argument that the personal characteristics of political leaders or the ideology of the governing party would have an impact on the conduct of foreign policy (Dyson, 2006; Parmar, 2005; Margaret G. Hermann, 1980; Etheredge, 1978).

Kenneth Dyson (Ibid, p289) noted: "The British choice in Iraq has been characterized as 'Tony Blair's War,' with many believing that the personality and leadership style of the prime minister played a crucial part in determining British participation." Along the same line of thought, Margaret G. Hermann (Ibid, p12) suggested that the personal characteristics "interrelate to form a personal orientation to behaviour or a general way of responding to one's environment." According to her, "this personal orientation is transformed by the head of government into a general orientation to foreign affairs." In view of these findings, there are chances that under a different prime minister or

political party, the government might be more or less responsive to public and mass media demands. I do not expect dramatic differences in how officials respond at different stages of policy, but the intensity of those responses or resistance to them might be different under different leaders.

Personally, as I noted earlier, I wish I had the opportunity to study the policy review processes for a longer period to gain even better insights into the attitude of all the actors at that stage of policy. In fact, any of the three stages of policy could singularly be studied with the same purpose in mind: to have a clearer understanding of how policy actors relate at each of the three stages of the policy process. To look at other aspects of this study, I will now draw my conclusions on the research problem set out in chapters one, two and three. Also I will try to position this research among other key studies on state-media-public relations, especially in the context of international relations.

7.6 Conclusion on the Research Problem

In chapter one, I noted that two main groups of scholars viewed the influence of mass media and public opinion on foreign policy officials from extremes: as either so powerful they cannot be resisted (CNN Effect) or ineffectual (Manufacturing Consent). From the results of this study, it is very obvious that when employed, the stages of policy model would lead to a closer observation of how policy actors relate. As a result, it will lead to a better understanding of the processes of foreign policy. My findings confirm that studying only how

policy actors relate at the policy implementation stage is not far-reaching enough to fully understand how policy actors relate to each other in the process of foreign policy making.

I can also state that officials do not respond to mass media and public opinion policy proposals without necessarily weighing how those proposals compare with official policy plans. The idea that the media are all-powerful and able to compel officials to carry out their demands in the name of CNN Effect is not supported by this study. On the other hand, it did not find that officials to be impervious to mass media and public pressures. While officials were more responsive to public and mass media pressures at the policy initiation stage, evidently they tended to be much more focused on the policy objective at the policy implementation stage. Consequently, at the policy implementation stage, officials tended to be resistant to external pressures to make changes.

In short, the results of this study clearly confirm that officials respond differently to public and mass media demands at different stages of the policy process. The findings bear out my argument that the ideal way to study power relations among foreign policy actors is to look closely at how they relate at every stage of the policy process. In addition, the degree of public engagement, as confirmed in this study, shows that ignoring the public's role in the foreign policy process would amount to disregarding an attentive, rational and consistent group of actors in the policy process. In fact, turning a blind eye to the public's attitude to foreign policies could have dire political consequences for officials.

Furthermore, the stage of policy model has more than identified how officials act at the three stages of policy. More importantly, it has brought to light the attitude of other policy actors at the different policy stages. The attitudes of foreign policy officials are based on their understanding of the attitude of the public and the mass media to issues. This finding challenges some of those assumptions, especially the claim that officials always lead the public in the process of foreign policy. One example is John Dumbrell's claim that "most observers see public opinion responding to governmental leadership, rather than vice versa" (Dumbrell and Barret, 1990, p170). Kenneth Younger (1964, p22) also claimed that "international issues are relatively remote from daily life." Several of such scholars assumed that the members of the public depend solely on officials for guidance on foreign policy. Some also assumed that members of the public held no views before officials made foreign policy decisions known, (Zaller, 1994) and, as a result, officials would have no basis to be responsive to the public. My finding is that members of the public are active partakers in the foreign policy process.

Dumbrell also noted that "successful foreign policy has often been presumed to be antagonistic to open, democratic processes" (Dumbrell and Barret, 1990, p3) The so called closed process is thought to be even more associated with the British system. The British foreign policy process is severally described as "generally shielded from criticism and scrutiny" (Dumbrell and Barret Ibid, p2). Edward Herman (1993, p23) noted that the government could employ tactics "to keep the media compliant." If the foreign policy process in Britain were to be a consistently undemocratic process, it would mean that officials would be unreceptive of other views when making foreign policy. I did

not find that to be the case in this study. There were official sensitivity and responsiveness. However, the level of official responsiveness or resistance to public pressures depended on the stage of policy. Conversely, this study did not support the suggestion that “the media in general have always been able to force an ‘external’ set of priorities on foreign policy makers” because of their “technical capacity to cover the entire globe in ‘real time’” (Cohen, 1994, p9). In short, mass media impact on official attitude varied under the different circumstances characterising the different stages of policy.

In Table 7:6 below I summarize what I found to be the attitudes of officials, the public and the mass media during the three stages of policy. The table shows that the stages of policy have an impact on how policy actors behaved during the policy process. Those attitudes also had direct impacts on the type or grade of policy change that was attained.

| <i>Policy Stage</i> | <i>Official Attitude</i> | <i>Public Attitude</i> | <i>Attitude of the Mass Media</i> | <i>Grade of Policy Change</i> |
|---------------------|--|---|---|----------------------------------|
| Initiation | Open | Engaged, advocated policies | Engaged, advocated policies | Adjustment and Programme Changes |
| Implementation | Closed, mostly focused on policy execution | Engaged, supported official action | Engaged, supported official action, dependent on official sources | A few Adjustment Changes |
| Review/Evaluation | Guarded (Closed to the public) | Attentive. Importance of policy reduced | Disengaged | A few Adjustment Changes |

Table 7:6 Attitudes of policy actors in three stages of policy

As Table 7:6 above shows, official attitude to external pressure was found to be open or closed, depending on the stage of the policy process. It means,

therefore, that by adequately examining the whole policy process, I was able to answer the question I posed at the beginning of my study. I was able to confirm that officials were in different moods or had different attitudes towards the mass media and the public at different stages of the policy process.

During the policy initiation stage, officials were open to mass media and public policy inputs. On the other hand, I also found that officials were far from forced to “willy-nilly” (Cohen, 1994, p9) respond in line with public and mass media demands. Officials were responsive to those demands only to a degree.

Accepted that official responsiveness is found at the policy initiation stage, CNN Effect theorists should not stop at that stage but should also examine official attitude at other stages of policy. For instance, at the policy implementation stage, I found that officials were focused on policy execution and deliberations on policies were largely closed to public and mass media input. At this stage, public and mass media impact on policy was almost non-existent. The same trend was noted at the policy review stage. Although, officials publicly announced the commencement of the review process, the forum for public engagement in the process was not created.

Meanwhile, although the policy implementation and review stages were found to be "closed", they were not of the nature claimed by the manufacturing consent theorists: that the public and mass media play no role in the foreign policy process. As I found at the policy initiation stage, officials responded positively to some public and mass media demands. Additionally, for Manufacturing Consent theory, attention should not be focused on only one stage of policy. In fact, there should not be an assumption that official attitude

at a stage of policy is representative of all the stages of the policy process. Equally, I found that the attitudes of other policy actors were different or varied by degree at different stages of the policy process.

Before looking at those different attitudes, it is critically important to note that the British public, to varying degrees, were engaged in the process of the British Iraq policy. There was always a certain degree of public attentiveness to how officials handled the policy. That finding contradicts popular assumptions that ordinary citizens were disengaged, uninterested and confused about the foreign policy process (Powlick and Katz, 1998; Holsti, 1992 and Caspary, 1970). I found in many opinion polls at the policy initiation stage that the citizens were fully engaged and contributed to the shape of the Iraq policy.

Later at the policy implementation stage, citizens were equally engaged in the policy process. Similar to the policy initiation stage, polls during the policy implementation stage showed that respondents ranked foreign policy (especially the Iraq question) as the most important issue facing Britain. Although, a sizeable part of the population continued to demand for policy changes during the policy implementation stage (for example through anti-war demonstrations), polls showed that most citizens were supportive of the government at this stage of the policy. Earlier, I noted that the public's attitude could have resulted from the so called rally effect. That is the tendency the mass media and the public have to rally around the national flag during times of war (Allen and others, 2002; Schubert and others, 2002).

Furthermore, I found that the public continued to be attentive to how officials managed the Iraq policy. The policy was second only to immigration in what the public considered to be the most important issues facing Britain. In summary, as regards public attitude in the foreign policy process, the results of this study disprove the dominant idea in the literature that the members of the public were usually irrational, unsteady and disengaged in terms of foreign policy. Many opinion polls showed that the British publics were consistent, rational and engaged or attentive during the three stages of the Iraq policy.

I also found variation in the attitude of the British mass media in different aspects of their work in the stages of policy. Similar to what I found among citizens, the mass media were found to be involved or engaged in the process of policy making at the policy initiation stage. They advocated policy positions, although most of those positions centred on the process rather than the fundamental question of whether or not the Iraq war should be fought. By the number of editorials written during the policy implementation stage, there was no doubt the mass media were very engaged at the policy implementation stage. Similar to what I found among the citizens at this stage of policy, during the policy implementation stage, most of the mass media editorials changed from opposing the policy as they did at the initial stage of policy to be more balanced in their criticism of official policy actions.

In view of the number of editorial comments written at the policy review stage, I assume the mass media paid very little attention to the review of the Iraq policy. Previously, I suggested that the slow-moving nature of this stage of policy might have had contributed to the lack of mass media involvement at the policy review stage. As a result, I would argue that the reduced mass media and public interest might have emboldened officials to seize the initiative and dominate processes at the policy review stage. In addition, other aspects of public discontent, such as public demonstrations, were hardly visible. Significantly, little to no interest was shown in the mass media which are known as key conveyors of public attitudes or as the “force multiplier” (Livingston, 1997, p2).

Finally and most importantly, the type of policy changes recorded were different at the three stages of policy. In other words, the impact of public and mass media pressure were different at different stages of policy. At the policy initiation stage, there were adjustments in how officials processed policy in line with public demands. There were more far-reaching responses (programme changes) on some demands. They included, for example, demands for the recalling of the Cabinet and Parliament. Also, there was far-reaching response to the demand that government explained its rationale for going to war. Later, as the policy went into implementation and review stages, no substantial adjustments to policy were made.

More importantly, there were evidences of changes in aspects of the British Iraq policy but the degrees of changes were also different at different policy stages. Therefore, to fully understand official sensitivity to public opinion and

the mass media in foreign policy making, it is inevitable that we should examine how those actors relate at all the stages of the policy process. In the next section, I will further examine the implications of my findings for more of the known theories.

7.7 Application and Further Implications of Research Result for Key Theories

The result of this study brings further insight to some findings already made on decision making processes. On the subject, attention seems to be focused on domestic policies to explain official policy processes. But while citing studies by John Kingdon, Robert Durant and Paul Diehl (1989, p182) suggested that a “focus on foreign policy affords additional advantages in building a theory” on how governments reach decision on issues in the policy domain.

This study is in support of the emerging argument in the literature that “the domestic and foreign policy spheres are not totally dissimilar” (Durant and Diehl’s, Ibid). Official responsiveness in the domain of foreign policy as found in this study reflects similar degrees of responsiveness as Soule and King (2006) found in domestic policies. When John Kingdon (1973) found such similarities between foreign and domestic policies processes in the United States, it was received with caution because of the dangers of generalizing from US experiences only (Durant and Diehl, 1989). It is, therefore, important to have more policy processes in other policy environments. Such studies will attest to the universal applicability of the stages of policy model. In that

direction, this study has added to the understanding of policy processes by finding that foreign policy processes in Britain are considerably similar to domestic policy processes. Most important, in view of such similarities found in this study, officials should not be expected to respond in radically different ways to public and mass media pressures in domestic and foreign policies.

The fact that policy actors engage in policy processes and respond to other actors engaged in the processes is common to both domestic and foreign policies (Schlager and Blomquist, 1996, p652).

In terms of the public's sophistication, Powlick (1991, p611), who studied the American foreign policy processes, found that officials were marginally more positive about the public's sophistication than has been previously thought. He also found a major increase in the degree of input that officials feel the public should have into the foreign policy process. In this study, I found that British officials were more than marginally positive about mass media and public opinion at the policy initiation stage. It is, however, a matter for concern that while public attention at the policy review stage was stable and reasonably high, officials did not open a channel for public participation in the review.

Finally, in terms of how this study relates to other studies on mass media impact, I can see some similarities with Robinson's (2002) elite agreement and disagreement concepts. According to Robinson, mass media impact tends to be pronounced when there is elite disagreement and is drastically reduced when there is elite agreement. In terms of the stages of policy process model, there is a considerable degree of official responsiveness to

mass media and public demands at the point of policy initiation. This is the stage when policies would have hardly taken a reasonable form.

Just as Robinson noted, at this stage the policy elite are in disagreement on what course to take. Whereas Robinson identified the immediate cause of responsiveness as elite disagreement, going by the results of this study, it is actually because when policies are at their formative stages, officials and the rest of the elite corps are more open to policy ideas. That openness closes considerably as the policy process advances. I will now recap my main points in this chapter.

7.8 Summary

First, in this chapter, I restated the justification for this study. My principal reason is that studies on the influence of public opinion and mass media on foreign policy tend to ignore the fact that a foreign policy emerges in a process made up of stages. Some observe only the execution stage of the policy process and conclude that officials do not respond to mass media and public demands. Others observe how policy actors relate only at the initial stage of policy and conclude that the mass media, for example, was all powerful and control foreign policy makers. In this chapter, I reaffirmed why we should study how policy actors relate at all stages of the policy process. I argued that responsiveness, in fact, depended on the stage of policy. I also explained how I used both qualitative and quantitative methods to study mass media and

public opinion demands and then measured official responsiveness. By using the mixed methods, I was able to find both the nature and the degree of official responsiveness.

Furthermore, I examined the research question I posed in chapters one to three and found that the five supporting hypotheses I raised were largely supported. I also examined how this study is related to other studies in foreign policy and public policy making. Finally, I reviewed some of the limitations of this study and what other areas research could focus for a better understanding of the foreign policy process. Overall, I concluded by noting that officials responded differently at different stages of policy but they pay a high price if they ignored public concerns on the conduct of foreign policy at any stage of the process. As I will soon explain, Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Labour Party paid very dear prices for being insensitive at the later stages of policy.

If the rationale for official responsiveness is to make political and electoral gains, refusing to engage the public or respond to their concerns would lead to the reversal of political and electoral gains. Unwillingness to engage the public at the policy review stage of policy would lead to damaged public trust and confidence. Just as officials would want to carry the public along in terms of the initiation, execution and review of domestic policies, they should endeavour to engage the attentive public at all stages of the foreign policy process. Such a need becomes even more pronounced when there will be demands on citizens to pay a price for such a policy. The human price paid in

a war is so important that what should be a foreign policy usually dovetails into domestic politics.

The burdens of the Iraq policy for Labour Party governments under Mr Blair and later Mr Gordon Brown were clear pointers to why policy makers must not disregard public and mass media concerns about the direction of foreign policy. According to YouGov polls, the stand of the Labour Party, Blair and Brown in public view waned over time, starting from a commanding 12-point lead over the Conservative Party a few months before government's plan to attack Iraq. Labour and its government gained an 8-point lead when it made its case against Iraq in compliance with public and mass media demands. The party's lead in the polls hovered around eight points at the initial stages of the war. It took a deep, negative turn in the summer of 2003, ranging between one point lead to -4 points behind the Conservative Party. By January 2004, a month after the government announced its plan to review its policy, the Labour Party was -5 points behind the Conservative Party.

Although the Hutton Inquiry on the Iraq policy started about the same time that Labour's popularity waned, it is instructive that the period of unpopularity coincided with the period in the stage of policy that the government was not responsive to public concerns about the Iraq policy. The cloud of mistrust and unpopularity was lifted in brief intervals but it eventually swept Labour from power in a resounding electoral defeat in May 2010. The lesson is that officials should pay equal attention to public and mass media attitudes at all stages of policy.

In real terms, as this study shows, governments show certain degrees of pragmatism in deference to public and mass media demands; most times they strive to consistently follow their original policy plan. The common argument is that such official plans are well thought out and serve the long-term interests of the nation. Also, the British government was constrained on the degree of responsiveness to mass media and public opinion because of its desire to stick by foreign allies. Agreed that nations, for long-term strategic reasons, tend to stick to their allies, sometimes there are domestic prices to pay for such loyalty. The so called special relationship between the United States and Britain did not save the Labour government from public reproach for ignoring public concerns at different stages of the Iraq policy.

To conclude, this study demonstrates that officials respond differently at different stages of policy. They are more responsive at the policy initiation stage and marginally responsive as the policy progressed to implementation and review stages. It is, therefore, in the best interest of the mass media and leaders of public opinion to pile pressure on officials at the early part of policy if they wish to have influence on the direction of policy. It is also vital to note that officials pay a price for any period in the policy process when they are not responsive to public concerns.

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Appendix 1: Frequency and Nature of Newspaper Editorials

Frequency of newspaper editorials

| Sept 2002 (Dates) | Times | Telegraph | Guardian | Independent | Subtotal |
|----------------------|--------|-----------|----------|-------------|----------|
| 1 | Sunday | | | | |
| 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 8 | Sunday | | | | |
| 9 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 10 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 11 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 15 | Sunday | | | | |
| 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | |
|-------|--------|---|---|---|----|
| 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22 | Sunday | | | | |
| 23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 25 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 29 | Sunday | | | | |
| 30 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | 7 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 25 |

| March 2003 | <i>Times</i> | <i>Telegraph</i> | <i>Guardian</i> | <i>Independent</i> | subtotal |
|------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------|
| 1 | | | | | |
| 2 Sunday | | | | | |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| 4 | 1 | 1 | | | 2 |
| 5 | | | | 1 | 1 |
| 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| 7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 9 Sunday | | | | | |
| 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 11 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| 12 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 13 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 14 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| 15 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| 16 Sunday | | | | | |
| 17 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 |

| | | | | | |
|-----------|----|----|----|----|---------------|
| 18 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 19 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| 20 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 21 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| 22 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| 23 Sunday | | | | | |
| 24 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| 25 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| 26 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| 27 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 28 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| 29 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| 30 Sunday | | | | | |
| 31 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| Total | 29 | 23 | 29 | 20 | Total: 101 |

Nature of Editorials and Framing of Official Policy

| Category of policy | Media framing at initiation stage |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| • Rationale for war | |
| Regime change | 9 |
| Saddam intransigence | 7 |
| No justification | 0 |
| Bush/US vested interest | 1 |
| National interest | 6 |
| Prevent attack on Israel | 2 |
| Saddam's terrorist links | 1 |
| Eliminate terrorism | 0 |

| | |
|--|---|
| Eliminate Iraqi weapons threat | 5 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Downside of military action | |
| Iraq will be destabilized | 0 |
| Region will be destabilized | 1 |
| Will lead to more terrorists | 2 |
| Military casualties | 1 |
| Iraqi civilian casualties | 0 |
| Cost to tax payers | 0 |
| Anti-British (Western) feelings | 0 |
| Refugee problem | 0 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of government actions | |
| Critical | 4 |
| Commendation | 7 |
| Purposeful | 5 |
| Subservient to the US | 1 |
| Dismissive | 1 |
| Empathy | 3 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purpose/nature of editorial | |
| Advocacy | 9 |
| Analytical | 3 |
| Taking sides in elite debate | 4 |
| Descriptive | 3 |

| | |
|---|----|
| Endorsement of official position | 3 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mode/tone of editorial | |
| Derisive | 4 |
| Supportive | 7 |
| Tough | 4 |
| Insightful | 2 |
| Neutral | 0 |
| Demanding action | 8 |
| persuasive | 1 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sources mentioned | |
| British Prime Minister | 15 |
| British minister | 2 |
| US official | 3 |
| European official | 1 |
| Military | 0 |
| Political party official | 6 |
| UN official | 1 |
| Think-tank | 2 |
| Clergy | 2 |
| MPs | 1 |
| Unnamed government official | 1 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Projections into the future | |
| Clearly yes | 4 |
| Clearly no | 10 |

| Category of Policy | Frequency of Demand in Editorials at Policy Initiation Stage |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 2. On Military Intervention | |
| (a) in support | 4 |
| (b) caution | 3 |
| (c) opposed | 0 |
| (d) urgent action | 0 |
| 3 Produce evidence of WMD | |
| (a) Necessary before war | 1 |
| (b) helpful | 1 |
| (c) does not matter | 0 |
| (d) enough already produced | 2 |
| 3 Send back weapon inspectors | |
| (a) necessary | 3 |
| (b) helpful | 1 |
| (c) no need | 0 |
| 4 Second UN resolution to approve war | |
| (a) necessary | 1 |
| (b) helpful | 1 |
| (c) unnecessary | 0 |
| 5 Conflict avoidable | |
| (a) yes, through diplomacy | 2 |

| | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| (b) yes, depends on Saddam | 2 |
| (c) yes, through UN | 4 |
| (d) no, unavoidable | 0 |
| 6 How war should be fought | |
| (a) just UK and US enough | 0 |
| (b) multilateral action | 1 |
| (c) involve Iraqis/Arab states | 0 |
| (d) be steadfast | 0 |
| (e) enough troops needed | 0 |
| (f) shield Iraqi civilians | 0 |
| (g) provide humanitarian aid | 0 |
| 7 Nature of intervention | |
| (a) swift | 0 |
| (b) difficult and long | 0 |
| (c) complex | 0 |
| 8 Post war plans | |
| (a) Un mandate needed | 0 |
| (b) UN mandate not needed | 0 |
| (c) Un humanitarian role needed | 0 |
| (d) Allied nations' affair | 0 |
| 9 What to do with Saddam | |
| (a) exile | 1 |
| (b) fair trial | 0 |
| (c) execute | 0 |

| | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| (d) leave to Iraqis | 0 |
| 10 Checks and balances needed | |
| (a) parliamentary approval of war | 3 |
| (b) cabinet | 1 |
| (c) public opinion | 2 |
| (d) no need | 1 |

Appendix 2: Frequency, Nature and Weight of Official Responsiveness/Sensitivity

| September 2002 | Nature ⁵¹ of response | Number of responses | Type of response/sensitivity | Number of positive responses | Number of negative responses | Weight of official | Degree of change |
|----------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| 1 | 2,3 | 2 | 3,4 | 1 | 1 | 8,1 | -1,1 |
| 3 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1,-1 |
| 4 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | | 8 | 1,-1 |
| 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | 4 | -1 |
| 8 | 3,2 | 2 | 4,3 | 1 | 1 | 2,8 | 1,-1 |
| 9 | 3,2 | 2 | 3,3 | | 2 | 4,2 | -1,-1 |
| 10 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1,-1 |
| 11 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1,-1 |
| 12 | 1,4,3 | 3 | 4,3,4 | 2 | 1 | 8,6,6 | 2,-1,1 |
| 13 | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | -1 |
| 14 | 3,4 | 2 | 2,2 | | 2 | 2,6 | -1,-1 |
| 15 | 3 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | 6 | -1 |
| 16 | 4 | 1 | 3,4 | 1 | | 6 | 1 |
| 17 | 3,3 | 3 | 2,4,2 | 1 | 1 | 2,6,4 | -1,1, -1 |

⁵¹Key to table: (I)Nature of response – 1: press statement; 2: press conference; 3: press interview; 4: public statement; 5: parliamentary statement; 6: policy announcement

(III)Type of response: 1: acknowledgement; 2: dismissive; 3: defensive; 4:conciliatory; 5: persuasive; 6: extensive case

(VI) Weight of official: 1: undisclosed source; 2: senior official; 3: Downing Street; 6: Cabinet member; 8: Prime minister; 10: Cabinet

(VII) Degree of change: -1: dismissive; 1: adjustment; 2: programme; 3: problem/goal; 4: orientation

| | | | | | | | |
|--------|--|----|---------------------------------|----|----|--|--------------------------|
| 18 | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 6 | -1 |
| 21 | 4 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | -1 |
| 22 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | | 6 | 1 |
| 23 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 8 | -1 |
| 24 | 5,5 | 3 | 6,6,6 | 3 | | 8,6 | 2,-1, -1 |
| 25 | 4 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | 2 | -1 |
| 26 | 6 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | -1 |
| 28 | 1 | 1 | 1,5 | 1 | | 2 | 1 |
| 29 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | | 8 | 1 |
| 30 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | | 1 | 1 |
| Totals | 1(3), 2(6), 3(12), 4(7), 5(2),6(1) | 34 | 2(9),3(9) 4(11),5(1) 6(4) | 17 | 19 | 8(10), 6(9), 4(3), 2(8) 1(3) | 2(2) 1(13), -1(23) |

| March 2003 | Nature of response (I) | Number of responses (II) | Type of response/sensitivity (III) | Number of positive responses (IV) | Number of negative responses (V) | Weight of official (VI) | Degree of change (VII) |
|------------|---|--------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|------------------------|
| 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | -1 |
| 3 | 5 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | 6 | -1 |
| 4 | 4 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 6 | -1 |
| 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 8 | -1 |
| 7 | 4,3 | 2 | 2,1 | 1 | 1 | 6,4 | -1,1 |
| 10 | 6,5 | 3 | 2,2,3 | | 3 | 8,6,4 | -1,-1,-1 |
| 12 | 2,3 | 2 | 2,1 | 1 | 1 | 6,1 | -1,1 |
| 13 | 5 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | 6 | -1 |
| 16 | 2 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 8 | -1 |
| 17 | 5 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | -1 |
| 18 | 5 | 1 | 6 | | 1 | 8 | -1 |
| 20 | 6,4,5,6,6,6 | 6 | 1,2,2,2,2,5 | | 6 | 8,6,6,8 | -1(6) |
| 21 | 6,2,2,3 | 4 | 1,3,2,2 | | 4 | 8,6,6,1 | -1(4) |
| 23 | 2,3 | 2 | 3,2 | | 2 | 8,6 | -1,-1 |
| 24 | 1,3,5,6 | 4 | 1,2,4,2 | 2 | 3 | 8,4,6,8 | -1,1, -1,1 |
| 25 | 6 | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | -1 |
| 26 | 5 | 3 | 1,2,3 | | 3 | 6,1,4 | -1(3) |
| 27 | 6,2,1 | 3 | 1,2,3 | | 3 | 6,1,3 | -1(3) |
| 28 | 2,3,6 | 3 | 1,3,4 | 1 | 2 | 8,8,2 | 1,-1,-1 |
| 30 | 5,2 | 2 | 3,2 | | 2 | 6,6 | -1,-1 |
| 31 | 1 | 1 | 5 | | 1 | 8 | -1 |
| Totals | 1(3),2(8), 3(7), 4(3), 5(8),6(11) | 44 | 1(8),2(22), 3(9),4(2), 5(2),6(1) | 5 | 39 | 8(13), 6(16), 4(4),3(1) 2(2), 1(6) = 229 | 1(5), -1 (39) |